1 Introduction

Existing literature suggests that faced with China’s ascendant influence, many Southeast Asian countries have adopted hedging as an alternative strategy to balancing and bandwagoning. Although extensive debates on the conceptualization and operationalization of hedging are ongoing, previous studies agree that the implementation of hedging hinges on certain contingencies. Hedging is unlikely to persist when there is an all-out rivalry among great powers. Since 2010, the Sino-US competition has significantly intensified. On the one hand, Washington has hardened its stance on China, explicitly depicting China as a revisionist state and strategic competitor (The White House 2017). On the other hand, China’s foreign strategy has also shifted. To a large extent, the strategy of keeping a low profile has been replaced by the strategy of striving for achievement (Yan 2014, 153–184). Many observers describe China as becoming more assertive, especially in the South China Sea disputes (He and Feng 2012, 633–644; Johnston 2013, 7–48; Liao 2016, 817–833). Against this background, it is worth asking how the hedging strategy of Southeast Asian countries might evolve when Sino-US competition escalates.

Previous studies have not specified the mechanisms through which great power competition undermines the hedging strategy. More importantly, the existing literature focuses mainly on systemic forces and tends to neglect unit-level factors that determine the sustainability of hedging. Consequently, it cannot sufficiently explain why the sustainability of hedging varies across countries. In the real world, some countries’ hedging persists, whereas other countries have abandoned hedging and shifted to balancing or bandwagoning. This article contends that to understand the breakdown and persistence of hedging, it is necessary to consider the secondary state’s domestic politics, and in particular, the leader’s political security. It argues that the general public’s preference for a consistent foreign policy constitutes a challenge to hedging. As great power competition escalates, foreign policy issues increasingly attract the public’s attention. Consequently, hedging is more likely to encounter domestic opposition. Nevertheless, whether hedging will break down or persist also depends on the political security of decision-makers. Insecure leaders are more likely to cater to the public, which in turn results in the breakdown of hedging. On the contrary, secure leaders enjoy great autonomy in foreign policy-making. It is more likely for them to maintain hedging amid great power rivalry. This theoretical framework is demonstrated through case studies of the Philippines and Singapore’s strategies toward China.

2 Conceptualizations of hedging

The term “hedging” is increasingly applied to describe Southeast Asian countries’ strategic behavior under uncertainty, usually associated with power transition. Nevertheless, scholars have developed various conceptualizations of hedging. Some scholars conceptualize hedging as a comprehensive strategy composed of political, economic, and security policies. Kuik Cheng-Chwee, for instance, suggests that a hedger simultaneously pursues “return-maximizing” and “risk-contingency” options (Kuik 2008, 159–185). The former consists of economic pragmatism, binding engagement, and limited bandwagoning, allowing the hedgers to reap economic and political profits, whereas the latter includes dominance denial and indirect balancing, and aims to reduce losses when things go awry. Similarly, Goh contends that Southeast Asian countries’ hedging not only entails cooperation with the US and soft balancing against China, but also the political, economic, and strategic engagement of China (Goh 2005). Jackson also considers military investment, security cooperation with the US, as well as economic and diplomatic enmeshment with China, as important indicators of hedging (Jackson 2014, 331–356).

Another strand of literature, however, considers hedging a security policy. Lim and Cooper, for instance, maintain that if policies of economic and political engagement are incorporated into the conceptualization of hedging, all East Asian countries (except North Korea) are hedging (Lim and Cooper 2015, 696–727). The concept cannot reflect the meaningful differences in strategies adopted by East Asian countries. Thus, they highlight that hedging exclusively refers to a state’s behavior within the security realm. Haacke emphasizes the difference between hedging as a strategy of risk management and balancing as a threat response (Haacke 2019, 375–417). Yet, in the same vein, Haacke’s conceptual framework also focuses on the hedger’s security policy.

