Professor Jeeloo Liu’s article, “the metaphysical as the ethical: a pragmatist reading of Wang Yangming’s ‘The Mind Is the Principle’” (Liu, 2024), offers an original and thought-provoking interpretation of the metaphysics of Wang Yangming (王陽明, 1472–1529, art name of Wang Shouren王守仁) from the perspective of contemporary pragmatism, specifically as understood by Sami Pihlström and Hilary Putnam. I agree in general that Wang Yangming’s metaphysics has “a human face” and is rooted in human being’s copings with the world. In this paper, I wish to discuss two issues, one is the way in which the mind is interconnected with things, and the other is the interpretation of qi (vital force) in Wang Yangming’s thought.

1 “Xin wai wu wu” (心外無物, there is nothing external to the mind)

The whole structure of the article consists in laying bare three pragmatist metaphysical theses, and then use them to re-construct Wang Yanmging’s thought. The three theses are as follows: First, “metaphysics is a humanistic inquiry which centers on humans’ engagement with the world.” Second, “The world is structured by us through our practices of coping with the world, and in our thinking: what ought I to do?” Third, “Human reality is grounded on human values and humans’ ethical concerns” (Liu, 2024: 12).

In principle, I agree with Liu in describing Wang Yangming’s metaphysics by these three theses. I especially appreciate her defense of Wang Yangming against the criticism that he confounds fact with value. However, I have a bit reservation about the phrase “the world is structured by us.” I find this assertion incongruous with Wang Yangming’s thought, especially when Liu says, “To Wang Yangming, the human mind grounds reality in the sense that without its perception and cognition, the world would lack its categories and distinctions” (Liu, 2024: 9–10). “In Wang Yangming’s conception, particular things are categorized by us, and for us.” (Liu, 2024: 20) “Through the mind’s conceptual scheme, natural phenomena such as heaven, earth, and the myriad things are divided into their respective categories.” (Liu, 2024: 5) To support her claim, she quotes Wang Yangming’s saying, “My spiritual lucidity is the master of heaven and earth, ghosts and spirits. Without my spiritual lucidity, heaven would have no one to observe its height; without my spiritual lucidity, earth would have no one to detect its depth” (Wang, 2010: 136). However, Wang Yangming merely wants to emphasize that without the mind, there is no one to appreciate the magnitudes of Heaven and Earth. Here, the function of the mind is appreciation or value-perception, not conceptualization or categorization. In Wang Yangming’s thought, there is no Humean or Kantian epistemology in which the mind structures the empirical world in a logical order. The “lucidity” of the mind is compared not to a lens that creates the world of phenomena in which inputs of senses are synthesized in a certain structure with cognitive normativity. The mind is better compared to an active player in the world, or a mirror that reflects the value of things, not a mirror of representation in modern epistemology. If Wang Yangming would claim that “the world is structured by us” in any epistemological sense, he would have to answer the question, why do external things so miraculously fit our a priori cognitive system?

Most commentators of Wang Yangming would agree with Liu that “metaphysics is a humanistic inquiry which centers on humans’ engagement with the world” (Liu, 2024: 12). However, a point of contention among these commentators is whether the mind has another, yet higher, status as the ontological foundation of the world. Liu nicely distinguishes two kinds of realism, “Existence Realism” and “Independence Realism.” The former holds that external entities have mind-independent existence, while the latter maintains that “the nature of the entities in question is independent of our cognitive and linguistic activities” (Liu, 2024: 10). Liu holds that Wang Yangming endorses the former, but not the latter. Liu characterizes his thought as “commonsense realism.” I wonder whether Liu would allow us to imitate the phrases from Kant’s “empirical realism” and “transcendental idealism,” and call her interpretation of Wang Yangming a combination of “commonsense realism” and “cognitive-linguistic idealism.” Liu refrains from using “idealist” to depict Wang Yangming, but I think idealism still leaves some traces in her interpretation. I agree with Liu that Wang Yangming is not a “subjective idealist” like Berkeley, but that does not rule out other versions of idealism. Chen Shaoming 陳少明 and Chen Lisheng 陳立勝 both take Wang Yangming’s thesis “there is nothing external to the mind” to mean that the value, meaning, and significance of things are bestowed by the human mind (Chen, 2019: 179–202, Chen, 2014). I would label it “meaning idealism,” in contrast to Liu’s “cognitive-linguistic idealism.” The latter has the epistemological burden to explain the subject-object congruence as I previously mentioned, while the former does not.

