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Private provision of public good and endogenous income inequality

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Abstract

We model a simple economy with privately provided public good and with two groups of individuals—rich and poor. Only rich people contribute to the public good and they own capital input that is used to produce varieties of private goods under monopolistically competitive market structure. Income inequality is endogenously determined in the unique Nash equilibrium of the economy. We show that government intervention in the form of higher tax rate and/or larger transfer of the tax-revenue from rich to poor would be able to reduce the degree of income inequality. However, the impact of such a policy on the aggregate provision level of the public good is, in general, ambiguous. Income inequality in the market economy is too high and there will be under provision of the public good compared to the planner’s economy even if the planner is only interested in maximizing the welfare of the rich people. We derived the optimal capital and wage income tax rate that implement the first best solution.

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Notes

  1. It is well known that with warm-glow type preferences and/or, status signaling motive in private contributions, neutrality result may break down. See, Bernheim (1986), Bergstrom et al. (1986), Andreoni (1988), Glazer and Konrad (1996), Andreoni and Bergstrom (1996), etc. for more on neutrality results.

  2. See Bergstrom et al. (1986) and Itaya et al. (1997).

  3. As Bergstrom et al. (1986) put it—“the amount supplied by voluntary contributions will tend to be smaller the more equally income is distributed. Thus, if an economy evolves toward a more equal distribution of income we can expect the amount of public goods that would be provided voluntarily to diminish." (pp-43)

  4. There is a large literature on the effect of taxation on voluntary contribution. While the theoretical literature mostly agrees that an increase in tax rate will lead to an increase in donation, there is no consensus about the magnitude of income and prices elasticities of donations in the empirical literature. See, for instance, Reece (1979), Clotfelter (1990), Auten et al. (1992, 2002), Randolph (1995), Vesterlund (2006), Andreoni (2006), List (2011), etc.

  5. With regard to second best (optimal) taxation, our paper, therefore, contributes to the theoretical literature on inequality and efficiency in the context of collective action. There is a large body of literature in this area. See, for example, Ray and Ueda (1996), Cornes and Sandler (1996), Baland and Platteau (1997), Baland and Platteau (1998), Baland and Platteau (1999), Bardhan and Udry (1999), Bardhan et al. (2007), Ray et al. (2007), Baland and Platteau (2007), etc. For recent contributions in the empirical literature on inequality and voluntary giving, see Payne and Smith (2015) and Mastromatteo and Russo (2017), among others.

  6. We give parametric restrictions for which this will be true in the equilibrium.

  7. Sheremeta and Uler (2015) incorporated leakage in government’s redistribution machinery and find its experimental implications.

  8. We have omitted the jth script from the consumption as we will show that each rich consumes the same amount of each varieties of the private good. Thus, if we define \(c_{Hi}^j\) as the consumption of the ith private good by the jth rich agent, then it will be shown that \(c_{Hi}^j=c_{Hi}\) for all j. We will also adopt similar notation for poor agents.

  9. Mondal and Gupta (2022) derived some results related to group size effects on the aggregate provision of the public good. That paper uses a perfectly competitive market structure. The current paper is different from them as the focus here is on redistribution and income inequality.

  10. See theorem 5(v) in Bergstrom et al. (1986).

  11. Note that, this example should also satisfy the inequality restrictions in (21) and (22). It can always be done by an appropriate choice of L.

  12. In Tamai (2010), however, the optimum redistributive tax rate is strictly interior due to his consideration of a dynamic economy with capital accumulation.

  13. See Pecorino (2009), especially footnote 10 in his paper, for a discussion on this approach.

  14. To see this, note that there are n firms/varieties, each produces x units of private goods and each unit of production needs \(\beta\) units of labour. Hence the aggregate amount of labour needed in the production of private goods is given by \(n \beta x\). We have \(n=\frac{K}{\alpha }\), \(x=\frac{r\alpha \theta }{(1-\theta )\beta }\). Similarly, G units of labour are required in the production of the public goods. Therefore, labour market clears when \(n\beta x+G=H+L\). Replacing n and x, we get, \(rK\frac{\theta }{1-\theta }+G=H+L\) which is Eq. (17).

  15. Here, we essentially assume that government represents the interests of the rich. This is similar in spirit to Coate (1995) where government represents rich’s interest in providing necessary help to poor in a model of incomplete insurance.

  16. Appendix V shows that the expression \(t^{opt}\) lies between zero and unity. In Appendix VI, we show that \(\frac{\partial {t^{opt}}}{\partial {\delta }}>0\).

