Abstract
Harry Frankfurt had insightfully pointed out that an agent acts freely when he acts in accord with the mental states with which he identifies. The concept of identification rightly captures the ownership condition (something being one’s really own), which plays a significant role in the issues of freedom and moral responsibility. For Frankfurt, identification consists of one’s forming second-order volitions, endorsing first-order desires, and issuing in his actions wholeheartedly. An agent not only wants to φ but also fully embraces his desire to φ (and φ). Frankfurt’s official theory above encounters some serious problems, especially since it is believed that his concept of wholehearted identification is too strong to be necessary for freedom. In this paper, I propose that we can uncouple identification from wholeheartedness and thus get two different senses of identification: weak identification and strong identification. Then, I argue that this distinction does a better job than Frankfurt’s official theory. On the one hand, weak identification is enough for ownership and freedom and thus more promising than strong identification; on the other hand, this distinction has an attractive implication that it fits well with our intuition about the degree of freedom and responsibility.
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Notes
In this paper, by saying freedom, I refer to the necessary condition of moral responsibility.
I focus on the ownership condition issuing in one’s practical life. Thus, unless otherwise specified, mental states in this paper refer to motivational elements which move one to act, such as desires, urges, and carvings.
I believe that besides the authority requirement, there is the authenticity requirement of ownership (see, for example, Frankfurt, 1988: 65). For example, we might admit some vices (laziness, envy, etc.) as our own while we endeavor to overcome them. In other words, authority tells us that some states are our own and we long to maintain them; authenticity tells us that some states are our own while we have to accept them.
To say a certain desire is a raw material, according to Frankfurt, is to say its occurrence is not up to its owner. For example, my desire to bread occurs when I am hungry, meanwhile I do not create this desire.
Some argue that desires are not just raw materials, they are results of one’s deliberative processes (see Christman 1991; Smith 2004). For example, my desire to learn French might be a deliberate one. I could identify with this desire in creating it, but not in reflecting on it. I agree with them in some important respects. But I believe that those desires are not counterexamples to identification. But for now, I posit that first-order desires are raw materials.
Note that freedom of will is not required for moral responsibility, on Frankfurt’s view. By saying “securing,” the freedom of will requires alternative possibilities: “Whatever his will, then, the will of the person whose will is free could have been otherwise; he could have done otherwise than to constitute his will as he did” (Frankfurt, 1988: 24). But Frankfurt also claims that this so-called “principle of alternate possibilities” (PAP) is unnecessary for moral responsibility. Frankfurt-Style Counterexamples (FSCs) illustrate this point well. Combine Frankfurt’s acceptance of “freedom of will requires PAP” and his rejection of “PAP is not required for moral responsibility,” the conclusion is that freedom of will is not required for moral responsibility. Frankfurt contends that freedom required for moral responsibility is the freedom of action I conclude in this paragraph.
Later, in “The finest passion,” Frankfurt improves his concept of wholeheartedness, replacing the act of deciding with the state of self-satisfaction (Frankfurt, 1999). I believe that the latter is better than the former. But this difference is irrelevant here, for both are in common with respect to the fact that wholeheartedness requires forming second-order volition without any reservation, and this is all my point about the concept of wholeheartedness.
Some might reply that S’s decision is not arbitrary, for S cares about his desire and decision. According to Frankfurt, it is the case because S has a second-order volition endorsing his desire to A (thanks to the reviewer for pointing out this issue). However, I am afraid that Frankfurt’s criterion for “caring” (one cares about a thing if he forms endorsing second-order volition concerning this thing) is untenable, as it allows the agent to form volitions capriciously and irresponsibly. Even with wholehearted endorsement, if the agent forms volition in the abovementioned manner, whether he really takes his desire to A seriously is quite questionable.
I aim to uncouple identification and wholeheartedness and propose that the weak identification is more proposing. Therefore, there remains a puzzle. How can identification without wholeheartedness resolve the problem of arbitrariness? I will return to this issue at the end of Section 4, where I roughly propose that to resolve the problem of arbitrariness, weak identification requires appealing to some conditions without involving wholeheartedness. I thank the reviewer for pointing out this issue.
Later, Watson finds that he wrongly identifies values with better judgments, one’s valuing φ consist of one’s better judgments of φ and motivational inclinations to φ (see Watson, 1987). But here this point doesn’t matter.
It is worthy to note that Stump’s concepts of “intellect” and “goodness.” As Stump has emphasized, “an agent’s intellect may formulate a reason for an action in a manner that is hasty, thoughtless, ill-informed, invalid, or in any other way irrational” (Stump 1988: 400). In other words, Stump permits the good to be irrational.
I agree with them largely with respect to the issue of authority. However, as I have noted in footnote 3, besides authority requirement, there is another authenticity requirement (consider virtues and vices in us are really ours). And I believe that identificationist theorists I have mentioned neglect this issue, except Frankfurt, for he definitely claims that one could identify with desires of which he disapproves (see Frankfurt 1888: 65). How identificationist theorists formulate the authenticity requirement is another big question; however, here, I have no space to address this issue.,
Some reject the idea of degree responsibility. I do not claim that accepting this idea is the unavoidable consequence of distinguishing weak identification from strong identification. But it is a puzzle to those rejecters if they still endorse this distinguishment: if weak identification is sufficient and necessary for freedom, then what role does strong identification play in our practical life? Maybe some adopt this stance: being stronger than weak identification, strong identification is the better candidate for exercising a stronger form of agency than free agency, for example, self-governance, see Mitchell-Yellin (2015). This standpoint is similar to mine. It is committed to the view that human agency is a matter of degree (so do I), even though they do not connect it with freedom and moral responsibility where we come apart.
Strawson continues that one is morally responsible unless he can be exempted. The thesis of determinism does not always exempt us from moral responsibility. In this sense, Strawson is a compatibilist.
As I understand, there are two different models of degree freedom and responsibility. Model 1, as I have mentioned, concerns two (or more) agents might differ in freedom and responsibility while they perform one same action. Model 2 focuses on the possibility that the same agent could be free and responsible to different degree when he is in different scenario. For example, our akratic dieter Joe is free when he drinks cokes. However, Joe would be freer and more responsible when he chooses to reject cokes based on his better judgment. The distinction between weak identification and strong identification is capable of accounting the difference of Joe’s two actions: when Joe drinks cokes, he just identifies with his akratic action weakly, whereas Joe strongly identifies with his enkratic action of rejecting cokes.
Note that the inference from strong/weak identification to a degreed notion of freedom and responsibility seems too quick and heavily relies on our intuitions (thanks to the reviewer for pointing out this issue). However, throughout this section, I aim to underscore that “the distinction supporting the degree thesis” is promising for identificationist theory, and indeed, through my argument, we have some good reasons to accept this support.
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Yajun, C. Frankfurt’s concept of identification. AJPH 3, 32 (2024). https://doi.org/10.1007/s44204-024-00168-5
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s44204-024-00168-5