Abstract
In contrast to the traditional modeling of voter choice based on proximity, under directional models, selection of candidates is based on the direction and/or intensity of change from a status quo or neutral point. Voter choice can also be modeled as representing both approaches, e.g., as a directional model with proximity restraint, or alternatively, in terms of proximity to discounted positions.
We provide a unified perspective for these seemingly disparate models in terms of what we call “shadow” positions. We demonstrate that voter choice in a variety of spatial models including directional components can be viewed as proximity-based choices. Voters choose the candidate whose shadow is nearer, where shadow locations are defined by a simple transformation. We apply this approach to equilibrium analysis, showing that results for a discounted proximity model can be carried over – via shadows – to a variety of directional models.
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Merrill, S., Grofman, B. Conceptualizing voter choice for directional and discounting models of two-candidate spatial competition in terms of shadow candidates. Public Choice 95, 219–231 (1998). https://doi.org/10.1023/A:1004934108042
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1023/A:1004934108042