Abstract
Against the backdrop of anti-globalization and intensified geopolitical competition, the Biden administration has become more aware of the deficiency of the U.S. innovation system and raised more strategic concerns about external competition. To address the problems at home and abroad, the Biden administration is formulating a grand and comprehensive agenda for science, technology and innovation, including all stages from basic science to technological invention and then to innovation development, hoping to use state logic to “correct” market logic. In the era of technological revolution, the goals of Biden’s agenda are to reshape the domestic innovation environment and the international technology competition landscape, to consolidate the foundation for maintaining U.S. hegemony in science and technology, and to recalibrate the course for U.S. science and technology development. The practical implementation of Biden’s policies has already produced tangible results but it also faces enormous challenges. Although it may be too early to forecast the trajectory of the U.S. innovation ecosystem over the next 75 years, current initiatives are notably steering towards a strategic balance among national security, economic interests, and research and development efficiency. The transformation of the U.S. strategy for science, technology and innovation presents complex and severe challenges to China’s development of cutting-edge technologies and the safeguarding of its technology security. In response, China will need to contemplate and devise an effective strategy to remain competitive with the U.S. in the high-tech industries.
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Notes
In June 2011, the President’s Council of Advisors on Science and Technology submitted a report to Obama titled Ensuring American Leadership in Advanced Manufacturing. The report emphasized that “Although the U.S. has been the leading producer of manufactured goods for more than 100 years, manufacturing has for decades been declining as a share of GDP and employment. Over the past decade, it has become clear that this decline is not limited to low-technology products, but extends to advanced technologies invented in the U.S. and is not solely due to low-wage competition. Moreover, it is increasingly apparent that technology innovation is closely tied to manufacturing knowledge. We cannot remain the world’s engine of innovation without manufacturing activity. We do not believe that the solution is industrial policy, in which government invests in particular companies or sectors. However, we strongly believe that the Nation requires a coherent innovation policy to ensure U.S. leadership support new technologies and approaches, and provide the basis for high-quality jobs for Americans in the manufacturing sector.” See The President’s Council of Advisors on Science and Technology (2011).
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Zhao, J. Recalibrating the course: the Biden administration’s strategy for science, technology and innovation. China Int Strategy Rev. 5, 274–292 (2023). https://doi.org/10.1007/s42533-023-00147-0
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s42533-023-00147-0