This article adopts Kuik’s conceptualization of hedging (Kuik 2008). Indeed, the second approach, which confines hedging to a narrower security realm, enables researchers to measure hedging with greater ease and make a clear-cut distinction between the hedgers and the non-hedgers. However, it cannot fully capture the dynamism of hedging strategy. For instance, Lim and Cooper argue that only states that neither have a major territorial dispute with China nor a treaty alliance with the US maintain ambiguous alignment and thus can be categorized as hedging states (Lim and Cooper 2015). Nevertheless, “territorial dispute” and “treaty alliance” are close to constant variables. Taking the Philippines as an example, Lim and Cooper consider the country a “resolute ally” of the US. Yet, in recent years, the country’s China policy has undergone significant realignment (Heydarian 2017, 220–236). This conceptual framework does not admit as much variation as Lim and Cooper claim.

More importantly, this paper argues that the dynamism of hedging strategy, to a large extent, stems from its internal inconsistency. A hedger’s “return-maximizing” and “risk-contingency” policies contradict and are likely to modify each other. For instance, the behavior of return maximizing may deepen the secondary state’s economic dependence on the rising power, and thus result in the accumulation of future security risks. Perceiving increasing risks in the future, a hedger may take preventive action and pursue a strategy of decoupling with the rising power, even if disengagement means immediate economic loss. As demonstrated in the next section, due to systemic and domestic pressure, foreign policymakers’ formula of hedging is subject to constant adjustment. Hedgers must walk a fine line. To sustain hedging is to maintain a dynamic balance between return-maximizing and risk-contingency policies. Excluding economic and political elements from the conceptual framework, underrates the hedging strategy’s internal strain and thus ignores its source of change. Moreover, secondary states have been increasingly pressed to take a stand, not only on security affairs but also on issues such as 5G partnership and COVID-19 origins, which are also important signals of alignment.

It is worth noting that the formula for hedging varies across Southeast Asian countries. Drawing on Kuik’s conceptualization and operationalization of hedging, I contend that if a country’s hedging strategy prioritizes return-maximizing policies over risk-contingency policies, it can be considered a soft-hedger (Kuik 2008). Malaysia’s strategy toward China is a case in point. Specifically, Malaysia pursues a quieter approach in dealing with the South China Sea disputes than Vietnam and the Philippines under Benigno Aquino. It downplays the sea incidents and manages to prevent territorial disputes from damaging valuable economic cooperation with China (Storey 2020). Meanwhile, Malaysia endeavors to strengthen ASEAN’s collective diplomatic clout and maintains close security cooperation with the US, which distinguishes its China strategy from bandwagoning.

Apart from this dimension of “soft versus hard hedging”, the degree of intensity constitutes another dimension that can be applied to distinguish various strategies adopted by Southeast Asian hedgers through time (see Fig. 1). The intensity dimension captures the internal strain of hedging. Specifically, if a country simultaneously accepts rewards from competing great powers, the contradiction between return-maximizing and risk-contingency policies becomes more prominent. The intensity of its hedging strategy increases. For instance, the intensity of Singapore’s hedging strategy is high. In recent years, the city–state has actively participated in China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI). Meanwhile, it also lends great support to the US pivot to Asia and serves as a quasi-ally of Washington. In comparison with Singapore, Indonesia can be considered a moderate hedger. For secondary states, it is more challenging to maintain an intense hedging strategy. First, this is because great powers expect a return on their strategic investment and may compel a hedger to choose a side. Due to the deep engagement with the great power, an intense hedger is more sensitive, or even vulnerable, to punishment than a moderate hedger. Second, as demonstrated below, inconsistent foreign strategy is more likely to incur domestic criticisms. Due to internal and external pressures, intense hedging has a greater chance of breaking down to either hard hedging or soft hedging.

Fig. 1
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Varieties of hedging

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3 Public opinion and the leader’s political security

Whether hedging can persist is contingent upon certain conditions. The existing literature emphasizes the systemic pressure faced by the foreign policymakers of Southeast Asian countries (Chong 2017; Stromseth 2019). Kuik specifies three factors, the absence of an immediate threat, the absence of an ideological fault-line, and more importantly, the absence of an all-out great power rivalry (Kuik 2008). Ruonan Liu points out that full confrontation between great powers would squeeze Southeast Asian countries’ room to maneuver and propel them to “choose a side” (Liu 2017, 60–82). Similarly, Feng Liu and Zhirui Chen also hold that East Asian countries can only sustain their hedging strategies when there is a limited confrontation between China and the US (Liu and Chen 2015, 4–25). Yet, by focusing on systemic pressure alone, previous studies cannot explain why hedging breaks down in some cases but persists in others. For instance, the Philippines’ hedging strategy has shifted into balancing against China since 2008, but it has been restored under Duterte.

