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On the (Im)Possibility of Global Norms in a Divided World: Lessons from the Seventeenth Century

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Abstract

In order to develop a deep and detailed reflection on global norms, international law scholars need to pay more attention to insights supplied by the discussions on the philosophical problem of universals. Using the examples of the discussion on universals in Leibniz and Hobbes, the paper demonstrates the importance of the philosophical problem of universals to discussions on the possibility of global norms. In particular, the comparative study of Leibniz and Hobbes demonstrates that a world divided in states mostly presupposes a denial of universals and thus an impossibility of truly global norms. Although in such a world cooperation and agreement between states is desirable and possible, the resulting agreement does not reach the threshold of normativity required under this view. On the other hand, truly global norms become possible if one accepts the existence of universals following Leibnizian tradition. However, in this case, the nature of normativity changes. Moreover, while states do not need to disappear, their role changes significantly and the main unit of consideration becomes the individual human being. Under this view, a wide variety of actors at the international arena are accorded equal importance. Based on lessons learned from this discussion, the article demonstrates how the questions raised by an explicit inclusion of the philosophical problem of universals into debates about global norms have continuing relevance today. It also suggests some possible avenues for future research.

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Notes

  1. The literature on universality in international law is very rich and covers a wide variety of approaches. It remains a hotly debated topic. For example, the 2018 Annual Conference of the European Society of International Law had as its theme the topic of ‘International Law and Universality’. For some examples of debates on universality in international law, see Simma (2009), Klabbers (2018) and Nollkaemper (2011).

  2. The problem of universals can be traced back to classical Greek philosophy. It underwent significant modification and was enriched by the subsequent scholarship in philosophy. For a good recent overview of the contemporary philosophical debates on the problem of universals, see Galluzzo and Loux (2015).

  3. For an example of such an account, see e.g. Ginsburg (2010), 29–31. For quite a recent assessment of the significance of the Peace of Westphalia for the emergence of the territorial state system which forms the basis of international law as being ‘without parallel’, see Hassan (2006), 63.

  4. Toulmin (1992), 16. For various accounts of the crisis of the seventeenth century, see e.g. Mousnier (1953), Hobsbawn (1954a), Hobsbawn (1954b) and Trevor-Roper (1959).

  5. See for instance Rabb (1975), chapter III.

  6. Wilson (2010), 779. The author also highlights how this account started to change slowly at the very end of the eighteenth century (ibid); however, it is important to realise the impact of the account of atrocities on contemporaries, including such scholar as Leibniz and Hobbes. The atrocities of the war were known in England through publications such as Dr. Vincent’s The Lamentations of Germany and Wilson highlights: ‘All parties in the subsequent British Civil Wars struggled to avoid their conflict descending into the depravity they believed affected Germany.’ (ibid).

  7. Elliott (1992), 51. Similarly, but from a different perspective, Koenigsberger (1978), 202 especially.

  8. On the importance of philosophy broadly understood for the academic education in the seventeenth century, see Tuck (1998). It should be noted that due to this tendency of many seventeenth-century scholars, and especially of the two scholars selected for the purposes of this article, to aim at providing a complete explanation of the way our world works, they did not strictly separate for example metaphysical questions from political explanations. The problem we face today is that international law scholars’ reception of notions developed in the seventeenth century often occurs in oblivion of these notions’ metaphysical foundations. For more detail on this aspect of Hobbes’s thought, see Yahyaoui Krivenko (2020), chapter 2.2.1. As far as Leibniz is concerned, see discussion in chapter 1.1 and on p. 85 on scientia generalis with further references.

  9. For an accessible introduction to the problem of universals in early modern philosophy, see Di Bella and Schmaltz (2017).

  10. For example, in Leviathan Hobbes states: ‘substance and body, signify the same thing; and therefore substance incorporeal are words, which when they are joined together, destroy one another, as if a man should say, an incorporeal body.’ (Hobbes 1839b, II.34, 381).

  11. The size of this article does not allow providing a detailed elaboration of the link between mathematics and justice in Leibniz. My interpretation of this link emerges from the analysis in Yahyaoui Krivenko (2020) in general.

  12. Although this piece is usually referred to as a single work following the first edition of this work by Mollat and Loemker’s English translation, the recent scholarship demonstrates that these are actually two different pieces. The dating of these two pieces to 1703 is also the result of this same research. The original text of both pieces with detailed editorial notes can be found in Li (2015), 140ff.

  13. For a powerful defence of this thesis, see Mates (1989), 171–173.

  14. See for instance Leibniz (1710), I.20, 135: ‘… eternal verities which are in the understanding of God, independently of his will.’

  15. Here I mainly refer to Leibniz’s work on scientia generalis, characteristica universalis and encyclopedia generalis. These three areas are interrelated and taken together can be described as aiming at discovery of truths and invention of new knowledge. For more on these, see Burkhardt (1987), Couturat (1901), Leduc (2014), Pelletier (2018), Rateau (2018) and Schneider (1994).

  16. All Hobbes’s major works on law and politics, such as Leviathan or De Cive, start with the depiction of human psychology or what moves human beings. This follows Hobbes construction of a philosophical explanation from matter (body). Particularly telling in this regard is his trilogy Elements of Philosophy, which starts with the section on body, then continues with the section on man and concludes with the section on law and politics: Elementorum philosophiae sectio prima de corpore (1655); Elementorum philosophiae sectio secunda de homine (1658) and Elementorum philosophiae sectio tertia de cive (1642). Hobbes’s emphasis on human psychology in describing the process of best possible construction of universal norms positions his heritage very close to contemporary debates in international relations’ constructivism, which is perhaps not very surprising, but also to the moral foundations theory in psychology, which might be more surprising to many. This highlights again the significance of the broader framework of the philosophical problem of universals to contemporary discussions on global norms as discussed later in this article.