  17. Note that wage rate, w, is normalized to unity in our model.

  18. Similar results are obtained in Pecorino (2009) and Mondal (2015) who showed that higher economic growth may result in lower provision of the public good and welfare. For more results along this line, see Mondal (2013) and Bag and Mondal (2014).

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Acknowledgements

The first author acknowledges the comments received from seminar participants at the Delhi School of Economics and Indian Institute of Management, Kozhikode, India on a previous version of this paper. Any remaining errors are the sole responsibility of the authors.

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Appendices

Appendices

Appendix I

Here we are to show that \(\frac{\partial {(Gini)}}{\partial {\delta }}>0\). For \(t\ne 0\), the expression of Gini obtained from Eq. (23) is given by

$$\begin{aligned} Gini = \frac{1-t+\delta t - \frac{H}{H+L} }{1+\frac{H+L}{rK-G}}. \end{aligned}$$
(I.1)

By assumption, \(Gini\ge 0\). Using Eqs. (19) and (20), we have

$$\begin{aligned} rK-G= & {} \frac{ (1-\theta )(H+L)\delta t + \{ (1-\theta )(H+L)(1-t) H - H \} }{ (1+\theta )\delta t + (1-t)(1+H\theta ) } \nonumber \\ \Rightarrow \; \frac{rK-G}{H+L}= & {} \frac{ (1-\theta )\delta t + \{ (1-\theta )(1-t) H - \frac{H}{H+L} \} }{ (1+\theta )\delta t + (1-t)(1+H\theta ) } \nonumber \\ \Rightarrow \; \frac{H+L}{rK-G}= & {} \frac{ (1+\theta )\delta t + (1-t)(1+H\theta ) }{ (1-\theta )\delta t + \{ (1-\theta )(1-t) H - \frac{H}{H+L} \} } \nonumber \\ \Rightarrow \; 1+ \frac{H+L}{rK-G}= & {} 1+ \frac{ (1+\theta )\delta t + (1-t)(1+H\theta ) }{ (1-\theta )\delta t + \{ (1-\theta )(1-t) H - \frac{H}{H+L} \} } \nonumber \\ \Rightarrow \; 1+ \frac{H+L}{rK-G}= & {} \frac{ 2\delta t + (1+H) (1-t) -\frac{H}{H+L} }{ (1-\theta )\delta t + (1-\theta )(1-t) H - \frac{H}{H+L} }. \end{aligned}$$
(I.2)

Using the above expression and the expression of Gini, we have

$$\begin{aligned} Gini = \frac{\left( 1-t+\delta t - \frac{H}{H+L} \right) \left[ (1-\theta )\delta t + (1-\theta )(1-t) H - \frac{H}{H+L} \right] }{ 2\delta t + (1+H) (1-t) -\frac{H}{H+L}} \end{aligned}$$
(I.3)

We introduce the following notations:

$$\begin{aligned} T_1= & {} 1-t+\delta t - \frac{H}{H+L};\\ T_2= & {} (1-\theta )\delta t + (1-\theta )(1-t) H - \frac{H}{H+L}; \end{aligned}$$

and

$$\begin{aligned} T_3=2\delta t + (1+H) (1-t) -\frac{H}{H+L}. \end{aligned}$$

Then,

$$\begin{aligned} Gini=\frac{T_1T_2}{T_3}. \end{aligned}$$

So, we have the following,

$$\begin{aligned} \frac{T_3}{T_1}= & {} \frac{2\delta t + (1+H) (1-t) -\frac{H}{H+L} }{ 1-t+\delta t - \frac{H}{H+L} } \nonumber \\{} & {} \quad \Rightarrow \quad \frac{1}{2}\frac{T_3}{T_1} = \frac{2\delta t + (1+H) (1-t) -\frac{H}{H+L} }{ 2\delta t +2(1-t) - \frac{2H}{H+L}} \nonumber \\{} & {} \quad \Rightarrow \quad \frac{1}{2}\frac{T_3}{T_1} -1 = \frac{ (H-1)(1-t) + \frac{H}{H+L}}{2\delta t +2(1-t) - \frac{2H}{H+L} } >0. \end{aligned}$$
(I.4)

The expression \(\left( \frac{1}{2}\frac{T_3}{T_1} -1\right)\) is clearly a decreasing function of \(\delta\). Hence, \(\frac{T_3}{T_1}\) falls as \(\delta\) increases. Also \(T_2\) is an increasing function of \(\delta\). Therefore, Gini is increased when \(\delta\) is increased.

