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Net worth ratio, bank lending and financial instability

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Abstract

This paper extends a Minsky model by incorporating net worth ratio, which Steindl stressed the importance of in reference to financial markets. We construct a dynamic macroeconomic model comprising discrete equations of both the net worth ratio and interest rate. We investigate what factors bring the instability of the steady state. We show that the effect of asset income on consumption can contribute to economic stability following Lavoie (1995) and Hein (2007). On the other hand, the economy becomes unstable when a bank’s lending reaction is elastic with respect to the net worth ratio of the firm. When the steady state is a saddle point, the monetary policy is likely to shift the economy from an unstable path to a convergence path. It can be said that monetary policy may have a stabilizing effect in the long run, however, in practice, there would be considerable difficulties in accomplishing this.

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Notes

  1. See also Semmler (1987) and Dutt (2006).

  2. From the standpoint of the new Keynesians, Greenwald and Stiglitz (1993) pointed out that the investment and output of firms depend on the firms’ balance sheet factors under an imperfect capital market. On the other hand, the post-Keynesians extended stock-flow consistent (SFC) approach. The SFC models are based on accounting frameworks that consistently integrate financial flows of funds with a full set of balance sheets. These include Dos Santos (2005, 2006).

  3. Our model downplays some issues highlighted in Minsky’s work and some other Minskian models, such as changes in asset prices and financial innovation.

  4. The interest rate in the IS–LM model is determined by the money market. In our model, it is determined by the bank lending market.

  5. We describe the interest of the central bank advances as the discount rate.

  6. There are various types of dynamic models. Our dynamic model is similar to Taylor and O’Connell (1985) which is a continuous dynamic model. On the other hand, Greenwald and Stiglitz (1993) is a discrete dynamic model.

  7. This formulation follows Adachi and Miyake (2015).

  8. We assume that τ, \(\omega\) and \(n\) are constant throughout this paper.

  9. This follows Kalecki (1971). The markup rate τ is taken to be constant, representing Kalecki’s degree of monopoly.

  10. We suppose that the interest rate \(i_{t}\) is a risk-free interest rate. It is the theoretical rate, in practice, the interest rate of a bond which is issued by a government or agency whose risks of default are so low as to be negligible. With respect to the risk premium \(\sigma\), the importance of the role is emphasized by Kalecki (1937).

  11. We assume expected returns \(Q\) to be a linearly homogeneous function with respect to \(pI_{t}\) and \(pK_{t - 1}\). Then, the ratio of expected returns to capital depends on the accumulation rate.

  12. Dutt (1995, 2006) assumes that the firm has a desired investment function and adjusts current investment to this desired investment through time. Our investment model is similar to Dutt’s model with regard to the dependence on net worth ratio of the firm.

  13. See Steindl (1952).

  14. This means the inequality, \(i_{t - 1} \le a\). If this condition is not satisfied, the firm will raise new equity. This situation contradicts the assumption in this model.

  15. This assumption is similar to Steindl (1952) and Dutt (1995). The more general case, in which it is likely that \(i_{t - 1} < a\), does not produce any interesting insights within the structure used here.

  16. We suppose that investment exceeds retained earnings. In other words, \(l_{t}^{d} > 0\).

  17. Keynes (1936) stressed the importance of the lender’s risk. We note the following remarks made by Keynes: “But where a system of borrowing and lending exists, by which I mean the granting of loans with a margin of real or personal security, a second type of risk is relevant which we may call the lender's risk. This may be due either to moral hazard, i.e., voluntary default or other means of escape, possibly lawful, from the fulfilment of the obligation, or to the possible insufficiency of the margin of security, i.e., involuntary default due to the disappointment of expectation” (Keynes 1936, p. 144). In our model, the lender’s risk has an indirect influence on the interest rate through the cost functions of banks. It is in contrast to borrower’s risk \(\sigma\) which is formulated in the Sect. 3-1.

  18. For the sake of simplicity, we assume that the bank does not hold excess reserves. When the bank wants to lend more, it borrows more from the central bank.

  19. Appendix 1 outlines the process to derive Eq. (25).

  20. This assumption is similar to Lavoie(1995) and Hein (2007)

  21. Appendix 2 shows the mathematical results of comparative statics.

  22. We suppose that the retained earnings \(F\), the net worth ratio \(z\), and capital accumulation rate \(k\) are positive at the steady state.

  23. For convenience, we omit the asterisks which express the values of the steady state. Appendix 2 outlines the process to derive Eqs. (39a) and (b).

  24. For more information, see Gandolfo (1997).

  25. Appendix 3 outlines the process to derive the conditions to stabilize the steady state.

  26. If the economy starts below the separatrix, investment will eventually keep rising in that zone as net worth keeps rising and the interest rate falling. The economy continues to rise.

  27. Asada (2014) formulates a series of mathematical macrodynamic models that contribute to the theoretical analysis of financial instability and macroeconomic stabilization policies.

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Correspondence to Toshio Watanabe.

