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The Banking Union Translated into (Private Law) Duties: Infrastructure and Rulebook

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Abstract

This article starts out from the general question of how fields of regulation have impacted on the private law relationships between individuals, i.e., in competition law and capital market law. It states that the impact is sometimes more direct, as in capital market law, sometimes less direct and felt only after much more time, like in competition law, but that it is always present. Hence, the first result is obvious: the new Banking Union scheme will impact also on private law relationships. While this is already discussed in some specific areas—namely organisation of banks and recovery and resolution of banks (with the bail-in mechanism)—and while these areas are addressed in this article as well, the question most thoroughly dealt with here is whether such impact will be felt more generally and how it should be shaped. It concerns all bank-client relationships—mostly contract law—, the question of how much influence is welcome, and in which ways it can be channelled. The article provides ample material as to where similar questions have already been discussed in neighbouring fields of law and sees the regulatory package introduced under the term ‘Banking Union’ as one which will have a considerable amount of private law repercussions.

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Notes

  1. Groundbreaking, Mestmäcker (2012); and very early already, idem (1968), esp. at pp. 240, 252, 255 and 262; this idea is rooted in the writings of Böhm (1989), longer (original) version: idem (1966), esp. at pp. 85, 88 and 138 et seq.; Eucken (1990), esp. at pp. 241–250 et passim; from a classical private law perspective, rather similar (and in part even explicitly following Böhm and Mestmäcker): Canaris (2000), at pp. 277 et seq.; see also Kennedy (2011); similar for consumer law: Drexl (1998), at pp. 282 et seq.; and for disclosure and information duties, i.e., key in this respect: Grundmann (2002).

  2. Early in this sense, Müller-Graff (1993), at pp. 14; on the key role private autonomy plays as one of the four cornerstones in a European economic constitution, see Basedow (1996), at pp. 1179 et seq. and 1181–1184.

  3. ECJ 20.2.1979, Case 120/78 Cassis de Dijon [1979] ECR 649.

  4. See, in particular, Green Paper ‘Building a Capital Markets Union’ of 18 February 2015, COM(2015) 63 final.

  5. On this question, see Culpepper et al. (2015/2016, forthcoming).

  6. In this sense, for instance, see the Austrian Parliament (at http://www.parlament.gv.at/PERK/GL/EU/B.shtml) summarising the so-called Four Presidents’ Paper of 2012 (EU/ECB/IMF/Eurogroup) which proposed the following structure: the European Banking Union encompasses (1) the SSM, (2) the SRM, (3) the harmonised deposit guarantee scheme and (4) the Single Rulebook.

  7. Council Regulation (EU) No 1024/2013 of 15 October 2013 conferring specific tasks on the European Central Bank concerning policies relating to the prudential supervision of credit institutions, OJ 2013 L 287/63 [based on Art. 127(6) TFEU]. On the legal basis (in my view not doubtful), see the convincing argument by Ruthig (2014), esp. at pp. 450–460.

  8. Regulation (EU) No 806/2014 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 15 July 2014 establishing uniform rules and a uniform procedure for the resolution of credit institutions and certain investment firms in the framework of a Single Resolution Mechanism and a Single Resolution Fund and amending Regulation (EU) No 1093/2010, OJ 2014 L 225/1 (based on Art. 114 TFEU). Positive on the possibility to create new regulatory authorities (in the case of the European Banking Union: the Single Resolution Board in Brussels with the Single Resolution Fund) on the basis of Art. 114 TFEU: ECJ, 22.1.2014, Case C-270/12 United Kingdom v Parliament and Council [2014] EU:C 2018:18 (on ESMA and its regulatory powers, namely with respect to short-selling). It is in regard to this part of the European Banking Union system in particular that the legal basis is considered sceptically and that an amendment of the Treaties is called for, because decisions on resolution of banks are likely to provoke more actual litigation in courts, see, for instance, Vice-President of the German Central Bank (Bundesbank) Sabine Lautenschläger in: Bundesbank of 10.02.2014, Europäische Bankenunion—ein Großprojekt.

  9. Directive 2014/49/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 16 April 2014 on deposit guarantee schemes, OJ 2014 L 173/149.

