Abstract
This paper performs empirical tests of alternative auction models, based on the auctions of failed thrifts conducted by the Resolution Trust Corporation (RTC). RTC auctions are especially appealing because of the availability of a well-defined signal of underlying value as well as a measure of potential competition, both missing in previous studies of auctions of failed financial institutions. The evidence suggests that these transactions are best described as individual private value auctions and that they are significantly different from the takeovers of failed financial institutions previously studied.
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Gardner, R., Stover, R.D. The Role of Information in Resolution Trust Corporation Auctions of Failed Thrifts. Journal of Financial Services Research 14, 209–221 (1998). https://doi.org/10.1023/A:1008046330536
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1023/A:1008046330536