Abstract
We developed a class of dynamic stochastic general equilibrium models with nominal rigidities to investigate the importance of default risk awareness in developing and implementing monetary and fiscal policies. We introduced default risk in the model and analyzed two policies: exact policies and false policies. The exact policy includes optimal monetary and fiscal policies as well as policy authorities who are aware of default risk. The false policy includes optimal monetary and fiscal policies as well as policy authorities who are unaware of default risk. We calculated the coefficients of simple rules that are a class of Taylor rules and a class of the Bohn rule. We found that there is no distinction on simple rules between the exact and false policies if the interest spread in the steady state is low. However, if the interest spread is high, policy authorities should not stabilize inflation and minimize the premium difference. We calculated welfare costs under the two policies. If the interest spread is low, there is a large difference in welfare costs between the two policies, and if the spread is high, the difference between the welfare costs is further increased. If policy authorities are unaware of the default risk, they introduce a stricter policy that generates significant welfare costs. If the interest spread is high, policy authorities should be aware of the default risk.
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Notes
Blueschke et al. (2012) also discuss on optimal fiscal policy coordination on Slovenian Economy.
Benigno (2001) observes that this function, which depends only on the level of real government bonds, captures the costs of undertaking positions in the international asset market or the existence of intermediaries in the foreign asset market.
See Appendix C in Okano and Inagaki (2017) for details.
Similar to Hiraga (2019), the tax gap is one of the policy instruments in the model.
Our assumption \(\gamma > 1\) is supported by the data. See Okano and Inagaki (2017) for details.
In our model, the steady state is not efficient because friction stemming from the monopolistically competitive market cannot be dissolved by taxation. Thus, the target level of the output gap (or efficient output gap) is not zero, although the target level is zero in Gali and Monacelli (2005) because the steady state is efficient.
Unlike our model, Gali and Monacelli (2005) assume that under constant employment subsidies, monopolistic power completely disappears.
Creedy and Gremmell (2010) report that tax revenue elasticity ranges from 0.5 to 1, and we chose 1 as the tax revenue elasticity \(\varsigma _\tau\).
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This research was funded by a grant from the Ishii Memorial Securities Research Promotion Foundation.
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Appendices
Appendices
1.1 A nonstochastic steady state
We focus on equilibria in cases that the state variables follow paths that reflect a deterministic stationary equilibrium in which \(\Pi _t = 1\) and \(\frac{{{\tilde{P}}}_t}{P_t} = 1\). Because this steady state is nonstochastic, productivity is expressed with unit values; i.e., \(A = 1\).
In this steady state, the gross nominal interest rate is equal to the inverse of the subjective discount factor, denoted by
\(\Gamma \left( 0 \right) = 1\), which is the definition of the government debt coupon rate, may be simplified to
Notice that \(sp_t = 0\) in the steady state.
Equation (23) can be rewritten as:
with:
which may be simplified in the steady state to
Entering those equalities into the steady state condition of Eq. (A.1)—namely, \(K = F\)—yields
which can be rewritten as
Furthermore, Eqs. (25) and (A.2) imply that
with \(U_C = C^{-1}\) and \(U_N = N^\psi\). Note that because \(\tau \in \left( 0, 1 \right)\) and \(\varepsilon > 1\), this steady state is distorted.
In the steady state, the definition of \(R^H_t\) may be simplified to
In the steady state, Eq. (13) may be simplified to
By entering Eqs. (A.4) into (A.3) and rearranging the terms, we obtain
where we use \(\frac{B}{SP} = \left( \frac{SP}{Y} \right) ^{-1} \frac{B}{Y}\).
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Okano, E., Eguchi, M. The importance of default risk awareness in conducting monetary and fiscal policies. Eurasian Econ Rev 10, 361–392 (2020). https://doi.org/10.1007/s40822-020-00143-4
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s40822-020-00143-4