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Does Public Policy Crowd Out Private Contributions to Public Goods

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Abstract

It is sometimes claimed that individuals' contributions topublic goods are not motivated by economic costs and benefitsalone, but that people also have a moral or norm-basedmotivation. A number of studies indicate that such moral ornorm-based motivation might be crowded out, or crowded in, bypublic policy. This paper discusses some models that can yieldinsight into the interplay between economic and moral ornorm-based motivation for voluntary contributions to publicgoods, and compares their policy implications. We distinguishbetween five types of models: Altruism models, social normmodels, fairness models, models of commitment and thecognitive evaluation theory.

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Authors and Affiliations

  1. The Ragnar Frisch Centre for Economic Research, Gaustadalléen 21, N-0349, Oslo, Norway

    Karine Nyborg

  2. Department of Economics, Weatherhead School of Management, Case Western Reserve University, Cleveland, Ohio, 44106, U.S.A.

    Mari Rege

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  1. Karine Nyborg
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Nyborg, K., Rege, M. Does Public Policy Crowd Out Private Contributions to Public Goods. Public Choice 115, 397–418 (2003). https://doi.org/10.1023/A:1024245522958

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