In a departure from the existing literature, this article contends that great-power rivalry does not immediately lead to the breakdown of the hedging strategy. On the contrary, great-power rivalry brings new opportunities to the secondary states. As Brantly Womack states, in an asymmetric relationship, the great power tends to be less engaged and inattentive, whereas the secondary states are prone to paranoia (Womack 2006). In this sense, without great-power rivalry, hedging in the first place would not be a strategic choice available to the secondary states. In fact, great-power competition not only reduces secondary states’ vulnerability, but also increases the resources available to them (Zha 2022, 131–161). Specifically, secondary states may deal with a great power’s coercion by leaning on the rival power. Therefore, a great power’s forceful attempt at establishing alignment may backfire and push secondary states to the other side. Meanwhile, competing great powers are inclined to outbid each other by offering more economic benefits and political support, or by expanding their security commitments to the secondary states. For instance, Group of Seven leaders recently pledged $600 billion to finance infrastructure in developing countries to counter China’s BRI Initiative (Shalai 2022). In sum, as great power competition escalates, secondary states’ hedging becomes more intensive. Nevertheless, whether the strategy breaks down is contingent upon domestic conditions (Fig. 2).

Fig. 2
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Causal mechanism

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As neo-classical realists contend, systemic pressures are translated through unit-level intervening variables (Rose 1998, 144–177). This article suggests domestic factors play an important role in determining the evolution of hedging. To maintain an intense hedging strategy, a major challenge faced by hedging state’s decision-makers is posed by their domestic society. Decision-makers generally enjoy greater autonomy in the field of foreign policy than in domestic public policies. This is especially true when the external environment is benign. In contrast, as great power rivalry escalates, international affairs are likely to gain more publicity in domestic society. The risks of politicization of foreign policy also increase. Putnam defines politicization as the activation of groups who are less worried about the costs of no-agreement (Putnam 1988, 427–460). The politicization of foreign policy reduces the effective win-set of decision-makers and thus endangers international agreement. For instance, social groups that do not benefit directly from international trade may propel decision-makers to reduce economic dependence on the rising power for national security reasons.

More importantly, it is difficult for average citizens to comprehend the subtlety of hedging. Empirical research has demonstrated that average citizens are more prone to prejudices than policymakers in forming their attitudes about foreign affairs (Rathbun et al. 2016, 124–137; Lanoszka 2019, 227–248). As Morgenthau wrote,

The statesman must think in terms of the national interests…The popular mind, unaware of the fine distinctions of the statesman’s thinking, reasons more often than not in the simple moralistic and legalistic terms of absolute good and absolute evil (Morgenthau 1948, 152).

Similarly, Christensen also points out that “citizens are more likely than state elites to adopt highly stylized and ideological views of international conditions” (Christensen 2011, 17). Therefore, policies stated in easily digestible ways and containing no complicated logic are more likely to sell (Christensen 2011). As a strategy composed of contradictory elements, hedging is not as straightforward as balancing or bandwagoning. The public is prone to be skeptical of hedging: if the rising power poses a security challenge, why does our country still carry out economic cooperation with it, especially when cooperation deepens the country’s dependency on the rising power? If the rising power does not constitute a security challenge, why does our country align with the established power at the risk of losing strategic autonomy? The public’s questioning and dissatisfaction also provide political ammunition to the opposition and thus compel decision-makers to abandon hedging.

Leaders serve as a transmission belt between systemic and domestic pressure at one end, and foreign strategy at the other. Leaders with a solid support base at home enjoy greater autonomy in foreign policymaking and thus are more capable of resisting systemic pressure and dealing with domestic opposition. Secure leaders have a better chance of maintaining an intense hedging strategy. On the contrary, insecure leaders are more likely to cater to the public, abandoning strategic ambiguity and adopting a more consistent and straightforward foreign strategy. It is worth clarifying that the theoretical framework proposed here explains the sustainability of hedging strategy—whether it persists or not when great-power rivalry escalates. It does not explain which strategy, balancing or bandwagoning, would emerge. Many country-specific factors, such as geography, territorial disputes, and historical grievances with the great powers, would all play a role in determining the strategic choice.