Appendix II

Here, we are to show that

$$\begin{aligned} \frac{\partial {G}}{\partial {\delta }}{<}{(}{=}{)}{>}0, \quad \text{ iff, }\quad \frac{(H+L)(H-1)}{H} {<}{(}{=}{)}{>} \frac{1+\theta }{(1-\theta )(1-t)}. \end{aligned}$$

We write the expression of G obtained from Eq. (19) as follows:

$$\begin{aligned} G= & {} \frac{[(1-t) (H+L) (1-\theta ) + H\theta ] + \delta t (H+L)(1-\theta ) }{ (1-t)(1+H\theta ) +\delta t (1+\theta ) }\nonumber \\{} & {} \quad {}\Rightarrow \quad G = \frac{a_1+\delta b_1}{c_1+\delta d_1}; \end{aligned}$$
(II.1)

where

$$\begin{aligned} a_1= & {} (1-t) (H+L) (1-\theta ) + H\theta ;\\ b_1= & {} t (H+L)(1-\theta );\\ c_1= & {} (1-t)(1+H\theta ); \end{aligned}$$

and

$$\begin{aligned} d_1= t(1+\theta ). \end{aligned}$$

From Eq. (II.1), we obtain

$$\begin{aligned} \frac{\partial {G}}{\partial {\delta }} = \frac{\partial {}}{\partial {\delta }} \left( \frac{a_1+\delta b_1}{c_1+\delta d_1}\right) = \frac{b_1c_1-a_1d_1}{(c_1+\delta d_1 )^2}. \end{aligned}$$
(II.2)

Therefore,

$$\begin{aligned}{} & {} \frac{\partial {}}{\partial {\delta }} \left( \frac{a_1+\delta b_1}{c_1+\delta d_1}\right)< (=)> 0, \nonumber \\{} & {} \quad \text{ iff, } \quad b_1c_1<(=)>a_1d_1, \nonumber \\{} & {} \quad \Rightarrow \text{ iff, }\quad t (H+L)(1-\theta )(1-t)(1+H\theta )<(=)> [ (1-t) (H+L) (1-\theta ) + H\theta ]t(1+\theta ),\nonumber \\{} & {} \quad \Rightarrow \text{ iff, }\quad (H+L)(1-\theta )(1-t)[H\theta -\theta ]<(=)> H\theta (1+\theta ), \nonumber \\{} & {} \quad \Rightarrow \text{ iff, }\quad (H+L)(1-\theta )(1-t)(H-1)<(=)> H (1+\theta ), \nonumber \\{} & {} \quad \Rightarrow \text{ iff, }\quad \frac{(H+L)(H-1)}{H} <(=)> \frac{1+\theta }{(1-\theta )(1-t)}. \end{aligned}$$
(II.3)

This proves the result that

$$\begin{aligned} \frac{\partial {G}}{\partial {\delta }}<(=)>0, \quad \text{ iff, }\quad \frac{(H+L)(H-1)}{H} <(=)> \frac{1+\theta }{(1-\theta )(1-t)}. \end{aligned}$$

\(\square\)

Appendix III

Here, we are to show that \(\frac{\partial {G}}{\partial {t}}>0\). Using Eq. (19), we write G as follows:

$$\begin{aligned} G= & {} \frac{H\theta + (H+L)(1-\theta ) - t(1-\delta )(H+L)(1-\theta )}{ 1+H\theta - t [1+H\theta -\delta -\delta \theta ] } \nonumber \\{} & {} \quad \Rightarrow G = \frac{a_2-t b_2}{c_2- t d_2}; \end{aligned}$$
(III.1)

where

$$\begin{aligned} a_2\equiv & {} H\theta + (H+L)(1-\theta );\\ b_2\equiv & {} (1-\delta )(H+L)(1-\theta );\\ c_2\equiv & {} 1+H\theta ; \end{aligned}$$

and

$$\begin{aligned} d_2\equiv 1+H\theta -\delta -\delta \theta . \end{aligned}$$

From Eq. (III.1), we get:

$$\begin{aligned} \frac{\partial {G}}{\partial {t}} = \frac{\partial {}}{\partial {t}} \left( \frac{a_2-t b_2}{c_2- t d_2} \right) = \frac{a_2d_2 - b_2c_2}{(c_2- t d_2 )^2}. \end{aligned}$$
(III.2)