  17. For a brief overview of the state of nature in Hobbes’s works, see for instance Hoekstra (2007) or Navari (1996). A very detailed study of Hobbes’s view of the state of nature, including variations across different works, is Eggers (2008).

  18. On the importance of motion in Hobbes’s political theory, including his depiction of the state of nature and the ensuing establishment and functioning of the commonwealth, see Jakonen (2013) and Slomp (2011). The remaining discussion in this paragraph is based on Hobbes’s Leviathan and De Cive interpreted in light of Jakonen’s and Slomp’s work.

  19. After Leibniz arrived at this definition of justice arguably already in May 1677, he never changed it or deviated from it significantly until his death in 1716. Before this, Leibniz produced several preliminary attempts at connecting love and justice in a definition, but never returned back to them. Therefore, the definition he retained and regarded as final was that of justice as the charity of the wise. On these points, see Horowska (2017) and Schneider (1986).

  20. See on this note 15.

  21. See Leibniz (1694–1698), 579, where he emphasises that wisdom as a science of happiness is what needs to be studied above anything else.

  22. Leibniz (1667), Part 1, para. 9, 4–5. In the whole book, there is only this one paragraph dedicated to this issue.

  23. Riley says that in Leibniz ‘love is “affective”, wisdom “cognitive”’ (Riley 1996, 5). While love is affective in certain sense, the fact that the mature definition is based on charity (not love) and wisdom, the action element in ‘love’ or later ‘charity’ part of the definition is more important to highlight than the affective element. As I argue later in this chapter, affective element which is more closely linked to happiness than love serves as a bridging device connecting action to cognition.

  24. Famously, it is reported that at Leibniz’s death Nova Methodus marked with marginal annotations laid open on his desk: Johns (2013), 165, note 2; Berkowitz (2005), 12; and Schneider (1967), 50.

  25. Both works are contained in Grua (1948), 791–797 and 819–838, respectively. For a discussion of these pieces and their analysis form the perspective of systematisation of law, see König (1998); for their consideration from the perspective of codification as well as their impact on several codifications projects in Germany, see Berkowitz (2005).

  26. Of course, neither Hobbes nor Leibniz utilised the term ‘global norms’ or the adjective ‘global’ in relation to anything but the ‘spherical form’. The first uses of ‘global’ as connoting something comprehensive or worldwide are attested only in the nineteenth century (see The Oxford English Dictionary entry 2 for ‘global’, online edition consulted at www.oed.com). However, this does not mean that seventeenth-century scholars could not envisage a concept which has for instance worldwide validity. This is clearly part of Leibniz’s articulation of universal eternal truths and his vision of percepts of justice.

  27. The clearest statement is contained in Leviathan: ‘For if we could suppose a great multitude of men to consent in the observation of justice, and other laws of nature, without a common power to keep them all in awe; we might as well suppose all mankind to do the same; and then there would be, no need to be any civil government, or commonwealth at all; because there would be peace without subjection’ (Hobbes 1839b, II.17, 155).

  28. This interpretation of Hobbes’s view of the interstate relations does not correspond to the dominant in international law perception of Hobbes as an advocate of the equation of the international relations to anarchy. However, this perception of Hobbes’s view of the international as anarchic is due to a misinterpretation of and insufficient attention to his heritage. For a detailed defence of Hobbes’s interpretation presented here, see e.g. Yahyaoui Krivenko (2020), chapter 6.2.3.1, as well as Grewal (2016).

  29. See definition of a treaty provided by Art. 2(1)(a) of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (22 May 1969) 1115 UNTS 331.

  30. This specific point explains the reasons for Hobbes’s equation of the law of nations with the law of nature: ‘Concerning the offices of one sovereign to another, which are comprehended in that law, which is commonly called the law of nature, I need not say anything in that place; because the law of nations, and the law of nature, is the same thing.’ (Hobbes 1839b, II.30, 342).

  31. This comparison to a compass is taken from Schiedermair (1970), 344.

  32. This relative neglect by Leibniz of the theoretical engagement with the concept of state, which was very popular during his lifetime, is well explained in Herrmann (1958). Leibniz obviously was interested in political realities of his time, but not in the theoretical elaboration of one dominant political form. This can be explained by at least two reasons: the human-focused or cognitive nature of his theory of justice and value of diversity in his general philosophical approach, which cannot be addressed here.

  33. Leibniz (1693), 174. Original Latin text reads as follows: ‘extra Rempubl[icam vel inter eos qui summae potestatis participes sunt (quales interdum plures sunt etiam in eadem Republica) locus est. juri Gentium Voluntario, tacito populorum consensus receptor.’ Notable here is the use of term respublica translated as ‘state’ by Riley. Although it is generally a correct translation, if we try to comprehend Leibniz’s position from the perspective of the contemporary international law, this translation obscures the richness of Leibniz’s thought on the issue of political form of life, which also cannot be dealt with here.

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Yahyaoui Krivenko, E. On the (Im)Possibility of Global Norms in a Divided World: Lessons from the Seventeenth Century. Jus Cogens 2, 57–74 (2020). https://doi.org/10.1007/s42439-020-00016-z

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