The following sections will illustrate the above-mentioned theoretical framework using the China strategies of the Philippines and Singapore since 2010 as examples. Both countries are secondary states facing intense great-power competition. Their China strategies all generate domestic publicity. The purpose of the case studies is to test how the leader’s political security intervenes. Therefore, the cases were selected to focus on this key independent variable. The presence of mass protests, coup threats, and impeachment attempts against the leader indicates political insecurity. In the Philippines case, President Gloria Macapagal Arroyo encountered a legitimacy crisis in the last few years of her ruling. Theoretically, the country’s hedging strategy is less likely to be sustained. Empirical evidence lends support to this proposition. Due to domestic opposition, the Philippines’ hedging strategy toward China broke down and shifted to balancing under Aquino. Yet, after the 2016 elections, Rodrigo Duterte emerged as a political strongman with a solid support base at home. The Philippines’ hedging strategy was restored. In the case of Singapore, successive leaders of the People’s Action Party (PAP) have enjoyed a firm political base and thus autonomy in foreign policymaking. In contrast to the Philippines’ foreign policy realignment, Singapore has maintained an intense hedging strategy toward China amid systemic and domestic challenges.

4 The breakdown and restoration of the Philippines’ hedging strategy

During Arroyo’s term, the Philippines’ China policy combined risk-contingency and return-maximizing measures. On the one hand, the Philippines continued to promote security cooperation with the US on the foundation of the 1951 Mutual Defence Treaty (MDT) and the Visiting Forces Agreement. The US provided considerable assistance to the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) in the latter’s counter-terrorist operations in Mindanao. The two sides also developed the Cooperative Security Locations, which allowed US troops to utilize the AFP’s military facilities in a future exigency (Castro 2009, 399–423). On the other hand, the Arroyo government significantly enhanced economic and political engagement with China. The two countries reached a series of agreements on infrastructure projects (Go 2008). China also became a major provider of official development assistance (ODA) to the Philippines (Storey 2008). In September 2004, the two countries reached a milestone in the joint development of the South China Sea, agreeing to collect seismic data in the disputed areas. As Vietnam joined in later, the tripartite Joint Marine Seismic Undertaking (JMSU) was signed in March 2005.

The hedging strategy, however, encountered domestic opposition in the last few years of Arroyo’s term. Although Arroyo was active in the international arena, her legitimacy at home was undermined by a series of electoral and corruption scandals, which in turn affected her government’s international cooperation. Some major infrastructure projects funded by concessional loans from China, such as the National Broadband Network, were suspended due to allegations of corruption and overpricing (Baviera 2012, 241). More importantly, the JMSU also suffered from politicization. An article by Barry Wain titled “Manila’s Bungle in the South China Sea”, attracted public attention to the JMSU (Wain 2008, 45–48). The article suggested that politicians with business links to China had persuaded Arroyo to acquiesce in the JMSU, and that the agreement allowed China to collect seismic data even in undisputed areas of the South China Sea. It soon triggered the Philippine public’s suspicion that Arroyo was selling out the country’s territory. Amid the domestic clamor, the JMSU was allowed to expire in 2008.

The country’s China strategy shifted to balancing after Aquino came to power in 2010. In March 2011, two Chinese patrol vessels approached a Philippine survey ship near the Reed Bank and forced the latter to withdraw. Manila responded by sending attack aircraft and coastguard vessels to escort the survey ship (Storey 2011). A more serious standoff took place at the Scarborough Shoal in April 2012 and brought bilateral relations to the nadir. In September 2012, the Aquino government officially renamed the South China Sea as the “West Philippine Sea”, which further raised tensions with China (Agence France-Presse 2012). Despite China’s strong protests, the Aquino government filed a case against China with the Hague-based permanent court of arbitration (PCA) in 2013. Meanwhile, the Aquino administration enthusiastically welcomed the US pivot to Asia and actively sought Washington’s security commitment in the event of a conflict with China. The two countries held the first bilateral strategic dialogues in Manila in January 2011 and the inaugural “2 plus 2” meeting in April 2012. In May 2014, the Philippines concluded the Enhanced Defence Cooperation Agreement with the US after eight rounds of negotiations, which further broadened the scope of the Mutual Defense Treaty (MDT) (Thayer 2014). As Heydarian suggests, by the end of the Aquino administration, the Philippines had aligned itself tightly with the US (Heydarian 2017).

