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Pragmatic infallibilism

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Abstract

Infallibilism leads to skepticism, and fallibilism is plagued by the threshold problem. Within this narrative, the pragmatic turn in epistemology has been marketed as a way for fallibilists to address the threshold problem. In contrast, pragmatic versions of infallibilism have been left unexplored. However, I propose that going pragmatic offers the infallibilist a way to address its main problem, the skeptical problem. Pragmatic infallibilism, however, is committed to a shifty view of epistemic certainty, where the strength of a subject’s epistemic state can vary depending upon the practical context. Pragmatic views of epistemic strength are quite radical so the argumentative goal of my discussion is to argue for its plausibility, thereby arguing for the plausibility of pragmatic infallibilism. To do so, I discuss the role that the framing of decision problems and the construction of our deliberative attitudes have in our theories of rational choice. And I explore a way in which these necessary components of a normative theory of rationality can be used to motivate pragmatic views of evidential support. Finally, since the plausibility of our pragmatic account will depend upon the plausibility of a constructive account of rational choice, I conclude by comparing the adequacy of the constructive account with orthodox Bayesian and knowledge-based accounts.

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Notes

  1. Pragmatic accounts of knowledge have also been motivated by the ordinary use of “knows” as well as the epistemic norms that connect knowledge and action. See Kim (2017) for an overview of the types of arguments given for pragmatic encroachment.

  2. See BonJour (2010) for a discussion of the threshold problem. For an example of a pragmatic solution, see Fantl and McGrath (2009:26).

  3. Brown (2018:11) observes that “while in principle such a shifty infallibilist view could take the form of any of contextualism, relativism, or pragmatic encroachment, it’s been developed in most detail for contextualism.”

  4. “Our advice to fallibilists is this: if you don’t want to budge on skepticism, at least think about budging on purism.” Fantl and McGrath (2009: 29)

  5. Dutant (2007) offers a detailed discussion of the competing accounts.

  6. This is derived from the definition of fallibilism found in Fantl and McGrath (2009). Epistemic chance is a measure of the likelihood of a proposition p given the strength of a subject’s epistemic state with respect to p. I will largely use epistemic probability to talk about epistemic chance. However, this assumption is simply for ease of discussion and plays no important justificatory role.

  7. While this view of epistemic certainty is inspired by Lewis (1996), I will appeal to a different view of evidence and relevant possibilities.

  8. The two notable exceptions are Weatherson (2018) and Mueller (2021) along with a critical discussion in Comesaña (2013). I also discussed this view in Kim (2019). I contrast my approach with Mueller’s below.

  9. This proposal comes from DeRose (2009: fn. 25).

  10. Gao (2019)

  11. Page 142, Mueller (2021). Thanks to Andy Mueller for discussion on these points.

  12. Kim (2014) – Anonymized reference to author’s paper.

  13. Schroeder (2021) offers the most fully worked out reason-theoretic approach to these issues. In contrast, early work by Fantl and McGrath (2002) and the work of Weatherson (2012) have been situated within a decision-theoretic framework.

  14. Shafer (1986a:464)

  15. The discussion in Tversky and Kahneman (1985) of framing effects and the literature following the discovery of preference reversals, documented in Lichtenstein and Slovic (2006), have both pointed to the importance of framing in understanding choice behavior.

  16. These two elicitation methods are respectively labeled the P-bet and $-bet in Lichtenstein and Slovic (1971).

  17. Shafer (1986a: 464-465)

  18. In Kim (2014), I offer a detailed discussion of the normative significance of preference reversals and offer an alternative normative interpretation of subjective expected utility theory. I will simply summarize some of those claims here.

  19. Many are dissatisfied with the minimal coherence constraints imposed by SEU. For example, objective Bayesians have proposed additional principles of rational belief (e.g., Jaynes’ entropy maximization). Broome (1991) has argued for rational requirements of indifference. While many of these approaches are compatible with the constructive point of view, they do not appear amendable to the pragmatic approach we are developing.

  20. Shafer proposes that we interpret SEU in a constructive way by viewing the theory as one that helps us to construct rational preferences. While I agree with this interpretation, the theory is incomplete and inadequate as I discuss in Sect. 3.

  21. See the essays in Sects. 3 and 5 of Lichtenstein and Slovic (2006)

  22. Thomason (1986) and Norby (2015) provide some examples. In Kim and Vasudevan (2017), we also explore a context-sensitive account of belief and acceptance.

