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Political Shirking, Opponent Quality, and Electoral Support

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Abstract

Several recent papers in the public choice literaturesuggest that legislators shirk, or vote in a mannercontrary to constituent interest. This paper exploresthe relationship between senatorial shirking andelectoral consequences. I model political shirking,opponent quality and election outcomes assimultaneous, and find significant evidence of arelationship between shirking over the senatorial termand electoral outcomes. However, I find that voterspunish recent shirking much more than they punishearly-term shirking, and that senators apparently actconsistently with this relationship.

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Authors and Affiliations

  1. Department of Economics, University of Florida, Gainesville, FL, 32611-7140, USA

    David N. Figlio

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  1. David N. Figlio
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Figlio, D.N. Political Shirking, Opponent Quality, and Electoral Support. Public Choice 103, 271–284 (2000). https://doi.org/10.1023/A:1005051613015

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