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The complex challenges and opportunities of the industrial and energy sectors (IESs) in the time of climate politics: carbon capture, utilisation, and storage (CCUS) in France as a case study

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Abstract

This article contributes to the history of both climate policies and industrial and energy sectors (IESs) dynamics in France, through the analysis of discourses and practices around a climate technology: CCUS (carbon capture, utilisation, and storage). We show that while CCUS has been continuously promoted as a decarbonisation technology in speeches, the main goal of its promoters in practice has instead been research and R&D cooperation, plus funding. With rare exceptions, CCUS has remained politically disconnected from the issues of energy independence and deindustrialisation. This brings into question the French technocratic and political elites’ commitment to undertaking these two missions. Of course, some public players stress that they do not want to confuse the debate over CCUS, or make it more controversial, since reindustrialisation tends to generate new domestic CO2 emissions. Nonetheless, other factors can explain the very marginal space made for energy independence and deindustrialisation in the CCUS discourses. Firstly, many members of the political, expertise, and industrial elites demonstrate a certain self-satisfaction over the level of decarbonisation and energy independence, mainly related to France’s unique development of nuclear power. Secondly, the issue of reindustrialisation has always been rather low on the French governmental agenda. Besides this, the practices of CCUS promoters raise a democratic problem. Firstly, most public planners still think of the question of decarbonisation in a way that is rather disconnected from other issues of public action. Secondly, decisions about IESs and climate are still often made in a classic State-centred technocratic problem-management style, and/or are kept in a confined technical sphere. By studying the case of CCUS, this article both contributes to the complex history of French IESs in the time of climate politics, and opens up the present debates over decarbonisation and IESs to greater complexity.

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Data availability

The textual sources we quoted are publicly available data; we fully referenced them at the end of the article. We also used interview material; we will make the list of interviewees available to the editor whenever we are asked to.

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Notes

  1. The IPCC usually defines the “industrial” sector as the mining of ores and minerals, manufacturing, construction, and waste management (the largest source of global greenhouse gases (GHG) and CO2 emission), and the “energy” sector as the energy supply facilities. The industrial facilities relevant for CCUS mainly belonged to heavy industry in the first stage (1990s–2000s) but have diversified since then.

  2. Naturally, recurrent (near-continuous) debates have also been waged about the level of taxation and salary. Though we recognise them to be part of a long-term strategy of IESs actors, they are very volatile, being highly dependent on the government’s political stripes, market fluctuation, inflation rate, and so on.

  3. A “climate technology” is defined as a technological substitute for technologies emitting more GHG gases.

  4. Existing empirical studies, including ours, are now numerous and robust enough to define three main phases of decarbonisation in the French and European IESs since the 1990s: 1992–2004, 2005–2014, and 2015–. Of course, this is one possible periodisation among others. The last period is still ongoing, since we cannot predict whether recent events — the war in Ukraine, the implementation of the “France 2030 plan,” etc. — will be major game-changers or not. Here, we do not take into account any post-2022 material.

  5. Zhu et al., (2023, p. 7) estimates France ranks tenth in terms of the number of CCUS patents. The top four are non-European countries — China, the USA, Japan, and South Korea — followed by the European Patent Office, and Germany.

  6. BRGM (Bureau des Recherches Géologiques et Minières) is the National Geological Survey, and IFP (Institut Français du Pétrole, renamed Institut Français du Pétrole et des Énergies Nouvelles (IFP(EN)) in 2010) is the French School, or Institute, of oil and new energies.

  7. Ademe is the Agence de la transition écologique, the main public agency in charge of ecology management.

  8. In Germany, there is a direct urgency for decarbonising coal-fired power stations. In countries which are more decarbonised but are big oil and gas producers, e.g. the Netherlands and Norway, the “interest” lies mainly in the development of storage capacity.

  9. In a collective book calling for an “argumentative turn,” M. Hajer (1993, pp. 43–44) argued that the controversies on acid rain and the other “new environmental issues” of the 1970–1980s were no longer “localised,” and were now interpreted as taking part in “the crisis of industrial society.” As a result, a new methodological approach was needed. Hajer called for “the examination of argumentative structure in documents and other written and spoken statements.” Another example is found in Litfin (1994, pp. 7–10), which recognises narratives and the precautionary principle as having been deciding factors in the stratospheric ozone governance. K. Litfin advocates a “discursive approach” that analyses “the influence and substantive content of discursive practices in international environmental politics,” and in particular “the distinctive role of scientific discourse in [international] regime formation”.