The Philippines reoriented its foreign policy after Duterte came to power in 2016. On the one hand, although the PCA ruled in favor of the Philippines in July 2016, the Duterte administration decided not to “flaunt” the legal victory against China. Meanwhile, Duterte also took action to limit security cooperation with the US, withdrawing the Philippine Navy from the joint patrols with the US Navy in the South China Sea. Soon after Duterte assumed office, China and the Philippines agreed to resume bilateral talks on the South China Sea disputes (Perlez 2016). Bilateral economic cooperation also deepened. By June 2017, the Duterte administration had signed 22 bilateral agreements with China, and China, for the first time, became the Philippines’ largest trading partner. On the other hand, even though Duterte repetitively threatened to abandon the Philippines’ alliance with the US, security cooperation between the two countries not only continued but also intensified. In March 2022, the US and the Philippines held “the largest ever” Balikatan joint military exercise (Jennings 2022). The Duterte administration not only restored but also maintained an intense hedging strategy toward China.

Much empirical evidence suggests that the breakdown and restoration of the Philippines’ hedging strategy cannot be attributed to systemic pressure alone. For instance, Manila and Washington often took different stands on the South China Sea disputes. Despite the pressure exerted by the Aquino administration, the US was reluctant to confirm whether military contingencies in the South China Sea would trigger the 1951 Mutual Defence Treaty (Malig 2012). Aquino’s balancing strategy toward China had gone beyond the baseline set by the US. On the contrary, when Pompeo eventually clarified the US security commitment during his visit to Manila in 2019, the then-US Secretary of State only received a lukewarm response from the Duterte administration. To understand the Philippines’ foreign policy realignment, it is important to take domestic politics into consideration, and in particular the leader’s political security.

As mentioned above, Arroyo suffered from a legitimacy crisis at home, which undermined her autonomy in foreign policymaking. In the later years of her rule, Arroyo faced allegations of corruption, electoral fraud, and violating the Constitution. She barely survived attempts to impeach her with support from key political allies in Congress. In 2006, she had to deploy armed troops to appease street protests (Coronel 2007, 175–182). Arroyo was considered the most unpopular president in the Philippines since the restoration of democracy in 1986 (GMA News 2006). Therefore, when the JMSU and infrastructure projects funded by China caught the public’s attention and incurred criticism, Arroyo, as an insecure leader, catered to domestic nationalists and significantly reduced cooperation with China.

More importantly, Arroyo’s legitimacy crisis contributed to the complete breakdown of the hedging strategy under Aquino. Amid Arroyo’s scandals, Aquino aptly campaigned on “no corruption, no poverty” and won the 2010 elections. The country’s foreign policy was also employed to serve Aquino’s political interests. An assertive policy on the South China Sea disputes enabled Aquino to set himself apart from Arroyo and left the public with the impression that “the former government could be bought; the current government cannot” (International Crisis Group 2012). Under Aquino, the country’s China policy further tilted toward balancing. Contrary to its narrative of good governance, the legitimacy of the Aquino administration was undermined by a corruption scandal in the Priority Development Assistance Fund. In the follow-up investigation, the public found that only anti-Aquino politicians were targeted, which raised suspicions that Aquino utilized the anti-corruption campaign to purge political enemies (Thompson 2016, 39–68). Furthermore, Aquino was also criticized for being inefficient in addressing social problems, such as poverty and unemployment. Against this domestic political background, Aquino attached more importance to the South China Sea issue. Tensions with China generated a “rally round the flag effect,” bolstering Aquino’s legitimacy at home (Zha 2015, 242–268).