In labeling Wang Yangming as “commonsense realism,” Liu seems to overlook the research literature in which Wang Yangming’s philosophy is interpreted as objective idealism. Mou Zongsan (牟宗三, 1909–1995), an influential modern Neo-Confucian philosopher, asserts that Wang Yangming has a “transcendent sense” of liangzhi (original knowledge of the good) in which liangzhi is, as Wang Yangming puts it, “the foundation of the existence of myriads of beings” (乾坤萬有基) (Mou, 2003: 285). Liu mentioned that Chen Lai 陳來 likens Wang Yangming’s view to Fichte’s concept of the “pure Ego” that is logically antecedent to the individual self and grounds all external things (Liu, 2024: 3). This shows that she was aware of the possibility of reading Wang Yangming towards this general theoretical direction. In fact, the notion of a universal mind that grounds both the individual mind and the whole world is not entirely foreign to Chinese philosophy. The Surangama Sutra (楞嚴經), a Sutra that first appeared in the Tang Dynasty in Southern China and became popular in the Song and Ming dynasties, states that all things in the world, including every individual’s mind and body, are founded in a universal mind (Lai, 2010: 43). Zhu Xi 朱熹 (1130–1200) was very familiar with this sutra. Wang Yangming’s contemporary, Luo Qinshun 羅欽順, believes that it was the source of the thought of Yang Jian楊簡(1141–1226), a disciple of Lu Jiuyuan (陸九淵, 1139–1193) (Luo, 1990: 79). Qian Mu suggests that it influenced Wang Yangming (Qian, 2004: 140–141). In fact, Wang Yangming need not learn it from Buddhism. The Northern Song dynasty Neo-Confucian Shao Yong (邵雍, 1012–1077) states, “the body was born after the Heaven and Earth, but the mind exists before them.” (身生天地後, 心在天地前, Shao, 2010: 501). Zhan Ruoshui (湛若水, 1466–1560), Wang Yangming’s friend, states that the mind is both all-encompassing (無所不包) and all-penetrating (無所不貫) (Huang, 2008: 878). Given the prevalence of the theoretic model of universal mind during Wang Yangming’s era, it should be an available option for his conceptualizing the mind and liangzhi.

Wang Yangming might indeed have in mind a similar metaphysical framework. He says, “Liangzhi is the spirit of creation. This spirit produces heaven and earth, spiritual beings, and the Lord. They all come from it. Truly nothing can be equal to this.” (Chan, 1963a: 216, modified). Chen Lisheng (2019: 282) points out that Wang Yangming’s phrase “…produces heaven and earth, spiritual beings, and the Lord” (生天生地,神鬼神帝) is referring to Laozi’s and Zhuangzi’s descriptions of Dao, and his sentence that “truly nothing can be equal to this” (真是與物無對) is borrowed from Cheng Hao’s (程顥, 1032–1085) assertion that “nothing can be equal to this Dao此道與物無對” (Chan, 1963b: 523, modified). Thus, Wang Yangming’s underlying intention is to equate liangzhi with Dao. Here, liangzhi carries a dual meaning: while it typically denotes an individual’s moral capability, it can also refer to the universal mind, which is Dao. The individual’s liangzhi partakes in the ceaseless creativity of the all-encompassing universal Dao, which implies that nothing is external to liangzhi or the mind.

The source of discrepancy in interpreting Wang Yangming’s metaphysics lies in how to categorize “xin” (heart/mind) and “liangzhi.” Liu analyzes meticulously the capabilities of the xin of an individual (Liu, 2024: 5), which is very helpful. However, Wang Yangming frequently employs “xin” and “liangzhi” not merely in the sense of the subjectivity of an individual, but in an ontological sense in which xin and liangzhi is much more encompassing. For instance, he says, “Liangzhi is Change (i.e., the Dao of changes represented by the Book of Change), as the Way, it changes frequently.” (良知即是易, 其為道也屢遷. Chan, 1963a: 260, modified). He says, “This substance of the mind is what we call Dao” (這心體即所謂道, Wang, 2010: 16). Elsewhere he says, “The mind is the Dao, and the Dao is Heaven. If one knows the mind, he knows both the Dao and Heaven.” (心即道, 道即天, 知心則知道、知天. Chan, 1963a: 47, modified). In this regard, the mind is not just the subjective mind but also the ontological universal mind. Nothing exists outside the mind, not only because all things are interconnected with the subjective mind, either practically, cognitive-linguistically (as per Liu), or through the mind’s meaning-bestowing (as per Chen Shaoming and Chen Lisheng), but also because the mind is by nature identical to the universal mind in an ontological sense. Even Wang Yangming’s renowned passage about the blossoming tree can be read in this light,

The Teacher was roaming in Nan-chen. A friend pointed to flowering trees on a cliff and said, “[You say] there is nothing under heaven external to the mind. These flowering trees on the high mountain blossom and drop their blossoms of themselves. What have they to do with my mind?”