  10. This shift was linked to the fight against urban air pollution and transboundary acid pollution, but also (and arguably even more) to geopolitics, and to technological breakthroughs making oil and natural gas less expensive, gas more adapted to electricity production, etc. The rise in oil prices following the Oil Shocks primarily benefitted natural gas. For Perthuis and Solier (2018, p. 10), these international phenomena largely explain why, after the post-war period when CO2 emissions per capita “had reached 4.4 t/hab. in 1980″ on average in the world, i.e. “nearly twice those of 1950 (2.2 t/hab.),” the increase in emissions in the 1980s–1990s became less rapid than that of the population (4 t/hab. on average, excluding deforestation)”.

  11. Despite no climate policy being implemented in the 1970s–1980s, the major energy shifts and savings made in France at that time led to “a reduction of CO2 emissions greater than 35% between 1980 and 1988, while its economic activity grew by 10%.” Estimates published in 1990 indicates that France emitted “less than 2% of global CO2 emissions” (for more than 5% of its GDP) in 1988; and, “with 1.9 tons of carbon per inhabitant and per year, it ranked between the majority of industrialised countries (USA: 5 tons, Western Germany: 3.1 tons) and the world average (1 ton)” (Peretti, 1990, p. 21). Today’s estimates contrast greatly with these ones, arguably because of different carbon accounting methods and different emission scopes (although it is certain that indirect emissions are included in neither case), but the ratio between France, Germany, and USA has the same order of magnitude as the estimation made in the late 1980s. According to the World Bank (2023), France emitted 6.14 t/hab in 1990 (4.46 in 2019), Germany emitted 12.03 t/hab. (7.91 in 2019), and the USA emitted 19.41 t/hab. (14.67 in 2019).

  12. EOR means injecting CO2 into oil formations to stimulate oil production. This technique is an important part of the technical and legal history of CCUS. Starting in the 1970s, the EOR tradition has continued to develop significantly in the last three decades, adopting a CO2-mitigation rhetoric. Yet in the country that built the biggest EOR and CCUS facilities, the USA, “more than 70% of the CO2 injected today for CO2-EOR is from natural sources” (IEA, 2019).

  13. Haugen and Eide (1996, p. 1061) estimates that the CO2 emissions from a 500-MW coal fired power station “amount to about 0.4% of the total CO2 emissions from European power stations.” For a gas fired power station of the same size, the emissions will be roughly half.”.

  14. The share of manufacturing industry in the value added of the whole economy (in current value) decreased by about 3 points every 10 years between 1979 and 2007 (Rignols, 2016).

  15. However, this meant that the cost of a ton of CO2 captured with industrial capture facilities, then varying between €60 and €150 (depending on the technology and on the expert) would have to drop, and/or that the market price of a ton of CO2 would have to rise a lot in the future.

  16. The Total company implemented this project between 2007 and 2012, on the first big French site of natural gas production, opened in the late 1950s, just before the closing down of the gas wells in 2013.

  17. Besides this, some important IES actors had distanced themselves from CCUS by the late 2000s, or had even stepped aside, for fear of environmentalists’ protests against “useless new projects (‘nouveaux projets inutiles’),” and/or because the French government CCUS roadmap appeared unclear, and/or for technical reasons (the lack of storage reservoirs in France).

  18. Of course, not all Ademe agents have the same view on CCUS (Ademe 1 and 2 interviews).

  19. For instance, an industrial chair on CCUS named “Chaire CTSC” (for “Captage, Transport et Stockage du CO2”) with several PhDs on the topic was created at the turn of the 2010s, involving Le Havre University and the École des Mines de Paris, along with other partners including BRGM (Pigeon, 2016, p. 229). Most works came from natural science. The research institution that was most involved in the CCUS debate from a social science perspective was CIRED, which is also the main developer of climate-change-related Integrated Assessment Models in French public research. CIRED and the École des Mines de Paris also contributed to the public–private METSTOR project (2006–2010), which aims to design a methodology to assist in the pre-selection of CO2 storage sites, along with other public research and expert institutions (Ademe (coord.), BRGM, INERIS, IFPEN, Institut de Physique du Globe de Paris, and Pau University) (Arnoux et al., 2010).

  20. A Total representative explained: “At that time [in the second part of the 2000s], we were constantly under threat of additional taxation for exceptional profits. The French government was saying: you have to do something [about your CO2 emissions], or we will tax you more.” Speaking about the Lacq demonstrator, another Total representative added: “we needed to show [the French government] we were getting ready” (Total 2&1 interview). Indeed, the demonstration phase was theoretically about technical demonstration, but it was also (and maybe mainly) about demonstrating good intentions in terms of decarbonisation.