  10. In this sense, the President of the Bundesbank Jens Weidmann in the Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung (FAZ) of 19.3.2013; that it was meant as a first step only and that the others had to follow soon was, however, explicitly mentioned already in the 12th Recital of the SSM Regulation as well as outlined in the June 2012 Report of the President of the European Council ‘Towards a Genuine Economic Union’ (Brussels, 26 June 2012, EUCO 120/12, PRESSE 296, PR PCE 102).

  11. Directive 2013/36/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 26 June 2013 on access to the activity of credit institutions and the prudential supervision of credit institutions and investment firms, amending Directive 2002/87/EC and repealing Directives 2006/48/EC and 2006/49/EC (CRD IV), OJ 2013 L 176/338, and Regulation (EU) No 575/2013 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 26 June 2013 on prudential requirements for credit institutions and investment firms and amending Regulation (EU) No 648/2012 (CRR), OJ 2013 L 176/1—both implementing Basel III.

  12. Regulation (EU) No 468/2014 of the European Central Bank of 16 April 2014 establishing the framework for cooperation within the Single Supervisory Mechanism between the European Central Bank and national competent authorities and with national designated authorities (SSM Framework Regulation), OJ 2014 L 141/1.

  13. Regulation (EU) No 1022/2013 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 22 October 2013 amending Regulation (EU) No 1093/2010 establishing a European Supervisory Authority (European Banking Authority) as regards the conferral of specific tasks on the European Central Bank pursuant to Council Regulation (EU) No 1024/2013, OJ 2013 L 287/5.

  14. Directive 2014/59/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 15 May 2014 establishing a framework for the recovery and resolution of credit institutions and investment firms and amending Council Directive 82/891/EEC, and Directives 2001/24/EC, 2002/47/EC, 2004/25/EC, 2005/56/EC, 2007/36/EC, 2011/35/EU, 2012/30/EU and 2013/36/EU, and Regulations (EU) No 1093/2010 and (EU) No 648/2012, of the European Parliament and of the Council, OJ 2014 L 173/190.

  15. On the dispute on whether for a European deposit guarantee scheme a common guarantee fund was needed, see Arnaboldi (2014); Schneider (2013b), at pp. 456; and regarding the concern that a European (!) recovery and resolution scheme would not be operational without a deposit guarantee, which therefore, to align well, needed to be European as well (just as, in the US, with the Federal Deposit Insurance Company, FDIC), see Aizenman (2009); Gros and Schoenmaker (2014); Weder di Mauro (2013), at pp. 19.

  16. Prominent is the criticism voiced by, for instance, Legrain (2014); Goyal (2013), at pp. 12; U Schneider and P Mülbert, ‘Europäische Bankenunion ohne effektiven Rechtsschutz?’, Börsen-Zeitung, 5.1.2013. It is true, however, that the restriction of the ECB’s direct supervision to those 123 credit institutions constitutes the most incisive modification of what had been the EU Commission’s proposal (and Barroso’s political announcement of it in September 2012 in his ‘State of the Union’ speech). Today, this restriction is justified by subsidiarity concerns (see Recitals 28 and 87 SSM Regulation). Under Art. 6(4) SSM Regulation, the following credit institutions are ‘systemically relevant’: (1) any credit institution whose total value of assets on the balance sheet exceeds €30 billion or (2) any credit institution whose total value of assets on the balance sheet exceeds only €5 billion, but also exceeds 20 % of the GDP of that eurozone Member State; (3) any credit institution that is among the three biggest in that eurozone Member State; (4) any credit institution that has requested or received financial assistance directly from the EFSF or the ESM; (5) any other credit institution which the ECB considers to be ‘systemically relevant’ and therefore subjects to its own supervision. On the list of 123 credit institutions (21 in Germany), see European Central Bank, List of Significant Supervised Entities, 16 March 2015, available at: https://www.bankingsupervision.europa.eu/ecb/pub/pdf/list_sse_lsi.en.pdf?7cfe8aed9fcde86121744f574159bd25.