Therefore,

$$\begin{aligned}{} & {} \frac{\partial {}}{\partial {t}} \left( \frac{a_2-t b_2}{c_2- t d_2} \right)> 0, \nonumber \\{} & {} \quad \text{ if, } \quad a_2d_2>b_2c_2,\nonumber \\{} & {} \quad \Rightarrow \text{ if, } \quad [H\theta + (H+L)(1-\theta )][1+H\theta -\delta -\delta \theta ]> (1-\delta )(H+L)(1-\theta ) (1+H\theta ), \nonumber \\{} & {} \quad \Rightarrow \text{ if, }\quad H\theta [1+H\theta -\delta -\delta \theta ]> (H+L)(1-\theta ) [(1-\delta )(1+H\theta ) - 1-H\theta +\delta +\delta \theta ], \nonumber \\{} & {} \quad \Rightarrow \text{ if, } \quad H\theta [1+H\theta -\delta -\delta \theta ]> (H+L)(1-\theta ) [ \delta \theta (1-H) ], \nonumber \\{} & {} \quad \Rightarrow \text{ if, } \quad H\theta [1-\delta +\theta (H-\delta )] > - (H+L)(1-\theta ) [ \delta \theta (H-1) ]. \end{aligned}$$
(III.3)

The left hand side of inequality (III.3) is always positive while its right hand side is always negative for \(H\ge 1\). Hence, inequality (III.3) always holds true for all \(H\ge 1\). This proves the result \(\frac{\partial {G}}{\partial {t}}>0\). \(\square\)

Appendix IV

We are to show that \(\frac{\partial {(Gini)}}{\partial {t}}<0\). We write Gini from Eq. (23) as follows:

$$\begin{aligned} Gini = \frac{1-t(1-\delta ) - \frac{H}{H+L} }{1+\frac{H+L}{rK-G}}. \end{aligned}$$

We take the expression of \(\left( 1+ \frac{H+L}{rK-G}\right)\) as derived in Eq. (I.2) in appendix III, and express it as follows:

$$\begin{aligned} 1+ \frac{H+L}{rK-G}= & {} \frac{ 2\delta t + (1+H) (1-t) -\frac{H}{H+L} }{ (1-\theta )\delta t + (1-\theta )(1-t) H - \frac{H}{H+L} }, \nonumber \\{} & {} \quad \Rightarrow \quad 1+ \frac{H+L}{rK-G} = \frac{ \left[ 1+H-\frac{H}{H+L}\right] - t (1+H-2\delta )}{ \left[ (1-\theta )H-\frac{H}{H+L} \right] - t(1-\theta )(H-\delta ) } \nonumber \\{} & {} \quad \Rightarrow \quad 1+ \frac{H+L}{rK-G} = \frac{ a_3 - t b_3}{ c_3 - td_3 }. \end{aligned}$$
(IV.1)

where,

$$\begin{aligned} a_3\equiv & {} 1+H-\frac{H}{H+L};\\ b_3\equiv & {} 1+H-2\delta ;\\ c_3\equiv & {} (1-\theta )H-\frac{H}{H+L}; \end{aligned}$$

and

$$\begin{aligned} d_3\equiv (1-\theta )(H-\delta ). \end{aligned}$$

Differentiating the R.H.S. expression in Eq. (IV.1) with respect to t, we get;

$$\begin{aligned} \frac{\partial {}}{\partial {t}} \left( \frac{ a_3 - t b_3}{ c_3 - td_3 }\right) = \frac{a_3d_3-b_3c_3}{(c_3 - td_3 )^2}. \end{aligned}$$
(IV.2)

Therefore,

$$\begin{aligned}{} & {} \frac{\partial {}}{\partial {t}} \left( \frac{ a_3 - t b_3}{ c_3 - td_3 }\right)> 0, \nonumber \\{} & {} \quad \text{ iff, } \quad a_3d_3>b_3c_3,\nonumber \\{} & {} \quad \Rightarrow \quad \text{ iff, }\quad \left( 1+H-\frac{H}{H+L}\right) (1-\theta )(H-\delta )> (1+H-2\delta ) \left( (1-\theta )H-\frac{H}{H+L} \right) ,\nonumber \\{} & {} \quad \Rightarrow \quad \text{ iff, } \quad \frac{H}{H+L } \left[ 1-\delta +\theta (H -\delta ) \right] > - (1-\theta )\delta (H-1). \end{aligned}$$
(IV.3)

However, this inequality is always true since its left hand side is always positive and the right hand side is always negative for \(H\ge 1\). Hence, \(\frac{\partial {}}{\partial {t}} \left( \frac{ a_3 - t b_3}{ c_3 - td_3 }\right) >0\); and this implies that, \(\frac{\partial {}}{\partial {t}} \left( 1+ \frac{H+L}{rK-G} \right) >0\). This further implies that \(\frac{\partial {(Gini)}}{\partial {t}}<0\) because the numerator of the Gini expression is always a negative function of t. \(\square\)