  21. Source: Mars Actu, (2019, December 10). Retrieved April 7, 2023, from < https://marsactu.fr/lavenir-toujours-encombrant-de-la-centrale-de-gardanne. > (10/12/2019).

  22. Source: Arcelor Mittal’s website, 2022. Retrieved April 7, 2023, from < https://belgium.arcelormittal.com/fr/un-investissement-dans-les-technologies-de-decarbonisation. > . Note that the “100% renewable energy objective” will be difficult to reach in such facilities.

  23. Before the significant development of renewables in the 2010s, the argument “we cannot develop substitutes” was used a lot in IESs. It persisted afterwards in industry, especially in heavy industry and the chemical industry, and is now a very strong argument used to legitimise a recourse to CCUS. Though we recognise firms use this argument as a lobbying tool to maintain highly lucrative activities, we also acknowledge that it is not illegitimate in every case: at that point, the substitution of renewables for fossil fuel is not ready in many industrial processes, and many chemical reactions used in the industry emit GHG.

  24. The relevance of these small-scale projects is questionable, both economically and in terms of their ability to contribute significantly to the abatement of CO2 emissions.

  25. For instance, after giving up the Florange CCS project, ArcelorMittal explored different directions in what they termed “smart carbon technologies.” In Fos-sur-Mer, in southern France, the steelmaker has taken part in two significant R&D projects, the Vasco 2 pilot (2015–2019) and the Vasco 3 industrial demonstrator (2019–…), along with Total and other public and private players. These projects have aimed to grow industrial-scale microalgae crops enhanced by CO2-intensive industrial fumes. The VALORCO research project (2014–2018) in Maizières-lès-Metz gives another example of CCU program in France. Funded by Ademe to the tune of 17 M€, it studied the use of CO2 in chemical or biological processes for the production of chemicals, energy or materials.

  26. European Commission website, 2023. Retrieved April 7, 2023, from < https://energy.ec.europa.eu/topics/oil-gas-and-coal/carbon-capture-storage-and-utilisation_en > 

  27. Total set aside its CCUS agenda after the end of the Lacq project in 2013, but only for 2 years: it reinstated it “just before COP21 [in Paris in late 2015, when] the future director of Total, P. Pouyanné, announced that the company would invest 10% of its R&D budget in CCUS.” “This [announcement] was a game-changer,” argues a public subsurface researcher (Total and CNRS interviews). In fact, it signalled a slight upturn at most, and most French industrialists (and even more energy companies) have remained on the sidelines since 2015. As for Total, it had clearly redefined its strategy, with offshore storage abroad becoming its CCUS priority.

  28. Not every national expert isoptimistic about this option for France. The National Low-Carbon Strategy mentions this way forward (MoE, 2020, p. 164). However, the 2021 report on the Decarbonisation of French Industries commissioned by the Ministry of the Economy is sceptical about the possibility of storing 15 Mt of French CO2 per year (the National Low-Carbon Strategy figure) by CCUS by 2050, since “other European users [will use their] maritime access to the North Sea”, even if the opportunity to store CO2 offshore abroad materialised. In addition, the experts estimate that reaching the objective of 15 MtCO2/year in 2050 “would cost at least 750 M€/yr” (GCE, 2021, pp. 39–40).

  29. Quite ironically, the idea of associating nuclear energy with the CCUS is now gaining ground. The British subsidiary EDF Energy called on competent companies to apply to set up a demonstrator for DAC within the Sizewell-C EPR he wants to build in Suffolk, southeast England. Our field observations show that similar research programs are now beginning considered in France as well.

  30. At the 2008 Hokkaido-Toyako summit, G8 countries had announced that 20 large-scale CCS demonstration projects would be built in the world by 2010.

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RB (lead author) defined the approach of the article, conducted a part of the interviews, did most of the work on the textual archives, and completed the final manuscript. XADS, SC, and FA (co-authors) conducted a part of the interviews, did some of the work on the textual archives, and approved the final manuscript.

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Correspondence to Régis Briday.

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Briday, R., Chailleux, S. & de Sartre, X.A. The complex challenges and opportunities of the industrial and energy sectors (IESs) in the time of climate politics: carbon capture, utilisation, and storage (CCUS) in France as a case study. Rev Agric Food Environ Stud (2024). https://doi.org/10.1007/s41130-024-00208-x

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