Abstract
The hypothesis that drug enforcementis relatively high in local jurisdictions where statelaws dictate that police retain seized assets istested in the context of a reduced-form equation ofthe supply and demand for drug enforcement. Theresults are robust across model specifications, someof which directly control for the level of drug use:legislation permitting police to keep seized assetsraises drug arrests as a portion of total arrests byabout 20 percent and drug arrest rates by about 18percent. Police bureaucrats apparently desirediscretionary budget increases, and they haveconsiderable discretion in determining resourceallocation.
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Mast, B.D., Benson, B.L. & Rasmussen, D.W. Entrepreneurial Police and Drug Enforcement Policy. Public Choice 104, 285–308 (2000). https://doi.org/10.1023/A:1005183918319
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1023/A:1005183918319