The Teacher said, “Before you look at these flowers, they and your mind are in the state of silent vacancy (同歸於寂). As you come to look at them, their colors at once show up clearly. From this you can know that these flowers are not external to your mind.” (Chan, 1963a: 222)

We should note that Wang Yangming’s words “同歸” (both belong to) and “寂” (ji, silent vacancy) refers to the Commentaries on the Book of Change (易傳):

Change (i.e., the Dao of changes) has neither thought nor action, because it is in the state of absolute quiet (ji, 寂) and inactivity, and when acted on, it immediately penetrates all things. (易, 無思也, 無為也, 寂然不動, 感而遂通天下之故. Chan, 1963b: 267)

What is there in the world to think about or to deliberate about? In the world there are many different roads but the destination is the same (同歸). There are a hundred deliberations but the result is one. What is there in the world to think about or to deliberate about? (子曰: 天下何思何慮? 天下同歸而殊途, 一致而百慮, 天下何思何慮! Chan, 1963b: 268)

Remember that Wang Yangming explicitly says, “liangzhi is Change (i.e., the Dao of changes),” so it is warranted to use the resource of the Book of Change to interpret Wang Yangming’s words. The two passages share a common theme that ideally there is no need of calculative or deliberative thinking. Before there is any such thinking, the world was in a state of undifferentiated unity, like a root from which all beings sprout. If one can nurture a strong sense of connection with this root, then one’s mind can engage with external things with a penetrating understanding of the multiplicity of things. Mystical though it seems, it has been one aspect of the tradition of the philosophy of Change. Neo-Confucianism, since the time of Cheng Hao, has emphasized that there is an undifferentiated unity between the mind and the world even before the mind consciously reflects it. In this sense, when Wang Yangming says, “Before you look at these flowers, they and your mind are in the state of silent vacancy (同歸於寂).” He is alluding to the Book of Change’s idea that the mind and its objects belong to a larger unity of being. Since liangzhi is Change, and the mind is Dao, the blossoming tree is not external to my mind in the sense that it is not external to the substance of my mind, which is the universal mind.

In a word, although I agree with Liu that Wang Yangming is not a subjective idealist like Berkeley, this does not rule other possibilities of idealism. Liu has only attacked the most implausible version of idealist reading of Wang Yangming, but did not consider other versions of idealism.

2 “Yi qi liu tong” (一氣流通, interconnected by the same qi)

As I have interpreted the famous “blossoming tree” dialogue in terms of oneness, the concept of qi (vital force) is highly pertinent. Now I turn to the second point I wish to discuss about Liu’s interpretation. She states, “Another philosophical evidence of Wang Yangming’s anti-idealism bent is his commitment to qi-naturalism.” (Liu, 2024: 6). I agree that Wang Yangming’s sayings about qi show that he does not negate that there exist things beyond an individual’s mind. Qi forms the universe, and gives life to humanity. Even the mind of an individual cannot emerge without the refined qi. This view rejects subjective idealism. However, it does not mean that Wang Yangming is a qi-naturalist. It all depends on what “naturalism” means. Naturalists typically proclaim to ally philosophy with natural science, often reducing all mental properties to physical ones. This reductionist tendency is far from what Wang Yangming would endorse. For Wang Yangming, qi is never merely material. Qi is typically pervasive and continuous, encompassing both mental and physical dimensions. Even plants have liangzhi and empathize with broken tiles and stones (Chan, 1963a: 272). In this sense, his position aligns more with panpsychism, which Liu rejects (Liu, 2024: 15), than with the typical reductionist version of naturalism.Footnote 1 I guess by qi-naturalism Liu does not mean materialism, because, in her book Neo-Confucianism: Metaphysics, Mind, and Morality, she carefully explains that Zhang Zai and Wang Fuzhi’s qi-centered cosmology is not materialism, because qi is not just matter (Liu, 2017: 77, 104). Then why does Liu still emphasize that Wang Yangming is a qi-naturalist? If not materialism, what else could qi-naturalism suggest? If it means to stress that there is nothing “supernatural,” it is not the concern for Wang Yangming, and finds no place in his philosophical agenda at all. Liu admits that Wang Yangming’s view is “more liberal than contemporary commonsense realism, in that he also acknowledges the existence of immaterial things such as spirits and ghosts.” (Liu, 2024: 9). To make it even more complicated, Zhu Xi also acknowledges that all things are composed of qi, that the mind of individuals could not emerge without the refined qi, and that qi has existed since the beginning of the universe. Hence, the term “qi-naturalist” could categorize almost all Neo-Confucians, it is too broad to be truly useful as a label.

