Abstract
This paper attempts to delve into Wittgenstein’s unique notion of solipsism and its centrality in his proposal of transcendental ethics. Ethics for him is an enquiry into what is most valuable in one’s life; a very personal experience of values woven around the individual subject. We analyse the true nature of ethical in Wittgenstein’s writings and argue that it can only be understood through a close examination of the relation he proposes between self and the world. Our argument is rooted around his unique notion of solipsism without a solipsistic self. This distinctive ontological relationship between self and the world explicates moral significance into the world and how morality is defined as deeply felt personal responses to life.
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Notes
Wittgensteinians’ works can be classified in two different groups: ‘interpreting Wittgenstein’ and ‘using Wittgenstein’. Though their connection cannot be denied but it is important to talk them separately in discussing certain issues like ethics. For details, see Anat Biletzki (2003).
Rorty, Geertz, Pitkin and Toulmin have used Wittgenstein in an extended sense to further their positions in philosophy, sociology, anthropology and political thoughts.
Writings on Wittgenstein’s work by Russell, Carnap, Anscombe, Hintikka, Hacker, Goldfarb, Shanker, Kripke, Diamond and Putnam could be categorized as belonging to the interpreters group.
Represted by F. P. Ramsey, G. E. M. Anscombe, D. Pears, P. M. S. Hacker and P. T. Geach, etc.
Represented and popularized in the last three decades by Cora Diamond, James Conant, Juliet Floyd, Alice Crary, Michael Kremer and Rupert Read, etc.
Epistemological solipsism is the doctrine which holds self as the origin of knowledge of existence. It claims nothing can be known to exist except the self and its content of consciousness. It does not assert that there is one and only self which is this origin (Edwards 1967: 487). Knowledge is restricted only to individual’s own immediate experiences and cannot be shared with others. This doctrine cannot deny the existence of other minds as metaphysical solipsism does. It is only that their existence cannot be known with certainty.
Cyril Barrett also acknowledges the paucity of references to ethics in Wittgenstein’s later writings (Barrett 1991: 227). Rush Rhees’s report in ‘Some Development in Wittgenstein’s View of Ethics’ (Rhees 1970: 94-103) and some scanty remarks in Notebooks and Culture and Value are important evidence to claim that his views on ethics had not changed. Also, see Barrett, p.126 for acknowledging continuity thesis as one of the acceptable positions among Wittgensteinians.
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Mallick, M., Sirola, V.S. Privacy of Moral Perspective. J. Indian Counc. Philos. Res. 32, 109–121 (2015). https://doi.org/10.1007/s40961-015-0010-1
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s40961-015-0010-1