Abstract
In Seeing Things as They Are (Searle 2015), Searle developed a direct realist’s theory of perception. According to direct realism, physical objects are directly and immediately perceived. Searle claims that Berkeley’s theory of perception goes against direct realism. For Searle, Berkeley’s theory suggests that only subjective experiences (ideas) are directly and immediately perceived, not physical objects. Contrary to Searle, G. S. Pappas claims that Berkeley’s theory of perception is consistent with the view that physical objects are immediately perceivable (Pappas 1982; Pappas 1987). Given the conflicting interpretations of Berkeley’s theory of perception, this paper attempts to defend Searle’s position on Berkeley’s theory of perception. It refutes Pappas’ interpretation by arguing that he is inconsistent with Berkeley’s theses of ontological phenomenalism and heterogeneity thesis.
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Notes
Direct realism and naive realism are often understood as one and the same view in philosophy of perception. However, Searle’s account of direct realism (1983, 2015) differs from the naive realism of Campbell (2002), Martin (2002, 2004, 2006), Genone (2016), and many others. Throughout this paper, a distinction between direct realism and naive realism is maintained.
Some philosophers (e.g., Crane 2001: 131) uses the expressions ‘direct perception’ and ‘immediate perception’ alternatively. For example, Crane says that according to direct realism ‘we do perceive material objects directly or immediately’ (Crane 2001: 132). The expressions ‘direct’ or ‘immediate’ perception means that we perceive things without perceiving some other intermediary entities. Most of the direct realist uses these expressions interchangeably. Throughout this paper, I will use both expressions interchangeably. For a useful discussion of the expression ‘direct’ in perception, see Snowdon (1992).
Now onwards, Searle’s claim will be taken as PONIP, whereas Pappas’ claim will be taken as POIP.
‘Ontological phenomenalism’ is a metaphysical thesis subscribed by Berkeley (Pappas 1987: 204). It views that reality is mental. According to this view, each physical object is a collection of sensible ideas. I will discuss it more. in Sec. 3.
Heterogeneity is an epistemic thesis maintained by Berkeley. According to it, no idea is common to two different sensory modalities. I will discuss it more in Sec. 4.
Citation found in Searle (2015: 82).
I repeat some sentences or thoughts again and again to be clear and comprehensive.
Dicker argues that Berkeley conflates two senses of immediate perception: the psychological sense and the epistemic sense (Dicker 1982: 49–50). Dicker says the absurd result of this conflation leads Berkeley to conclude (i) ‘physical objects are not causes of sensations, but merely a collection of sensation (Dicker 1982: 62), (ii) the reduction in dispositional aspect of sensible quality to manifest aspect of quality, (iii) physical things are unperceivable, and finally (iv) only sensation/ideas are perceivable (Dicker 1982: 63-4). I think all these interpretations amplify PONIP.
Contrary to Pappas, Dicker (2006) advocates for an epistemic notion of immediate perception.
The expression ‘NTV’ refers to the book, An Essay Towards A New Theory Of Vision by Berkeley.
Suggestion can be understood as a mental act within the act of perception. A perception involves the act of suggestion can be counted as mediate perception. In contrast to it, immediate perception involves no act of suggestion (Pappas 1987: 198). For more on Suggestion, see (Berkeley NTV Sec. 16; Dialogues p. 174).
Contrary to Pappas, Jackson (1977: 7) refueses to admit the distinction between mediate-immediate perception on the basis of suggestion.
Pappas interpreted Berkeley’s notion of immediate perception as extensional and non-propositional (Pappas 1987: 200). But I am not discussing this in detail here since my focus is on the consistency of POIP with Berkeley’s other theses.
Italics mine.
Pappas admits that his definition is not completely free from all challenges.
This passage is taken from ‘Three Dialogues Between Hylas and Philonous,’ in A. A. Luce and T. E. Jessop, eds., The Works of George Berkeley, Bishop of Cloyne, 9 vols. (London: Thomas Nelson and Sons, 1948-57), vol. II, p. 230.
E1 and E2 are plausible because they are coherent (not contradict) with C1, C2, and C3.
This condition I already discussed in the second section.
Italics mine.
I acknowledge that Pappas attempts to fix POIP with the heterogeneity thesis. However, his attempt was unsuccessful. See Pappas (2000: 95–100).
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Acknowledgements
I would like to thank Prof. Laxminarayan Lenka, Department of Philosophy, University of Hyderabad, for correcting and commenting on the earlier drafts of this paper. I am also grateful to Dr. O. Priya, University College, University of Kerala, for the constant words of encouragement and valuable discussions. I am thankful to M. Chaitanya and Venkateswara. K. Reddy in the Department of Philosophy, University of Hyderabad, who helped me to shape the paper in its final form. I also thank the anonymous reviewer(s) of JICPR for their suggestions and feedback, which helped me improve this paper. I wrote the paper during my UGC-SRF availing at the University of Hyderabad.
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Sreenish, S. Berkeley’s Theory of Perception: Searle Versus Pappas. J. Indian Counc. Philos. Res. (2024). https://doi.org/10.1007/s40961-024-00334-3
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s40961-024-00334-3