Appendix V

Here we are to show that,

$$\begin{aligned} 0\le \frac{(H+L-\theta L)(H-1)}{(H+L-\theta L)(H-\delta ) - (1-\delta )\{L-\theta (H+L)\}}\le 1, \quad \text{ for } \text{ all }\;\; \delta \in [0,1]. \end{aligned}$$

First we show that it does not exceed unity.

$$\begin{aligned}{} & {} \frac{(H+L-\theta L)(H-1)}{(H+L-\theta L)(H-\delta ) - (1-\delta )\{L-\theta (H+L)\}} \le 1 \\{} & {} \quad \Rightarrow \quad (H+L-\theta L)(H-1) \le (H+L-\theta L)(H-\delta ) - (1-\delta )\{L-\theta (H+L)\}\\{} & {} \quad \Rightarrow \quad -(H+L-\theta L)(1-\delta ) \le -(1-\delta ) \{L-\theta (H+L)\}\\{} & {} \quad \Rightarrow \quad -(1-\delta ) \le \theta (1-\delta ). \end{aligned}$$

This last expression is always true for all \(\delta \in [0,1]\). Next, we are to show that

$$\begin{aligned} \frac{(H+L-\theta L)(H-1)}{(H+L-\theta L)(H-\delta ) - (1-\delta )\{L-\theta (H+L)\}}\ge 0. \end{aligned}$$

Since the numerator of this expression is always non-negative for \(H\ge 1\), we are to show that the denominator is positive. This implies that

$$\begin{aligned}{} & {} (H+L-\theta L)(H-\delta ) - (1-\delta )\{L-\theta (H+L)\}>0\\{} & {} \quad \Rightarrow (H+L) [H-\delta + (1-\delta )\theta ]>L [ 1-\delta + \theta (H-\delta ) ] \\{} & {} \quad \Rightarrow H [H-\delta + (1-\delta )\theta ]> L [ 1-\delta + \theta (H-\delta ) -H+\delta -\theta +\theta \delta ] \\{} & {} \quad \Rightarrow H [H-\delta + (1-\delta )\theta ]> L [ 1-\theta +\theta H -H ] \\{} & {} \quad \Rightarrow H [H-\delta + (1-\delta )\theta ]> L (1-\theta )(1-H) \\{} & {} \quad \Rightarrow H [H-\delta + (1-\delta )\theta ] > - L (1-\theta )(H-1). \end{aligned}$$

However, this is always true for \(H\ge 1\) and \(\delta \in [0,1]\). Hence, the proof follows. \(\square\)

Appendix VI

Here we show that \(\frac{\partial {t^{opt}}}{\partial {\delta }}>0\).

Using Eqs. (19) and (28), we find that

$$\begin{aligned}{} & {} G^*=G^m\\{} & {} \quad \Rightarrow \frac{(1-t+\delta t)(H+L)(1-\theta )+H\theta }{(1-t)(1+H\theta )+\delta t (1+\theta )} = \frac{H+L(1-\theta )}{1+\theta }. \end{aligned}$$

With some rearrangement, we solve for \(t=t^{opt}\) as follows:

$$\begin{aligned} t^{opt}=\frac{[H+L(1-\theta )]\theta (H-1)}{(H+L)\theta (H+\theta ) - L\theta (H\theta +1) - \delta (1+\theta )H\theta }. \end{aligned}$$
(VI.1)

When \(\delta =1\), the denominator of the above expression becomes

$$\begin{aligned}{} & {} (H+L)\theta (H+\theta ) - \theta \left[ L(H\theta +1) - (1+\theta )H\right] \\{} & {} \quad = \theta (H-1)(H+L(1-\theta ))\ge 0. \end{aligned}$$

Therefore, we get \(t^{opt}=1\) when evaluated at \(\delta =1\). From the expression of \(t^{opt}\) in (VI.1), we can see that \(\delta\) only affect the denominator and an increase in \(\delta\) lowers the denominator monotonically. Therefore, we can clearly state that

$$\begin{aligned} \frac{\partial {t^{opt}}}{\partial {\delta }}>0. \end{aligned}$$

\(\square\)

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Mondal, D., Gupta, M.R. Private provision of public good and endogenous income inequality. Ind. Econ. Rev. 58, 399–425 (2023). https://doi.org/10.1007/s41775-023-00204-w

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