  17. For figures on this, see Lannoo (2014a), at pp. 27.

  18. Going even further (the ‘most powerful EU Institution’ altogether): Schneider (2013a), at pp. 4–5.

  19. The three authorities of the ESFS are listed in Art. 2(2) of Regulation (EU) No 1095/2010 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 24 November 2010 establishing a European Supervisory Authority (European Securities and Markets Authority), amending Decision No 716/2009/EC and repealing Commission Decision 2009/77/EC, OJ 2010 L 331/84: ESMA (created by Regulation (EU) No 1095/2010 itself, replacing the formerly existing authority for this area, CESR); the EBA (created by Regulation (EU) No 1093/2010 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 24 November 2010 establishing a European Supervisory Authority (European Banking Authority), amending Decision No 716/2009/EC and repealing Commission Decision 2009/78/EC, OJ 2010 L 331/12); and EIOPA, the supervisory authority on insurance undertakings.

  20. On the Rulebook on banking supervision and on EBA’s competence to draft it, see Moloney (2013); Schneider (2013b).

  21. For protection of functioning markets and of individual investors (as mutually reinforcing each other), ground-breaking (not only in German literature): Hopt (1975), at pp. 51 et seq. and 334-337; today, for instance, Grundmann (2012), § 19 para. 16-18; see also Moloney (2014), at pp. 564–571; apparently, however, individual investors’ litigation is of little importance in UK practice, see: Alcock (2000), at pp. 178-180 (‘In the UK, such private resort to the courts has been much rarer.’).

  22. See for tort claims in antitrust law (and legislative action in this respect in Europe), the White Paper of the European Commission ‘Damages actions for breaches of the EC antitrust rules’, COM(2008) 165 final, now enacted as Directive 2014/104/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 26 November 2014 on certain rules governing actions for damages under national law for infringements of the competition law provisions of the Member States and of the European Union, OJ 2014 L 349/1; on this Directive, see Wisking and Dientzel (2014) and Haus and Serafimova (2014).

  23. Similar ones can be found in the SRM Regulation: breaking links between bank funds and state funds and treating groups in a uniform way, see Recitals 6, 10 and 19; and, more abstract: combatting ‘fragmentation’ of the system (Recitals 1 and 9), and fostering ‘stability of credit institutions’ (Recital 12), ‘financial stability’ (Recital 19) and ‘market integrity’ [Art. 6(2)]. A key difference in terms of objectives defined is clearly due to the legal basis of the SRM, i.e., Art. 114 TFEU. Consequently, the relevance of a limited SRM for the completion of the internal market in financial services as a whole is extensively referred to in, e.g., Recital 12.

  24. On this concept and on typical mechanisms used, see Stigler (1971); further developed by Laffont and Tirole (1991) and Levine and Forrence (1990).

  25. Namely Joerges (1980); to some extent also Reich et al. (2013), at pp. 70-86, esp. at pp. 78 et seq.; Howells and Weatherill (2005), esp. at pp. 89.

  26. In the very recent literature, see Renner (2014).

  27. On this question, the advantages and disadvantages of centralised and decentralised rule-setting, and the different kinds of regulatory competition, see (with many more references) Grundmann (2013a).

  28. Kegel (1964), at pp. 262, stated quite poignantly: ‘The law is public, if it is anything’.

  29. Directives 93/22/EEC (of the Council) and 2004/39/EC and 2014/65/EU respectively (of the European Parliament and of the Council), OJ 1993 L 141/27, OJ 2004 L 145/1 and OJ 2014 L 173/349; on the overall subject matter, see Kumpan (2014), Enriques (2006) and Kumpan and Leyens (2008).

  30. Binder (2013b); see also Langenbucher (2014).

  31. Namely Admati and Hellwig (2013).

  32. Regarding the different buffers and their goals (esp. incentives for risk reduction and compensation for higher systemic risk because of size), see Avgouleas and Cullen (2014), Goodhart and Dimitrios (2012) and Theissen (2013). For a US perspective: Whitehead (2011/12).

  33. For a comparative law survey (and further references) on such instruments as the ban on so-called wrongful trading or the action en comblement de passif: (2000) Corporate group law for Europe, at pp. 245–258; Grundmann (2012), § 35 para. 40–42.

