Abstract
In the present essay, we analyse the development of the proto-federations of the democratic city-states. We examine the political institutions and policies developed in the Achaean federation such as common defense and external policy, military organization, representative federal bodies like popular assemblies, parliament, generals as military and political commanders, federal finance ministers, etc., as well as its economic institutions and policies: common currency, federal budget and federal revenues. We offer arguments as to why the Achaean federation emerged and proved successful and finally, we offer some ideas as to how the Achaean federation would have faced a series of current global issues such as the European Union integration, global terrorism, etc.
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Notes
Many modern authors continue to call them “leagues”. As it will become clear in the following analysis, this denomination is inappropriate since the term “league” is almost a synonym of “alliance”. Finer (1997, vol. 1, p. 321) refers to them as confederations. The political units which we will examine are certainly much more than a mere alliance, thus we will define them as proto-federations, “proto” in the Greek sense of “first”, and not in the sense of less-developed. We owe this comment to Vincent Gabrielsen (Kopenhagen University).
The Achaeans were only marginally involved during the Peloponnesian war. Only one city-state, Pellene, became an active ally of the Spartans against the Athenians (Mackil 2013, p. 50).
Herodotus Hist. 1.145–146 refers to them as: Pelene, Sikyon, Aigeira, Aigai, Boura, Helike, Aegion, Rhypes, Patrai, Pharai, Olenos, Dyme and Tritaia.
For the geopolitical, historical and military background during that era one can read Fine (1940), Larsen (1965, 1968), Walbank (1970) and Grainger (1999). One could describe the whole image of the Greek world of the fourth to second centuries BCE as a “power politics situation”, having in mind H. Morgenthau’s (1963, 1965) analyses, in other words, as a fierce antagonism between different players.
We further analyse this issue in Sect. 3.
Ancient sources Polybius (Hist. 2.43.1–2) and Liv. Hist. 29.23 contradict this point, leading thus to different interpretations by modern scholars such as Mitsos (1947), Larsen (1968, p. 216) and Mackil (2013, p. 342) who argue about four pan-Achaean assemblies a year. We think that the number of the assemblies does not decisively change the core of our following argument. Since the Achaean federation had political structure similar to that of the neighbouring Aetolian federation, which performed two assemblies a year (see Economou, Kyriazis and Metaxas 2015 and the references therein) it is highly probable that the Achaean assembly convened twice a year.
We adopt the term “single citizenship” as the modern equivalent of isopoliteia, according to Cambridge Professor of Classics Paul Cartledge, in a personal communication to us. The term “iso” in modern Greek means “equal”. But the existence of equal political and economic rights across the federation does correspond de facto to a single citizenship. We suggest that citizens of the Achaean federation were “Achaeans”, in the sense of citizens of the USA being Americans, as well as being for example Megalopolitans (citizens of a city-state of the Achaean federation) or Californians. We owe this clarification to an anonymous referee.
Mackil analyzed this based here on a series of various fragments found in Achaea, such as those in the ancient city of Dyme, being codified as T35. Mackil (2013, pp. 453–482) offers totally 12 inscriptions with additional evidence, which verify our argument as far political, property and civic rights protection are concerned throughout the Achaean Koinon (federal state).
Kyriazis, Paparrigopoulos and Economou (2014) and Kyriazis and Economou (2015) provide evidence that the values that accompanied the military organization of ancient Greek phalanxes were certainly democratic, although phalanxes were also used by non-democratic Greek city-states such as Sparta and Macedonia. The adoption of phalanxes is another indication that verifies the general democratic mentality of the Achaean federation’s citizens.
Such privileges were being offered to gentry in other ancient Greek political entities, such as the Macedonian kingdom, but it seems that this was not the case in the democratic federations such as the Achaean one.
At the time we do not have information as to where the silver for the minting of coins came from, or about the relative value of the total circulation of the city-state’s coins. Presumably, they must have been in some proportion of economic activity. Larger and economically stronger city-states would thus have more coins in circulation than smaller ones. A survey and qualification of total finds of coins of the city-states of the federation might shed light on this issue.
During the 330’s, the Athenian economy was revived by the recession of 357-340 BCE and achieved the highest growth rates and public revenues increase, thanks to the implementation of the extensive public work programs undertaken by Eubulus and Lycurgus. Public revenues as a whole increased to as high as 1,200 talents (Amemiya 2007; Kyriazis 2009; Burke 2010). Thus, the Achaean defence budget of 217 BCE, which was a part of the overall budget, of 831 talents, denotes a very substantial sum, which is a sign of the existence of a strong federal economy.
Liturgies were a very special type of taxation and service levied on rich Athenians, as for example trierarchy (See Gabrielsen 1994). Under this, a wealthy Athenian undertook the running expenses (not wage costs) for the upkeep of a trireme warship for a year, of which he undertook also command. Being its commander in battle, the trierarch had a strong incentive to have a well-kept ship, since his own survival depended on this.
Seignorage is the difference between the value of the precious medal of a coin (silver, gold) and its actual selling price, after subtracting minting costs.
It is important to bear in mind that a year earlier the Messenians had murdered General Philopoemen, the head of the Achaean federation. His loss would probably have been a major casualty for the Achaeans as a whole. Philopoemen may be regarded as one of the most prominent Generals of Greek antiquity such as, Themistocles, Cimon and Iphicrates of Athens, Epameinondas and Pelopidas of the Boeotian Federation or Agesilaus and Lysander of Sparta. Nevertheless, it appears that the federal principles of the Achaean policymakers went beyond any sacrifice, in favor of the common good and the survival of the federation.
We call this a “glue”, inspired by the Athenian fourth century orator Demades, who called ecclesiastika (money paid out of the Athenian budget to citizens in order to enable them to participate and vote in the Assembly meetings) the “glue of democracy” (Plut. Mor. 1007B).
The revolt of the United Provinces started in 1568 but the United Provinces were recognized as an independent state after the Congress of Westphalia in 1648. They were abolished by the French invasion and conquest in 1795. We write the “new” Swiss federation since the older one, with a different structure that had been established at the end of the thirteenth century, was also abolished by the French invasion and conquest in 1798 and reestablished after the Congress of Vienna in 1815. Its constitution was drafted by the Greek count John Kapodistrias, Russia’s foreign minister at that time.
Ober (2015) analyses this evidence in detail.
We write “would be” since the EU is not yet a fully developed federation but, according to its Founding Fathers, J. Monnet, R. Schuman, A. Spinelli, K. Adenauer, etc. should become one.
We consider such as approach, that is, to offer proposals in order to solve current problems not as irrelevant since, we know, for example, that the Achaean federation had already influenced the shape of modern federal structures, such as the Constitution of the United States, as can been seen by the Federalist papers (on this issue see among others, Gummere 1962; Payne 1996, p. 613 and Richard 2009).
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Acknowledgments
The authors wish to thank Vincent Gabrielsen, as well as the Editor and the anonymous referees for their valuable comments and suggestions.
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Economou, E.M.L., Kyriazis, N. The emergence and the development of the Achaean federation: lessons and institutional proposals for modern societies. Evolut Inst Econ Rev 13, 93–112 (2016). https://doi.org/10.1007/s40844-015-0028-8
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s40844-015-0028-8