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Rational Beliefs as Produced by Computational Processes

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Abstract

Intelligent problem-solving depends on consciously applied methods of thinking as well as inborn or trained skills. The latter are like resident programs which control processes of the kind called (in Unix) daemons. Such a computational process is a fitting reaction to situations (defined in the program in question) which is executed without any command of a computer user (or without any intention of the conscious subject). The study of intelligence should involve methods of recognizing those beliefs whose existence is due to daemons. Once having been aware of so produced belief, one can assess it critically and, if possible and necessary, make it more rational. Eg, beliefs concerning properties of time are produced by a daemon-like intuition, likewise the Euclidean properties of space. The merit of getting aware of such daemon's activities, and so transforming implicit beliefs into explicit ones, lies mainly in the axiomatic characterization of the properties involved. That makes possible to improve a daemon-like conceptual equipment (producing beliefs) by suitable modifications of the axioms, or postulates. Such postulate sets can also define artificial daemons to either emulate or improve natural intelligence.

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Marciszewski, W. Rational Beliefs as Produced by Computational Processes. Foundations of Science 2, 87–106 (1997). https://doi.org/10.1023/A:1009635529026

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