In comparison with Arroyo and Aquino, Duterte maintained a more solid support base at home (See Fig. 3). In fact, consecutive surveys have suggested that trust in China is relatively low among ordinary Filipinos (Social Weather Stations 2020). Duterte’s opponents, such as Vice President Leni Robredo, also criticized Duterte for being too soft on China (Bloomberg News 2019). Nevertheless, Duterte was able to restore the hedging strategy. His stronghold of power gave him more autonomy in foreign policymaking and enabled him to counter domestic opposition. It is important to note that the leader’s political security only explains his/her capability to navigate a fraught international and domestic environment. It does not explain the motivations behind their strategic choice. For Duterte, domestic agendas motivated him to improve relations with China. Specifically, the controversial “War on Drugs” incurred criticisms from the Obama administration and resulted in the cancellation of US aid commitments (Heydarian 2017). Additionally, Duterte launched the ambitious “Build, Build, Build” infrastructure project. Consequently, political and financial support from China took on new salience.

Fig. 3
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Net satisfaction ratings of presidents

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5 The persistence of Singapore’s hedging strategy

Singapore is often considered a typical hedger (Kuik 2008). Since 2010, the intensity of Singapore’s hedging strategy has increased significantly. On the one hand, Singapore continues to deepen its strategic cooperation with the US. It views the US as an irreplaceable regional security guarantor and has become an important logistical hub to the US military since the early 1990s (Graham and Huxley 2015). The city–state welcomes the US pivot to Asia. In 2012, the two countries established the US–Singapore Strategic Partnership Dialogue, an institutionalized annual arrangement allowing the two sides to discuss issues ranging from security to trade and environment (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Singapore 2012). In 2015, Singapore and the US signed an enhanced Defense Cooperation Agreement. Singapore also gave the green light to the deployment of US P-8A Poseidon maritime surveillance aircraft, a US countermeasure to China’s expanded submarine capabilities in the South China Sea. Many observers suggest that Singapore’s strategic value to the US has exceeded that of Thailand and the Philippines, two treaty allies of Washington in Southeast Asia (Graham and Huxley 2015). Furthermore, Singapore endeavored to deepen its economic engagement with the US through the Trans-Pacific Partnership and has been vocal on the South China Sea disputes, defending the rights of freedom of navigation and the Permanent Court of Arbitration’s ruling against China (Tan 2016, 20–33). According to former US President Barack Obama, Singapore is “an anchor for the US presence in the region” (Yong 2016).

On the other hand, Singapore also maintains a close relationship with China. As Kuik contends, Singapore has long been a practitioner of binding-engagement policy and sought to enmesh Beijing in ASEAN institutions (Kuik 2008). More importantly, Singapore’s China strategy is also motivated by pragmatic economic considerations. Singapore serves as the financing hub of China’s BRI, with 33% of outbound investments from China to the BRI countries and 85% of inbound investments to China flowing through Singapore (Fernandez 2018). In 2013, China surpassed Malaysia to become Singapore’s top trade partner.

Nevertheless, Singapore’s hedging strategy has encountered difficulties in recent years. Challenges have come not only from the systemic level but also from the domestic. Many observers in China perceive Singapore’s support for the US pivot strategy as balancing against China. In August 2016, during his visit to the United States, Prime Minister Lee Hsien Loong praised then-President Obama as “America’s first Pacific President” and praised the rebalancing strategy for earning America new friends and strengthening old partnerships (Prime Minister's Office Singapore 2016). The Global Times, a nationalist newspaper in China, commented on Prime Minister Lee’s speech, asserting that as the competition between China and the United States over the South China Sea intensifies, the number of occasions during which Singapore is “standing with the United States” has increased (Shan 2016). A few weeks later, another report on the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM) Summit by the Global Times sparked a robust exchange with the Singapore Ambassador in Beijing. According to this report, Singapore attempted to endorse the arbitration ruling by adding paragraphs on the South China Sea in the Summit’s final documents (Wang 2016). The report not only ignited popular nationalism in China but also preceded a series of diplomatic tussles between the two countries (Chong 2017). Soon after the report came out, China’s foreign ministry intervened with remarks in support of the Global Times, which made observers believe that the report had the backing of the Chinese government and was “an explicit warning and bashing of Singapore’s activism on the South China Sea issue” (Zhang 2016). The signal became even stronger when China seized the military vehicles belonging to Singapore while in transit in Hong Kong on the way back from a military exercise in Taiwan. Furthermore, Beijing also imposed “sanctions with Chinese characteristics” on Singapore by not inviting Prime Minister Lee Hsien Loong to the Belt and Road Summit held in May 2017 in Beijing (Han 2017).