  34. On ring-fencing and separation along the lines of banking business areas, see European Commission, Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council on structural measures improving the resilience of EU credit institutions, 29 January 2014, and High-Level Expert Group on Reforming the Structure of the EU Banking Sector (‘Liikanen Report’), 2 October 2012, available at http://ec.europa.eu/internal_market/bank/docs/high-level_expert_group/report_en.htm.

  35. This is to avoid bank-runs and protect small investment (often aimed at estate planning for old age). On this area see, for instance, Binder (2013a), Hadjiemmanuil (2014) and Madaus (2014).

  36. In fact, the most famous commentary on banking transactions has gained its reputation also because it arranged the discussion of legal problems along the lines of the ‘life’ of transactions, i.e., from their ‘birth’ to their ‘death’, i.e., insolvency: see Canaris (1981); for commercial banking, also Canaris (1988).

  37. Commercial law also systematically comprises insolvency law, i.e., for companies, in the curricula or textbooks, see, for instance, Cian (2014/15).

  38. For wrongful trading and the action en comblement de passif under company law, see supra n. 33.

  39. For this question (also the aspect that the funds are levied on banks and not as general taxes), see Legal Service of the Council of the EU, Opinion on the Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council establishing uniform rules and a uniform procedure for the resolution of credit institutions and certain investment firms in the framework of a Single Resolution Mechanism and a Single Bank Resolution Fund and amending Regulation (EU) No. 1093/2010 of the European Parliament and of the Council (13 September 2012), para. 45. For reasons to consider the EU recovery and resolution regime as being more broadly linked to state aid law, see Lannoo (2014b).

  40. See Lambert et al. (2014). For arguments in the first sense: Dewatripont (2014) and Avgouleas and Cullen (2014), at pp. 49. Supporting the second view: Davies and Tracey (2014).

  41. See, in principle, Lannoo (2014b).

  42. See in particular Drijber and Burmester (2009), D’Sa (2009), Gilliams (2011) and Murphy (2013).

  43. See supra n. 8.

  44. On the relationship between consumer and investor protection—some authors also see investor protection mainly as consumer protection—see, for instance, Buck-Heeb (2012) and Moloney (2012).

  45. For the most recent developments in the case law of different national courts, see Grundmann (2015a).

  46. ECJ, 30.5. 2013, Case C-604/11 Bankinter [2013] ECR N.N., also published in OJ 2013 C 225/16 (key statements in the ruling); on my interpretation of the decision, see Grundmann (2013b).

  47. Mian and Sufi (2014).

  48. In this sense, for instance (invoking the Banking Supervision Act which contains a duty of responsible lending), Hofmann (2010), at pp. 1785 et seq.; for a comprehensive discussion, see Atamer (2011).

  49. For the loan business, of course, the Mortgage Credit Directive 2014 has introduced a duty of responsible lending for mortgage loans, which is by far the most important segment, anyhow: see Art. 19(5) n. 5 of Directive 2014/17/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 4 February 2014 on credit agreements for consumers relating to residential immovable property and amending Directives 2008/48/EC and 2013/36/EU and Regulation (EU) No 1093/2010, OJ 2014 L 60/34; see also its Art. 7.

  50. See, for instance, Grundmann (2015b), Third Part, paras. 481–485.

  51. For clauses favouring third parties and contained in interbank agreements in the area of direct debit, see Grundmann (2015b), Third Part, para. 348.

  52. See the three decisions of the German Private Law Supreme Court (Bundesgerichtshof), reported in: BGHZ (official reports) 133, 25; Neue Juristische Wochenschrift (NJW) 1998, 671; and NJW 1998, 2047.

  53. More generally for contract law and for its protective function also regarding third parties’ rights and for the public good, see Grundmann and Renner (2013).

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Authors and Affiliations

  1. European University Institute, Florence, Italy

    Stefan Grundmann

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  1. Stefan Grundmann
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Correspondence to Stefan Grundmann.

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The author teaches contract, banking, capital market and company law, both national and transnational, and theory of private law. He holds a chair in these areas at Humboldt University, Berlin, and one in transnational law more generally at the European University Institute, Florence, where he currently teaches.

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Grundmann, S. The Banking Union Translated into (Private Law) Duties: Infrastructure and Rulebook. Eur Bus Org Law Rev 16, 357–382 (2015). https://doi.org/10.1007/s40804-015-0021-z

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