Abstract
An overview is presented of what I take to be (some main aspects of) the role of the intellectual virtues within the epistemological enterprise. Traditionally, the theory of knowledge has been thought to be central to the epistemological project, but since, as I explain, the intellectual virtues aren’t required for knowledge, this might suggest that they have only a marginal role to play in epistemological debates. I argue against this suggestion by showing how the intellectual virtues are in fact crucial to several core (and inter-related) epistemological topics, including the nature of inquiry, epistemic axiology and our understanding of ignorance.
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Notes
For an important and influential presentation of a neo-Aristotelian view of the intellectual virtues, see Zagzebski (1996). (Note, however, that Zagzebski views the intellectual virtues as a subset of the moral virtues, which is not the view that the present author is inclined towards). For some other important discussions of the intellectual virtues along general Aristotelian lines, see Roberts and Wood (2007) and Baehr (2011). For a useful overview of contemporary work on the intellectual virtues, see Battaly (2014).
Notice that this claim is much weaker than the unity of the virtues thesis that is often credited to Aristotle (at least as regards the moral virtues), such that (in its most straightforward form) if one possesses one virtue then one possesses them all. For some recent discussions of this view, see Badhwar (1996), Wolf (2007) and Toner (2014). (It is weaker still than the related thesis that the different virtues are all, ultimately, manifestations of a single virtue. For discussion of this kind of view, see Penner (1973), Brickhouse and Smith (1997) and Cooper (1998)). In particular, the present formulation leaves it open that while one might clear the relevant threshold for some virtues, one might fail to clear the threshold for others (though one will tend to have a character that at least approximates to this threshold). For a useful recent discussion of the idea that there might be a defensible unity of the virtues thesis that applies specifically to the intellectual virtues, see Wilson (2021).
If one prefers, one can treat the intellectual good of truth as being the intellectual aspect of the good more generally, thereby preserving the more general features of the relationship between the intellectual virtues and the virtues simpliciter (i.e. in the sense that all virtues are motivated towards the good). I discuss the motivational state associated with the intellectual virtues in more detail in Pritchard (2021d).
See Bloomfield (2000) for a very useful discussion of the manner in which intellectual virtues are skills, including some of the background to this issue in the classical literature.
For further discussion of how one cultivates the intellectual virtues, with a specific focus on explicitly educational contexts, see Pritchard (forthcoming) and Pritchard and Croce (forthcoming).
This is the sense in which the theory of knowledge that I articulate—which I call anti-luck (or anti-risk) virtue epistemologyis a kind of virtue epistemology, since it grants that the virtues, at least in this inclusive sense of the term, are necessary for knowledge. See, for example, Pritchard et al. (2010, chs. 1–4) and Pritchard (2012, 2016b, 2020). This is a very different proposal to the kind of ‘robust’ virtue epistemology prominently advocated by such figures as Sosa (1991, 2007, 2009, 2015, 2020), Zagzebski (1996) and Greco (2010), however, as they all contend that there is a way of thinking about knowledge such that the virtue-theoretic condition is both necessary and sufficient. I have argued that such proposals are untenable because they are unable to accommodate knowledge-undermining epistemic luck and risk, which is why I advocate anti-luck/risk virtue epistemology instead. Note that Zagzebski (1996) is unusual among virtue epistemologists in that she is inclined to regard the intellectual virtues as being necessary for knowledge (i.e. as opposed to opting for the broad notion of virtue noted here, which includes mere cognitive skills and faculties).
At least insofar as knowledge is supported by reasons or justification of course—in what follows I will for the sake of simplicity take this as given, though it has been rejected in some quarters. Note that if one were aware that one’s justified true belief is Gettierized, then that would ordinarily act as a defeater for one’s original justification (albeit in a fashion that would normally provide a new justification for the belief), so in practice this kind of case is quite complicated. Nonetheless, I think it is relatively uncontentious that having a Gettierized justified true belief is not a good way to sate one’s drive to inquire.
Note that in saying that understanding can be a kind of knowing, I am not thereby endorsing the general idea that understanding is a kind of knowing. In fact, on my account of the relationship between knowledge and understanding, the latter claim is false, as there can be cases of understanding that fall short of the corresponding knowing due to environmental epistemic luck. We can set this complication to one side for our current purposes, however, and simply focus on understanding as being a type of knowledge. For discussion of this issue, see Pritchard (2009b, 2014a) and Pritchard et al. (2010, ch. 4). See also footnote 10.
For some key texts on the nature of understanding and its relationship to knowledge, see Grimm (2006, 2014), Greco (2013) and Hills (2016). For my own view in this regard, see Pritchard (2009b, 2014a) and Pritchard et al. (2010, ch. 4). Note that while most commentators agree that understanding is a more demanding epistemic state than knowledge, there is some dissent on this score. Some figures like Zagzebski (2001) and Elgin (2009) argue that understanding is not a form of knowing at all since it isn’t in the relevant sense factive. In addition, as I comment in footnote 9, on my view understanding isn’t always a more demanding epistemic state than knowledge (though it ordinarily is), as sometimes one’s understanding can fall short of knowing due to environmental epistemic luck. For a helpful overview of the contemporary literature on the epistemology of understanding, see Grimm (2010).
Of course, in attaining the understanding that answers one line of inquiry one might be led to undertake further inquiries that are prompted by one’s understanding of the answer to the initial inquiry (e.g. understanding how the high and low tides work might raise new questions about the nature of gravitational pull). In this sense, inquiry simpliciter might not be properly sated by gaining an understanding of the target answer. The point remains, however, that this particular line of inquiry is properly sated. For further defence of the idea that understanding is what legitimately closes inquiry, see Pritchard (2016c). For defences of the contrasting view that it is knowledge that plays this role, see Millar (2011) and Kelp (2014, 2018).
