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Judicializing Schmitt’s “Legality and Legitimacy”

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Abstract

In the Preussen contra Reich case of 1932, Carl Schmitt’s theories on equal chance and law in extreme conditions are interpreted and applied in a court of law, firstly by Schmitt himself, then, going contrary to Schmitt’s interpretation, by Dr. Arnold Brecht and Dr. Hans Peters. This paper will first present the basis of the two theories from Schmitt’s “Legality and Legitimacy,” namely, equal chance and the need for extraordinary measures. Then this paper will focus on the diverging legal interpretations of these two theories, as presented in court by different legal theorists. These divergent interpretations of “equal chance” and “law in extreme conditions,” as presented in the aforementioned case, have yet to reach an international readership, as the case itself has never been fully translated into English. Finally, this paper will question the practical application of the two theories in the reality of the empirical world, which in turn question the relationship between any parliamentary legislative system and law.

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Notes

  1. Known as the Weimar Constitution, as the German National Assembly (the de facto German national parliament following World War 1 and up until June 1920) had gathered in the town of Weimar following the January 1919 national elections in order to write up the constitution.

  2. Vinx (2015a, b), 3.

  3. Ibid., 3.

  4. Brecht (1970), 346–347.

  5. “die Wiederherstellung der öffentlichen Sicherheit und Ordnung im Gebiet des Landes Preußen “; Brecht (1976), 481.

  6. Brecht (1970), 346–347.

  7. Vinx (2015a, b), 4.

  8. Work which would constantly develop and would be challenged by other legal scholars of the time. Nonetheless, Schmitt’s notable works, such as “Die Diktatur” (1921), “Political Theology” (1922), “The Concept of the Political” (1927), “Constitutional Theory” (1928), and the “Guardian of the Constitution” (1931), would leave their impact and be widely discussed.

  9. The Prussian State application consisted of representations from the Prussian State Ministry, as well as representations from the Prussian state coalition government, comprised of the Social Democratic Party and Center Party, and other German Länder (States). See Note 55.

  10. Anschütz et al. (1965).

  11. Arnold Brecht was a jurist with a doctorate in law received at University of Leipzig. Brecht would serve as a civil servant of Germany prior to the Staatsgerichtshof proceedings, from 1918 to 1933. He would serve in various positions, starting from the Ministry of Justice, and eventually in the Ministry of Interior, before being appointed as one of the chief delegates of the Prussian State to the Federal Reichsrat; Britannica. https://www.britannica.com/biography/Arnold-Brecht. Accessed 20 March 2022.

  12. Brecht (1970), 347.

  13. Page 33 in the 2004 “Legality and Legitimacy” edition.

  14. Schmitt (2004), 34.

  15. Hans Peters was a jurist and political scientist, obtaining his doctorate in 1921. Peters would become a member of the Center Party in 1923. Prior to the proceedings at the Staatsgerichtshof in 1933, Peters would work as a senior lecturer at the University of Breslau between 1925 and 1928, before being appointed as an associate professor in public and administrative law at Berlin University. Peters would be appointed by the Prussian Minister of culture in the same year to a post in the ministry; Gedenkstätte Deutscher Widerstand. https://www.gdw-berlin.de/en/recess/biographies/index_of_persons/biographie/view-bio/hans-peters/?no_cache=1. Accessed 20 March 2022.

  16. Schmitt (2004), 69.

  17. Brecht (1970), 347.

  18. The final violent event occurring on 17 July 1932, known as the Altonaer Bluttsonntag, a clash involving the police, the SS and SA (NSDAP), and the Communist Party (KPD).

  19. Brecht (1976), 58.

  20. “die Krisis des Staatsrechts”; Von Trott zu Solz (1997), 85.

  21. Dyzenhaus (1997a, b), 39–85.

  22. It would be in his “Die Diktatur,” whereby Schmitt would propose for a different understanding to then commonly accepted interpretation of Article 48(2) of the Weimar Constitution. Differentiating between “suspending a norm and making an exception from the norm” (Arvidsson et al. 2015, p. 43), Schmitt would argue that Article 48 in fact provides for both. Under such an understanding of Article 48, the President in essence would have unlimited power in order to reestablish law and order (Schmitt [1928] 1964, pp. 215–257).

  23. Vinx (2015a, b), 43. In Arvidsson et al. (2015), 34–49.

  24. Verfassungsrechtliche Aufsätze aus den Jahren 1924–1954: Materialien zu einer Verfassungslehre, Carl Schmitt (1958), 1985, p. 345, as cited in Dyzenhaus (1997a, b), 70.

  25. Acting as legal advisor, and at other times as legal counsel, Schmitt would appear as an important figure amongst the “conservative” political ranks during the Weimar Republic. Upon the ascension of the NSDAP to power in 1933, Schmitt would join in May 1933 the Nazi Party (until 1936), whereby he would initially enjoy professional success and public accolades. Nevertheless, Schmitt would find himself accused as an “opportunist” in 1936. This would lead to his eventual resignation from all official political positions, retaining only his professorship in Berlin.