  23. Shifty views of evidence have been discussed in somewhat disparate ways without too much interaction. Neta (2003) and Beddor (2020) propose contextualist views of “evidence” that may seem similar. But contextualist accounts are best viewed as competitors to the pragmatic account. In the parallel debate about “knows” and knowledge, contextualist and pragmatic accounts are typically viewed as offering competing accounts of the same phenomena. In theory, contextualism is silent about the metaphysical pragmatic encroachment thesis about knowledge-relations. However, in practice, contextualists are at odds with pragmatists over how to explain the relevant data. The same applies to the debate about the context sensitivity of evidence and evidential probability.

  24. Diaconis et al. (2007)

  25. For additional arguments that we should not consider every possibility whose probability is greater than zero, see chapter 4 of Comesaña (2020)

  26. Thus, this is practically impossibility for any rational agent and not just a limit for human beings at a given time.

  27. In Kim (2014), I argue that while this type of all-things-considered rationality can govern some type of activity, it is not an activity that is within the realm of human possibility. And if that is the case, then these principles do not apply to us. To be clear, I am not trying to distinguish bounded rationality from ideal rationality. Rather, I am claiming that this unfettered all-things-considered rationality has no normative import whatsoever.

  28. Friedman and Halpern (2013) have proposed that plausibility measures are the most general measures of uncertainty and thus can be seen as a generalization of probability measures.

  29. Descartes (1984:14-15)

  30. “It would be disingenuous, however, not to point out that some things are considered as morally certain, that is, as having sufficient certainty for application to ordinary life, even though they may be uncertain in relation to the absolute power of God.” Descartes (1984:289-290)

  31. The epistemology of plausibility should articulate the factors that determine how plausible an alternative is. So one would need more than just an account of the formal structure of plausibility measures. For an example of a parallel investigation, Gardiner (2020) uses a relevant alternatives framework to explore the epistemology of risk, identifying some factors that contribute to the remoteness or relevance of an alternative. However, Gardiner’s analysis of relevant alternatives cannot simply be substituted for our analysis of plausible alternatives. Gardiner notes that the epistemology of risk should allow for the risks of relying on false beliefs and should not commit to the activity of eliminating all relevant alternatives. So a theory of epistemic certainty, which I assume is active, will look quite different than the theory of epistemic risk even if both appeal to the same framework.

  32. Shafer and Tversky (1985:300)

  33. Much of this section is borrowed from Kim (2012).

  34. Shafer and Tversky (1985:316)

  35. Shafer and Tversky (1985:316)

  36. Shafer and Tversky (1985:316)

  37. This approach is inspired by the account proposed in Chang and Fisher (2011). They argue that “evidence” is a “intrinsically contextual concept.” (Ibid 2011: 346). And they offer an action-based view where “a piece of information…can function as evidence only in the context of an evidential epistemic activity.” (Ibid 2011:361). They discuss their approach in the context of the raven paradox so their focus on the epistemic activity of theory testing.

  38. This, of course, means that epistemic chance and epistemic certainty are sensitive to practical factors.

  39. Comesaña (2020) credits Dutant with coining the phrase knowledge-based decision theory.

  40. See Lin (2022) for a summary of the many ways a subjectivist can respond.

  41. Some think that this is not within the purview of decision theory. Savage writes, “I believe, and examples have confirmed, that decision situations can be usefully structured in terms of consequences, states, and acts in such a way that the postulates of [Foundations of Statistics] are satisfied. Just how to do that seems to be an art for which I can give no prescription and for which it is perhaps unreasonable to expect one." (79, Dreze, 1990). Unfortunately, Savage did not appear to recognize how difficult this task actually is.

  42. Jeffrey (1965); Lewis (1981)

  43. Bradley (2017:20)

  44. As Shafer (2016:50) notes, “Jeffrey’s theory is more obviously non-constructive than Savage’s.”

  45. Williamson (2000) is the most prominent proponent of this view of evidential probabilities. However, he rejects the role of evidential probabilities in rational choice. See Levi (1980) for a proponent of the view that the relevant probabilities are conditional on total knowledge.

  46. This is the type of approach detailed in Keeney (1996)

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Acknowledgements

Thanks to the audience at the Southwestern Philosophical Society for their comments on an earlier draft and to my colleagues Katie Gasdaglis and Alex Madva for discussions about the topic.

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  1. California State Polytechnic University, Pomona, USA

    Brian Kim

  2. Department of Philosophy, Fullerton, USA

    Brian Kim

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Kim, B. Pragmatic infallibilism. AJPH 2, 42 (2023). https://doi.org/10.1007/s44204-023-00097-9

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