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Pigouvian Taxes Under Imperfect Competition If Consumption Depends on Emissions

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Abstract

The paper considers environmental regulation of a consumption good and an externality which influence demand and costs in a nonseparable way. Under monopoly two instruments are always required for first-best. The Pigouvian tax is more complicated than anticipated.

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Authors and Affiliations

  1. Department of Economics, University of Oldenburg, D-26111, Oldenburg, Germany

    Udo Ebert

  2. Department of Economics, University of Oldenburg, D-26111, Oldenburg, Germany

    Oskar von dem Hagen

Authors
  1. Udo Ebert
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  2. Oskar von dem Hagen
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Ebert, U., von dem Hagen, O. Pigouvian Taxes Under Imperfect Competition If Consumption Depends on Emissions. Environmental and Resource Economics 12, 507–513 (1998). https://doi.org/10.1023/A:1008215019489

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1023/A:1008215019489

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