  26. John P. Mc Cormick, Indentifying or Exploiting the Paradoxes of Constitutional Democracy? (2004), p. xix. In Schmitt (2004), xiii–xliii.

  27. Ibid., xlii–xliii.

  28. Dyzenhaus (1997a, b), 83.

  29. It is important to note that in “Legality and Legitimacy,” Schmitt dedicates certain passages of his book towards analyzing and presenting flaws and prerequisites of the Weimar Constitution and the parliamentary legislative state. Schmitt then also dedicates other passages towards proposing practices and, according to him, the correct interpretation of constitutional law. While the understanding of Schmitt’s “reflections on constitutional guardianship” and other proposed practices can be presumably rebutted as “anti-democratic” (Vinx 2015a, b, p. 47. In Arvidsson et al. 2015, pp. 34–49.), and as such may be pushed aside, his analysis regarding the flaws of the Weimar Constitution and the difficulties a parliamentary legislative state may face, appear to be all the more legally sound and thus prove to be more difficult to “push aside.”.

  30. Weimar Constitution, Article 68.

  31. Schmitt (2004), 27.

  32. Schmitt (2004), 39.

  33. “A resolution of the Reichstag (the federal parliament, the lower house of the legislature) requires a simple majority of the votes cast”; Weimar Constitution, Article 32.

  34. Schmitt (2004), 31.

  35. Ibid., 31.

  36. Ibid., 31.

  37. The Weimar Constitution would provide for the electoral process of the law making Reichstag parliament, with Article 22 providing for the “universal, equal, direct and secret suffrage of all men and women over twenty years of age.” Elections would occur every 4 years, in accordance with Article 23.

  38. Schmitt (2004), 29.

  39. Schmitt (2004), 32.

  40. Ibid., 33.

  41. Ibid., 33.

  42. Ibid., 34.

  43. Schmitt’s “ambitious Weimar-era critique of the fundaments of liberal constitutionalism” would constitute “one of the most impressive contemporary attempts to formulate a theoretical antipode to liberal constitutionalism” (Scheuerman 1996, p. 300). As a product of liberal constitutionalism, the Weimar Constitution would find itself at the center of Schmitt’s work up until 1932, with works such as “Die Diktatur,” “The Concept of the Political,” and “Constitutional Theory.”.

  44. Schmitt (2008), 62.

  45. Contrary to the legal order of a parliamentary legislative state, as intended by the Weimar Constitution, Schmitt would argue that, according to the “unanimously recognized” interpretation of Article 48, the President appeared to enjoy now “a right to issue decrees with the force of law, even of Reich statutes” (Schmitt 2004, p. 67).

  46. In “Legality and Legitimacy,” Schmitt makes the case that the Weimar Constitution provides for three extraordinary lawmakers, going beyond the ordinary procedure of lawmaking in parliament. The first extraordinary lawmaker is parliament when voting with a “qualified majority” threshold. According to the Weimar Constitution, a “qualified majority” threshold is needed when voting on certain issues (“Ratione Materiae”). The second extraordinary lawmaker are the people when voting in “direct, plebiscitary” referendums (“Rationae Supremitatis”). Article 73 of the Weimar Constitution provides for the instances in which such referendums may occur. The third extraordinary lawmaker is the president with his power of decree in times of emergency, according to Article 48 of the Weimar Constitution (“Ratione Necessitatis”).

  47. Schmitt (2004), 67.

  48. According to Article 68(1), “proposed statues are introduced by the Reich government or by the membership of the Reichstag,” upon where “Reich statues are [then] concluded by the Reichstag” (Article 68(2)).

  49. Schmitt (2004), 67.

  50. Ibid., 69.

  51. Ibid., 69.

  52. “If in the German Reich the public safety and order are being significantly disturbed or endangered, the President can utilize the necessary measures to restore public safety and order, if necessary with the air of armed force”; Weimar Constitution, Article 48(2).

  53. Schmitt (2004), 69.

  54. “Die Rechtsnormen sind gerade für den Fall vorhanden”; Brecht (1976), 58.

  55. In addition to the Prussian state government’s appeal to the Staatsgerichtshofs, the following parties would also bring suits against the Preussenschlag: “the Center Party and the Social Democratic Party in the Prussian Landtag, the individual members of the Prussian government who had been removed from their offices, and the states of Baden and Bayern” (Vinx 2015a, b, p. 263).