Liu cites Wang Yangming’s statement that all things are “interconnected by the same qi” (一氣流通) twice, as evidence that Wang Yangming acknowledges the existence of external things independent of the human mind. However, what Wang Yangming emphasizes is the contrary, namely, that the liangzhi and the world are mutually interdependent for existence, because they form one body. Liu quotes Wang Yangming’s saying,

For heaven, earth, ghosts, spirits, as well as myriad things, apart from my spiritual lucidity there wouldn’t be anything; at the same time, without them, there also wouldn’t be my spiritual lucidity. In this manner, [the world and I] have one qi penetrating both (yiqi liutong 一氣流通). How could one be separated from the other? (Liu, 2024: 9).

Following that quote, Liu writes, “This remark highlights the interdependence of the perceiver and the perceived. Since both the world and the perceiving subject are real, the world itself must not be dependent on the mind for its existence.” (Liu, 2024: 9) However, Wang Yangming explicit uses the sentence structure: “Without A, there is no B, and without B, there is no A.” This is a strong claim about the interdependency for existence, so how could we infer from it that A does not depend on B for its existence?

As to the other occurrence of Wang Yangming’s phrase, “interconnected by the same qi” (一氣流通), unfortunately, Liu only cites the second half of the entire passage and therefore misrepresents the meaning. The second half of the passage as quoted by Liu is as follows,

Wind, rain, dew, thunder, sun, moon, stars, animals, beast, grass, trees, mountains, rivers, earth, stones—these all share the same substance (yiti一體) as human beings. This explains why grains and animals can nourish people; herbs and stone needles can be utilized to heal human illness. All things share this one qi; hence they are interconnected (xiangtong 相通) (Liu, 2024: 9).

Liu then explains, “In this remark, he clearly acknowledges the existence of commonsense objects.” However, right before this second half of the passage, the first half of the passage reads,

Chu Pen-ssu asked, “Man has innate knowledge because he possesses pure intelligence. Have such things as plants and trees, tiles and stones innate knowledge also?”’ The Teacher said, “The innate knowledge of man is the same as that of plants and trees, tiles and stones. Without the innate knowledge inherent in man, there cannot be plants and trees, tiles and stones. This is not true of them only. Even Heaven and Earth cannot exist without the innate knowledge that is inherent in man. For at bottom Heaven, Earth, the myriad things, and man form one body. The point at which this unity is manifested in its most refined and excellent form is the clear intelligence of the human mind (Chan, 1963a: 221-222, italic added).

This whole passage appears directly before the passage of the dialogue about the blossoming trees in the same volume of Wang Yangming’s Chuanxilu. It is highly relevant to our topic. The sentence I highlighted above is especially unfavorable to Liu’s interpretation. I agree with Liu that Wang Yangming is not a subjective idealist, but Liu does not rule out other possibilities such as “objective idealism.” I really wish to avoid imposing such labels on Chinese philosophy, because it can easily become a “Procrustean” exercise. According to Wang Yangming’s “Inquiry on the Great Learning,” liangzhi is a shared attribute of all living beings. All things in the world form a unified body, and the living beings in this one-body have the awareness of being interconnected with one another. This awareness emerging from the one-body is referred to as liangzhi. (Chan, 1963a: 272). Wang Yangming uses qi to elaborate this interconnectedness: Herbs and stone needles can heal human illness, this shows that their qi enters into each other. This is used as a heuristic analogy about interconnection to suggest that human liangzhi is shared by animals and plants. Similarly, in the “blossoming tree” dialogues, Wang Yangming uses the immediacy of perception (“As you come to look at them, their colors at once show up clearly.”) to suggest that these flowers are not external to the mind. These two arguments in two adjacent passages are symmetrical. Both serve to illustrate the logical connection between oneness and liangzhi.

To conclude, I believe that Professor Jeeloo Liu’s article is an important contribution to the field of comparative philosophy between Neo-Confucianism and contemporary trends of thought. Although I disagree with some of her interpretations, especially in the interpretation of Wang Yangming’s passages about the mind, liangzhi, and qi, I generally agree that there is much room to explore in the dialogue between the Lu-Wang School of mind and pragmatism. In the history of philosophy, pragmatists held diverse positions in the philosophy of mind, such as Charles Sanders Peirce’s idealism and William James’s neutral monism. We may expect further philosophical dialogues to evolve between these two great traditions.