Apart from systemic pressure, the hedging strategy is also contested at home. Strategic thinkers in Singapore are divided on how to deal with intensifying great-power rivalry. A rare public debate between semi-retired diplomats and scholars occurred in July 2017. Commenting on the Qatar crisis, Kishore Mahbubani maintained that “small states must always behave like small states”, and that Singapore should be restrained in commenting on matters such as the South China Sea disputes (Mahbubani 2017). His argument was criticized by other retired diplomats, who have maintained that size does not matter and that Singapore should pursue its foreign policy principles (Salleh and Chew 2017). Some Singaporean scholars also challenge the sustainability of the hedging strategy. For instance, Chong warns that seeking simultaneous accommodation of both the United States and China may produce “diminishing returns and growing risks for Singapore” (Chong 2017). There are also increasing concerns that Beijing may capitalize on its influence over ethnic Chinese to interfere in Singapore’s foreign policymaking, and that chauvinism among ethnic Chinese may threaten the city-state’s multiracial national identity (Sim 2019; Tan 2017, 11–31).

The persistence of Singapore’s hedging strategy amid systemic and domestic pressure, to a large extent, can be attributed to its leader’s strong political standing. In the Philippine case, the leaders face a “praetorian society” (Huntington 1965, 386–431). Their political survival is under various threats, including coups, insurgency, and mass protests. On the contrary, there has been no major civil unrest in Singapore since 1969. Mass protests are also rare. Under electoral authoritarianism, the opposition parties are handicapped and can hardly challenge the PAP ruling elites. There has been no alternation of the ruling party in Singapore since its independence. In sum, Singaporean leaders enjoy a greater degree of political security than many of their counterparts in other Southeast Asian countries. The dominant position of the PAP in domestic politics ensures that the ruling elites “have been free from many of the domestic constraints that are characteristic of Western parliamentary democracies” (Leifer 2000). As Foreign Affairs Minister Vivian Balakrishnan proudly states, “no party politics has supervened or interfered in our pursuit of foreign policy. This is a blessing” (Tang 2022). Furthermore, the sense of vulnerability and the philosophy of survival promoted by the PAP has successfully disciplined domestic society. Actors such as labor unions, mass media, corporations, etc. have rarely voiced public criticisms of the PAP’s foreign strategy and exert negligible impacts on policymaking (Lam 2021, 203–217). Therefore, despite domestic concerns, the Singaporean government rapidly repaired its relations with China. In early 2017, the two countries resumed their Joint Council for Bilateral Cooperation Meeting, which was postponed from the year before (Lye 2018, 321–339). Prime Minister Lee Hsien Loong visited Beijing in September.

6 Conclusion

As great power competition escalates, secondary states may find their hedging strategies encounter greater systemic and domestic challenges. As the existing literature suggests, competing great powers exert more pressure on hedgers, pushing them to choose a side. In a departure from previous studies, this article has highlighted the fact that the domestic politics of the hedger also play an important role. The public prefers a consistent foreign strategy and is likely to cast doubts on hedging when it involves contradictory security, economic, and political policies. Nevertheless, leaders serve as a transmission belt between systemic and domestic pressure at one end and foreign strategy at the other. Leaders with a solid support base at home enjoy greater autonomy in foreign policymaking and thus are more capable of resisting systemic pressure and dealing with domestic opposition. Secure leaders have a better chance of maintaining an intense hedging strategy. On the contrary, insecure leaders are more likely to cater to the public and adopt a more consistent foreign strategy, which implies the breakdown of hedging. In this article, we have specified the conditions under which hedging is likely to persist or break down. Nevertheless, the theoretical framework proposed here suffers from some limitations. As discussed above, it does not explain which strategy, balancing or bandwagoning, might emerge when hedging is abandoned. This is a possible avenue for future research.