The terminology is my own—see e.g. Pritchard et al. (2010, ch. 1). See David (2001, 151–2) for a long list of quotations illustrating how widely held this view (under various descriptions) once was in epistemology. The list of contemporary epistemologists that he quotes includes William Alston, Laurence Bonjour, Roderick Chisholm, Richard Foley, Alvin Goldman, Keith Lehrer, Paul Moser, Alvin Plantinga,and Ernest Sosa (although I think it is clear from more recent work that Sosa at least should no longer be thought of as endorsing this thesissee, for example, Sosa (2003, 2020, passim)). See also Elgin (2017, 10), who in addition to Alston, Bonjour, Goldman and Lehrer also credits the view to William James. See also DePaul (2001) and the exchange between David (2013) and Kvanvig (2013). For general discussion of the contemporary literature on epistemic value, see Pritchard (2007) and Carter et al. (2018).
For a fairly representative sample of recent detractors when it comes to the idea that truth is the fundamental epistemic good, see Williamson (2000, passim), Kvanvig (2003, passim), Sosa (2003), Millar (2011), Kelp (2014) and Elgin (2017, passim). See also the exchange between David (2013) and Kvanvig (2013). Note that just how radical a departure these non-traditional proposals are from the traditional view depends on whether truth remains either as one of the fundamental epistemic goods (in the epistemic value pluralism case) or as a component of the sole fundamental epistemic good (in the alternative epistemic value monism case). For example, someone who holds that understanding is the sole fundamental epistemic good and that understanding is to be understood non-factively (see footnote 10) is offering a more radical alternative proposal to the traditional picture than someone who claims that knowledge (which is factive) is the sole fundamental epistemic good.
There are lots of presentations of this general problem for epistemic value truth monism in the literature, but for a clear articulation of this issue, see DePaul (2001, §2). For an influential statement of the problem that urges a virtue-theoretic response, see Sosa (2003). For a recent discussion of this problem, see Treanor (2018).
For a particularly clear statement of this problem in the recent literature, see Elgin (2017, 10).
Although it would take me too far afield to go into this issue here, I’m inclined towards a pluralistic view about what counts as understanding the world in ‘fundamental’ respects. For example, I don’t think that this only concerns scientific truths, but extends also to humanistic truths of a kind that one gains from, for example, reading great literature. Our talk of ‘the world’ as the object for understanding in this regard is thus to be read broadly as concerning such factors as our self-understanding and our social world, as well as the physical world.
For some key defences of the ‘standard’ account of ignorance as lack of knowledge, see Zimmerman (2008), Le Morvan (2011a, b, 2012, 2013) and DeNicola (2018). For some of the main defences of the ‘new view’ of ignorance, see Goldman and Olsson (2009), van Woudenberg (2009) and Peels (2010; cf. Peels 2011, 2012). The two main contemporary accounts of ignorance are usefully surveyed in Le Morvan and Peels (2016). Note that we are here focusing on propositional forms of ignorancesee Nottelman (2015) and El Kassar (2018) for two recent discussions of non-propositional forms of ignorance and how they relate to the propositional variety.
Note that I use the plural here rather than the singular. While one would expect that the main intellectual virtue that is lacking is that of curiosity, I think ignorance can also result from other intellectual vices besides the viceful lack of curiosity. For example, if one is dogmatic or intellectually arrogant, then this can prevent one from gaining knowledge of a subject matter even though one is curious about it, and that can also be a source of ignorance.
Although it would take us too far afield to explore this issue here, I would suggest that the normative conception of ignorance is particularly useful in terms of framing the political dimension of ignorance, such as when ignorance is used to promote, for example, racial or class hegemony. Ignorance is usually here understood along the conventional lines as either lack of knowledge (e.g. Fricker 2016, 144) or lack of true belief (e.g. Mills 2007, 16), with a further pernicious sub-class of ignorance delineated that involves a kind of intellectual culpability (e.g. Medina 2017). Far better, I think, to recognise that ignorance is already tied to a kind of intellectual culpability, and hence to regard the particular political ramifications of this ignorance as simply one manifestation of this culpability, rather than persisting with the idea that the general nature of ignorance is just the intellectually benign absence of the target epistemic standing. See also footnote 23.
I further articulate this notion of awareness in the context of the normative account of ignorance in Pritchard (2021b).
I think this point is particularly relevant to the implications of the normative account of ignorance to the political realm (see footnote 21). For example, there are cases of political ignorance where subjects exhibit a lack of ignorance of certain propositions that is superficial, and which co-exists with a deeper ignorance of other truths in the vicinity that would provide the subject with the necessary political understanding. (Consider, for example, someone who knows about the incredibly high incarceration rate for black males in the USA but does not go on to gain an understanding of why this might be so).
An earlier version of this paper was discussed as the part of the ‘Super Saturday Seminars’ hosted by the University of Mumbai. I am grateful to the audience on this occasion and especially the seminar organiser, Priyedarshi Jetli. Thanks also to Nikolaj Pedersen and two anonymous referees for Asian Journal of Philosophy.
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Pritchard, D. Intellectual virtue and its role in epistemology. AJPH 1, 21 (2022). https://doi.org/10.1007/s44204-022-00024-4
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s44204-022-00024-4