  56. The decree authorizing the Preussenschlag would rely on the first two paragraphs of Article 48; (1) If a Land does not fulfill its duties according to the Reich Constitution or Reich statutes, the President can compel it to do so with the aid of armed forces; (2) If in the German Reich the public safety and order are being significantly disturbed or endangered, the President can utilize the necessary measures to restore public security and order, if necessary with the aid of armed force. For this purpose, he may provisionally suspend in whole or in part, the basic rights established in Articles 114, 115, 117, 118, 123, 124, and 153.

  57. Dyzenhaus (1997a, b), 124. In The American Political Science Review, vol. 91, no. 1, American Political Science Association (1997), 121–34.

  58. Vinx (2015a, b), 4.

  59. Dyzenhaus (1997a, b), 124. In “The American Political Science Review, vol. 91, no. 1,” American Political Science Association (1997), 121–34.

  60. Vinx (2015a, b), 4.

  61. The court did hold that any Presidential decree under Article 48 could not contradict the Weimar Constitution. Therefore, it could not “infringe on Article 17, which provided that each Land should have its own constitution and government,” Article 63, which “guaranteed its representation in the Reichsrat [State Assembly],” and ultimately Article 33 “which gave each Land the right to be represented” before the Reichstag (Dyzenhaus 1997a, b, p.124). In The American Political Science Review, vol. 91, no. 1, American Political Science Association (1997), 121–34. 10.2307/2952263.

  62. Ibid., 124.

  63. Vinx (2015a, b), 4.

  64. Carl Schmitt, “Schlußrede vor dem Staatagerictshof in Peizig in dem Prozeß contra Reich “ in Carl Schmitt, Posiitionen und Begriffe im Kampf mit Weimar – Genf – Versailles 1923–1939, p. 226. In Vinx (2015a, b), 222–227.

  65. Vinx (2015a, b), 5.

  66. Brecht (1976), 11.

  67. Schmitt (2004), 33.

  68. “Krise des parlamentarischen Lebens “; Brecht (1976), 11.

  69. Ibid., 12.

  70. “Reichspräsident Hindenburg lehnte diese Forderung sehr bestimmt mit der Begründung ab, dass er es vor seinem Gewissen und seinen Pflichten dem Vaterlande gegenüber nicht verantworten koenne, die gesamte Regierungsgewalt ausschliesslich der nationalsozialistischen Bewegung übertragen, die diese Macht einseitig anzuwenden gewillt sei.“; Ibid., 12.

  71. “Die Zügellosigkeit, die aus dem Aufruf des Führers der naitonalsozialistischen Bewegung spricht, passt schlecht zu den Ansprüchen auf die Staatsfuehrung.“; Ibid., p.12.

  72. Schmitt (2004), 33.

  73. “Gerade solche “Kunstgriffe” und die missbräuchliche Benutzung formaler Möglichkeiten wirken politisch aufreizen und vergiften das ganze öffentliche Leben “; Brecht (1976), 27.

  74. Ibid., 27.

  75. Seiberth (2001).

  76. “President Hindenburg rejected this demand very forcefully, declaring that he could not bear the responsibility before his conscience and his duties toward the fatherland if he conferred all governmental power exclusively on the National Socialists, who intended to use this power one-sidedly”; Brecht (1970), 341.

  77. “Wer entschiedet darüber, ob eine Partei oder eine grosse Bewegung illegal ist? “; Brecht (1976), 39.

  78. “Es war gleichzeitig eine Bürgerkriegslage und eine Konfliktslage. Eine Bürgerkriegslage, in der sich mehrere mächtige organisierte Parteien mit sehr starken effektiven Machtmittlen gegnüberstanden, eine Art von Parteikampf, die wesentlich darin bestand, daß man sich gegenseitig für illegal oder als Staatsfeind oder Feind des Volkes oder den Nation erklärte”; “It was a civil war situation and a conflict situation at the same time. A civil war situation in which several powerful organized parties with very strong and effective means of power confronted each other, a kind of party struggle that essentially consisted of declaring each other illegal or an enemy of the state or of the people or of the nation”; Brecht (1976), 39.

  79. “im übringen gibt es wieder christlich deutsche Gewalttaten, noch kommunistiche Gewalttaten, es gibt eben strafbare Handlungen “; Ibid., 39.

  80. “Es handelt sich um die Frage, ob ein Angehöriger dieser Partei Staatsbeamter sein kann, ob es ein Grund für die Entlassung eines Privatangestellten ist “; Ibid., 39.

  81. “unabhängige Regierung “; Brecht (1976), 39.

  82. Ibid., 39.

  83. Schmitt (2004), 34.

  84. Brecht (1970), 362.

  85. Brecht (1976), 41.

  86. “storm troopers”; Brecht (1976), 41–42.

  87. Ibid., 58.

  88. Page 69 in the 2004 “Legality and Legitimacy” edition.

  89. Schmitt (2004), 69.

  90. Ibid., 69.

  91. “die Rechstnormen sind gerade für den Fall vorhanden, wo Schwierigkeiten hervortreten “; Brecht (1976), 58.

