Abstract
The issue of divisive referendums, which Professor Frey identifies as one of the problems of “Democracy of the Future”, is a special case of emerging tribalism (division into non-communicating competitive groups in political and social life). This article proposes an alternative institutional solution to address tribalism in both direct and representative democracy. It introduces competition for agenda setting in referendums such that more inclusive solutions emerge; it also proposes the adoption of an electoral system that multiplies the options of the public both in direct and representative democracy in order to further empower the general public.
This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution to check access.
Similar content being viewed by others
Notes
Exceptions from this statement are cases where the position is not considered a privilege that people seek (jury duty), or has side payments like body of electors which could be corrupted (as in Venetian elections). Finally, while a lottery as the final stage of voting is a system that produces strategy-proof electoral system according to Gibbard’s Theorem it is not clear why one would want such system (Gibbard 1973).
The word is in quotation marks, because in multidimensional spaces the probability that there will be a median in all dimensions is zero, but one could consider some other central location like the center of the yolk (Ferejohn et al. Ferejohn et al. 1984).
The text said: “Should the text submitted by the European Commission, the European Central Bank, and the IMF to the Eurogroup of 25/06/15 and composed by two parts representing their complete proposal be accepted?” (the titles (alone) of the two parts in English and Greek follow, and can be seen in the photocopy below
The interested reader should notice that the negative response endorsed by the government is presented on top.
The results of the recent election in Catalonia, where a majority of voters supported the side of remaining in Spain, is forcing a kolotoumba of the separatists, since a referendum would not support their goals.
Actually, if we take into account the fact that each person may use a different voice volume to support each candidate, this is a form of “range” voting, similar to the way the jury scores Olympic athletes today. But approval voting is a special category of range voting.
With no success, but given the US record of electoral system change it is not disappointing or even surprising. Actually, it would be a re-introduction because, as stated in Tsebelis (2014), “Approval voting has been the most stable electoral system in the history of our country (1864–1920). It was imported from Eptanisa, which got it from the Venetian Empire.”.
The interested reader can see a model of this electoral system. By changing names and percentages of parties one can calculate the results for their own country. Visit https://sites.lsa.umich.edu/tsebelis/data/ and click on “Multiple Vote Electoral System”.
References
Brams, S., Fishburn, P., & Merrill, S. (1988). The responsiveness of approval voting: Comments on Saari and Van Newenhizen. Public Choice, 59, 121–131.
Felsenthal, D. S “Review of Paradoxes Afflicting Procedures for Electing a Single Candidate” In Felsenthal & Machover, (Eds.). (2012). Electoral systems: Paradoxes, assumptions, and procedures. P 19-91 Springer Science & Business Media, New York.
Ferejohn, J. A., McKelvey, R. D., & Packel, E. W. (1984). Limiting distributions for continuous state Markov voting models. Social Choice and Welfare, 1(1), 45–67.
Frey, B. S. (2017). Proposals for a democracy of the future. Homo Oeconomicus, 34, 1–9.
Gerber, E. R. (1996). Legislative response to the threat of popular initiatives. American Journal of Political Science, 40(1), 99–128.
Gibbard, Allan. (1973). Manipulation of voting schemes: A General Result. Econometrica., 41(4), 587–601.
Hug, S., & Tsebelis, G. (2002). Veto players and referendums around the world. Journal of Theoretical Politics, 14(4), 465–515.
Laslier, J. F., & Sanver, M. R. (Eds.). (2010). Handbook on approval voting. New York: Springer Science & Business Media.
Matsusaka, J. G. (1995). Fiscal effects of the voter initiative: Evidence from the last 30 Years. Journal of Political Economy, 103(3), 587–623.
Matsusaka, John G. (2000). Fiscal effects of the voter initiative in the first half of the Twentieth Century. Journal of Law and Economics, 43, 619–644.
McGhee, E., & Shor, B. (2017). Has the Top Two Primary Elected More Moderates? Perspectives on Politics, 15(4), 1053–1066.
Nurmi, Hannu. (1999). Voting Paradoxes and How to Deal with Them. Berlin, Heidelberg and New York: Springer.
Plutarch (1888). Lycurgus. In A. H. Clough (Ed.), J. Dryden (Trans.), Lives of illustrious men. Boston: Little, Brown and Co.
Regenwetter, Michel, & Grofman, Bernard. (1998). Approval voting, borda winners, and condorcet winners: Evidence from Seven Elections. Management Science, 44, 520–533.
Saari, D. G., & Van Newenhizen, J. (1988). The problem of indeterminacy in approval, multiple, and truncated voting systems. Public Choice, 59, 101–120.
Tsebelis, G. (2002). Veto players: How political institutions work. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
Tsebelis, G. (2014). The Greek constitution from a political science point of view. Greek Political Science Review, 42, 145–172.
Author information
Authors and Affiliations
Corresponding author
Additional information
A derogatory Greek term for summersault, which in this case means an unexpected U-turn. First used for the transformation of the Greek population’s NO vote in the 2015 referendum into a resounding YES by PM Tsipras.
Rights and permissions
About this article
Cite this article
Tsebelis, G. How Can We Keep Direct Democracy and Avoid “Kolotoumba”. Homo Oecon 35, 81–90 (2018). https://doi.org/10.1007/s41412-018-0069-4
Received:
Accepted:
Published:
Issue Date:
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s41412-018-0069-4