Appendices

Appendix 1: The outlines of the process to derive Eq. (25)

The household earns wages ωN t and dividends from the firm. We assume that the costs of the bank G t−1 and the profit Π b t−1 are distributed to the household via the bank’s labor cost and other factors. The household can earn the interest from deposit. Finally, we suppose that the revenue of the central bank also belongs to the household.

Then, taking into account equation of dividends (14), the revenue of the household involved financial assets can be expressed as

$$\begin{aligned} {TR} = \omega N_{t} + aZ_{t - 1} + v\left( {pY_{t} - \omega N_{t} - i_{t - 1} L - aZ_{t - 1} } \right) + G_{t - 1} + i^{a} A_{t - 1} + \hfill \\ \quad \varPi_{t - 1}^{b} + \left( { 1 + i^{d} } \right)D_{t - 1} + M_{t - 1} + E^{q} . \hfill \\ \end{aligned}$$
(43)

Substituting Eqs. (16) and (17) into equation (43), we have

$$TR = \omega N_{t} + v(pY_{t} - \omega N_{t} ) + (1 - v)i_{t - 1} pK_{t - 1} + D_{t - 1} + M_{t - 1} + E^{q} .$$
(44)

Taking into account the economy as a whole, the assets which one has are the liabilities which another has. The following equation is satisfied:

$$L_{t - 1} = pK_{t - 1} - Z_{t - 1} = D_{t - 1} + M_{t - 1} .$$
(45)

From equations (44) and (45), we have

$$TR = \omega N_{t} + v(pY_{t} - \omega N_{t} ) + (1 - v)i_{t - 1} pK_{t - 1} + L_{t - 1} + E^{q} .$$
(46)

On the other hand, the expenses of the household involved financial assets can be expressed as

$${{TE}} = pC_{t} + D_{t}^{d} + M_{t}^{d} + E^{q} .$$
(47)

We have the Eq. (25) from equations (46) and (47)

Appendix 2: The comparative statics analysis in short-run model and the outlines of the process to derive Eqs. (39a) and (b)

The mathematical results of comparative statics in short-run model expressed as

$$r_{{z_{t - 1} }} = - \frac{{k_{{z_{t - 1} }} l_{{i_{t} }}^{s} - k_{{i_{t} }} (1 + l_{{z_{t - 1} }}^{s} )}}{\varOmega } > 0,$$
(48)
$$r_{{i_{t - 1} }} = - \frac{{(1 - v)\{ (1 - c)k_{{i_{t} }} + cl_{i_{t}}^{s} \} }}{\varOmega }{ \lesseqgtr }0,$$
(49)
$$r_{{i^{a} }} = - \frac{{k_{{i_{t} }} l_{{i^{a} }}^{s} }}{\varOmega } < 0,$$
(50)
$$i_{{i_{t - 1} }} = \frac{(1 - v)(1 - c)}{\varOmega } > 0$$
(51)
$$i_{{i^{a} }} = - \frac{{(1 - cv)l_{{i^{a} }}^{s} }}{\varOmega } > 0.$$
(52)

Linearizing this dynamic model near the steady state to analyze stability, we have

$$T_{1} = \frac{{\{ (1 - v)r_{{z_{t - 1} }} + 1\} - (k_{{i_{t} }} \cdot i_{{z_{t - 1} }} + k_{{z_{t - 1} }} )z}}{1 + k},$$
(53)
$$T_{2} = \frac{{(1 - v)(r_{{i_{t - 1} }} - 1) - z(k_{{i_{t} }} \cdot i_{{i_{t - 1} }} )}}{1 + k}.$$
(54)

The values of each element are appreciated at the steady state. Taking into account the results of comparative statics, we can rewrite equations (53) and (54) as Eqs. (39a) and (b) and determine the signs.

Appendix 3: The stability of the steady state

The following equation is satisfied at the steady state from Eqs. (32), (38a), (38b),

$$\{ 1 - v - (1 - cv)z\} k = (1 - c)(1 - v)i.$$
(55)

Assuming that the accumulation rate and the interest rate are positive at the steady state, we have the Eq. (40).

Substituting the results of comparative statics and equation (55) into the factors of coefficient matrix M D , we have

$$T_{1} + R_{2} = \frac{1}{1 + k} + \frac{(1 - c)(1 - v)}{\varOmega }\left[\frac{1}{1 + k}\frac{i}{k}\{ k_{z_{t-1}} l_{i_{t}}^s - k_{i_{t}} (1 + l_{z_{t-1}}^s )\} + 1\right],$$
(56)
$$T_{1} \cdot R_{2} - T_{2} \cdot R_{1} = \frac{(1 - c)(1 - v)}{\varOmega }\frac{1}{1 + k}\{ k_{z_{t-1}} (1 - z) - l_{z_{t-1}}^s \} .$$
(57)

For convenience, we omit the asterisks which express the values of the steady state. Substituting these equations (56) and (57) into the Eqs. (41), we can derive the factors which bring about the stable steady state.

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Watanabe, T. Net worth ratio, bank lending and financial instability. Evolut Inst Econ Rev 13, 37–56 (2016). https://doi.org/10.1007/s40844-016-0038-1

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