Abstract
Standard views about metaphysical structure presume that if metaphysical structure is hierarchical, any priority ordering of individuals is rigid or situationally invariant. This paper challenges this presumption. The challenge derives from an effort to interpret the kind of metaphysical structure implicit in writings central to the Huayan tradition of Chinese Buddhism. The Huayan tradition views reality as a realm of thoroughgoing interdependence. Close attention to primary sources indicates that this view does not fit comfortably in any of the metaphysical structures familiar from contemporary analytic metaphysics. Accordingly, this paper also develops a conception of metaphysical structure that rejects the standard presumption. Motivation for this conception derives from attending to certain formal analogies between kinds of metaphysical structure and kinds of social organization. These analogies provide guidance for a conception of metaphysical structure as heterarchical or situationally variable. This conception breaks new ground for analytic metaphysics and opens conceptual space for interpreting Huayan metaphysics as a heterarchical variation of foundationalism.
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Notes
For a similar notion of foundation, see Rabin & Rabern, 2016, p. 363.
Author’s translation. For an alternative translation, see Chödrön (2001, p. 1717).
Author’s translation. For an alternative translation, see Cleary (1993, p. 925).
Author’s translation. For an alternative translation, see Cleary (1983, p. 66).
Author’s translation. For an alternative translation, see Cleary (1983, pp. 135–136).
Author’s translation.
Author’s translation. For an alternative translation, see Cleary (1983, p. 66).
Author’s translation. For an alternative translation, see Cleary (1983, p. 136).
Author’s translation. For an alternative translation, see Cook (1970, p. 512).
Fazang’s view seems to have some affinities to Fine’s External Relative Non-standard Realism, albeit with respect to metaphysical structure rather than with respect to tense. See Fine (2005). Specifically, Fazang seems to endorse analogues to Fine’s principles of Realism, Neutrality, and Coherence while rejecting Absolutism. I thank Michael Clark for suggesting the connection to Fine’s work.
Author’s translation. For an alternative translation, see Cook (1970, pp. 474–475).
Coherentist interpretations of Huayan metaphysics interpret interdependence as a matter of simultaneous mutual inclusion. This requires that when one has complete power as cause, all others also have complete power as cause. Yet, for Fazang, when one has complete power as cause, all others completely lack power as cause. Insofar as having power and lacking power track distinct ontological aspects of individuals, Fazang’s remarks about mutual inclusion are inconsistent with coherentist interpretations of Huayan metaphysics.
See T45.1866.502a16-18, recited in Cook (1970, p. 450). The conception of projecting one’s own effect is narrower than the conception of having a disposition to produce an effect. The reason is that effects can arise from individuals despite having no connection to the specific characteristics of those individuals. Suppose, for example, that friendliness is the specific characteristic loving-kindness. Then instances of loving-kindness project friendship. Yet even if loving-kindness also has a disposition to reduce stress, instances of loving-kindness do not project stress reduction.
Inclusion, as Fazang conceptualizes it, is a matter of one including another within its range of power rather than within its spatial or temporal location. When x includes y, in Fazang’s technical sense of include, the range of effects over which x has power includes whatever effects y projects.
I thank Andrew Cling for helpful discussion on this point.
I thank an anonymous referee for helpful comments on this point.
Strictly speaking, Kant’s analogy between animal organisms and the ideal state concerns ways of judging organismic and ideal political relations (Huseyinzadegan, 2018, pp. 2558–2560). This subtle difference, between ways of judging relations and the relations themselves, does not affect the point of the example.
Rothbard defines an anarchist society as one in which “there is no legal possibility for coercive aggression against the person or property of any individual” (Rothbard, 1978, p. 191). Rothbard’s anarchist society is an anarchism with respect to social power that involves legally authorizes coercive aggression.
Sahlins assigns the label egalitarian to any social organization that lacks asymmetric power relations: “an egalitarian society is one in which every individual is of equal status…and no one outranks anyone” (Sahlins, 1958, p. 1). Sahlins’ labeling coincides with egalitarianism, as defined in the main text, provided that individuals have equal status by virtue of mutually occupying positions of power over each other. If all individuals have equal status by virtue of none occupying a position of power over another, then anarchism, as defined in the main text, qualifies as an egalitarian social organization in Sahlins’ sense of egalitarian.
Abbreviations
- Ch.:
-
Chinese
- CJP :
-
Critique of the Power of Judgment
- Skt.:
-
Sanskrit
- T:
-
Taishō Shinshū Daizokyō 大正新脩大藏經 [Buddhist Canon Newly Compiled during the Taishō Era (1912–1926)]. 100 vols. Takakusu Junjirō 高楠順次郎, Watanabe Kaikyōku 渡辺海旭 et al., eds. Tōkyō: Taishō Issaikyō Kankōkai, 1924–1934. Digitized in CBETA (https://www.cbeta.org)
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Jones, N. Metaphysical foundationalism, heterarchical structure, and Huayan interdependence. AJPH 2, 65 (2023). https://doi.org/10.1007/s44204-023-00117-8
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s44204-023-00117-8