  92. From the beginning of the Weimar Republic up until the proceedings of 1932, Schmitt had produced an elaborate amount of work on legal theory. His work would be highly contested and debated amongst the legal field of Weimar Germany. See Note 8 for further notable publications up until 1932 by Schmitt.

  93. “in diese gewisse Werturteile hineinlegt, und dann auf Grund dieser Werturteile rechtliche Folgerungen zieht “; Brecht (1976), 57.

  94. “dort wird als Grundsatz für das Staatsrecht die sinn- und situationsgemasesse Verfassungsauslegung aufestellt “; Ibid., 57.

  95. “hat jeder Teilnehmer der Rechtsordnung Anspruch darauf, dass das, was geschieht, von ihm vorausberechnet werden kann “; Ibid., 58.

  96. “the protection of the weaker against the strong, the politically more powerful, the economically more powerful, and so on”; “der Schutz des Schwächeren gegen den Starken, den politisch Mächtigeren, wirtschaftlich Mächtigeren usw,” Brecht (1976), 59.

  97. “dem ganzen Schwergewicht des Faktischen zu ihren Gunsten zu arbeiten sucht “; Ibid., 58.

  98. “die Rechtsnormen nicht gemacht für den Normalfall “; Ibid., 58.

  99. “Rechttsstaat ist … ein Staat, der den Willen und die Kraft hat, das positive Recht durchzusetzen und den Bürger vor Willkür und Ungerechtigkeit zu schützen”; “Rechtsstaat,” Hans Peters, 1951, as cited in Von Trott zu Solz (1997), 96.

  100. “If constitutional controversies arise within a state, for the decision of which there is no competent court, or should controversies of a public nature arise between different states or between the Reich and a single state, the Supreme Judicial Court of the German Reich shall decide the controversy on the appeal of either of the contesting parties, if no other court of the Reich is competent. The President of the Reich shall execute the decision of the Supreme Judicial Court.”; Weimar Constitution, Article 19.

  101. “soll fast alles mittels einer situationsgemässen Verfassung möglich sein “; Brecht (1976), 58.

  102. Weimar Constitution, Article 48(2).

  103. Hans Kelsen, Das Urteil des Staatsgerictshof vom 25. Oktober 1932, [The Court’s Judgment of 25 October 1932], Die Justiz, 6 (1930–31), p. 576. In Dyzenhaus (1997a, b), 3.

  104. Dyzenhaus (1997a, b), 128. In The American Political Science Review, vol. 91, no. 1, American Political Science Association (1997), 121–34.

  105. Vinx (2015a, b), 7.

  106. Law according to the theory of hierarchy entails that law is to be understood as a “step-wise sequence of enactments in which the creation of any legal norm is authorized by higher-level legal norms.” According to such an understanding, “there is no qualitative difference, only to one degree, between the activity of a legislator and that of a judge”; Ibid., 7–8.

  107. 107Ibid., 8.

  108. Dyzenhaus (1997a, b), 131. In The American Political Science Review, vol. 91, no. 1, American Political Science Association (1997), 121–34.

  109. Ibid., 130.

  110. Dyzenhaus (2005), 83. In Ramraj et al. (2005), 65–89.

  111. Dyzenhaus uses the example of torture to highlight this point. Torture is an act “absolutely prohibited by international law and by the domestic laws of many states.” However, certain instances may warrant that “officials consider that they have to torture to avoid a catastrophe.” The Supreme Court of Israel provides for a judgment on this very issue, on 6 September 1999, concerning the “Legality of the General Security Services’ Interrogations Methods”; Dyzenhaus (2005), 83. In Ramraj et al. (2005), 65–89.

  112. An “after-the-fact recognition that they [the government] made an excusable decision because it was necessary to act and the law did not provide them with the resources they needed”; Ibid., 84.

  113. Gross (2005), 92. In Ramraj et al. (2005), 90–106.

  114. This would require the government (public officials) to openly acknowledge “their actions and the extra-legal nature of such actions,” adhering to the necessities of a “particular case.” Such an action would be considered a “violation of the relevant rule” and the legal order, until society (the people) determine on whether or not the actor receives “ex post” approval of their actions; Ibid., 92.

  115. Der Geist des Römischen Rechts, Rudolph von Jhering, 1852, as cited in Stein (2018), 121.

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Acknowledgements

I would like to thank Dr. Miluše Kindlová for her valuable guidance throughout this endeavor.

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  1. Faculty of Law, Charles University, Prague, Czech Republic

    Alexander Carl Dinopoulos

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    Alexander Carl Dinopoulos

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Dinopoulos, A.C. Judicializing Schmitt’s “Legality and Legitimacy”. Jus Cogens 4, 155–179 (2022). https://doi.org/10.1007/s42439-022-00062-9

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