The Scope for and the Significance and Desirability of the Use of the Term ‘Genocide’ by Politicians: Joint Advisory Report by the Netherlands Advisory Committee on Issues of Public International Law and the External Advisor on Public International Law (March 2017)

Introductory Note

Numerous national and international parliamentary bodies (such as the European Parliament and the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe) have qualified atrocities committed in certain countries as ‘genocide’. Historical cases that have been so qualified include atrocities committed in Armenia, Nazi Germany and Namibia. Current atrocities most frequently qualified as ‘genocide’ are those committed by the Islamic State (IS) against members of minorities in Iraq and Syria. Are such determinations by parliamentary bodies desirable and what are its consequences? This question was posed by the Netherlands Parliament to two standing advisory bodies: the Netherlands Advisory Committee on Issues of Public International Law (CAVV) and the External Advisor on Public International Law (EVA). The Committee is an independent body that advises the Government and Parliament on international law issues, either at their request or on its own initiative. The External Advisor on Public International Law (currently Professor P.A. Nollkaemper) plays a similar role. The report prepared jointly by the two bodies observes that governments bear the primary responsibility for determining that genocide and crimes against humanity have been or are being committed in another state. There is no rule of international law that prevents parliaments from making such determinations but they have no special significance in international law. The importance of such a determination is that it is a necessary first step in activating obligations, such as the obligation to prevent. In its reaction to the report, the Netherlands Government generally agrees with the observations made in the report. However, it adds the important caveat that preventive action should not await the formal determination that acts of violence amount to genocide or crimes against humanity. This is perhaps the whole point of the debate. Legal niceties have a necessary role to play in the courtroom but they should not be employed as an excuse to delay preventive action by governments. There is also the need to combat the impression in public opinion that anything that does not reach the high threshold of genocide is somehow less worthy of attention. The report correctly emphasizes that crimes against humanity are no less serious.

Appendices

Appendix

Advisory report on the scope for and the significance and desirability of the use of the term ‘genocide’ by politicians

CAVV Advisory Report No. 28/EVA Advisory Report

The Hague, March 2017

Preface

On 29 November 2016 the House of Representatives of the States General adopted the following motion:

‘The House, having heard the deliberations, observing that the European Parliament, the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe and the United States House of Representatives have characterised the atrocities committed by ISIS against Yazidis, Kurds, Christians and other ethnic and religious minorities, and against Muslims who disagree with ISIS’ extremist interpretation of Islam, as crimes against humanity and genocide;

considering that establishing whether conduct meets the legal definition of genocide is always a determination to be made by a court but that such determinations often take years, while the political recognition that the crime has been committed is of great importance, not least because it enables the affected groups to process their grief;

requests that the government commission an advisory opinion from the External Adviser on Public International Law (Extern Volkenrechtelijk Adviseur, EVA) and the Advisory Committee on Issues of Public International Law (Commissie van advies inzake volkenrechtelijke vraagstukken, CAVV) and ask that they prepare a joint report for the purpose of creating clarity regarding the scope for and the desirability and significance of the use of the term “genocide” by politicians, in general and in relation to the aforementioned atrocities in the Middle East.’

In his letter of 19 December 2016 the Minister of Foreign Affairs asked the External Adviser on Public International Law (EVA) and the Advisory Committee on Issues of Public International Law (CAVV) to prepare a joint advisory report in accordance with the motion. The minister added that, in view of the deliberations on the motion in the House of Representatives, the use of the term ‘crimes against humanity’ could also be examined in the report, if so desired. Given the topicality of this issue, the minister requested that the advisory report be issued by 1 March 2017 if possible.

A draft report was drawn up by the EVA, Professor P.A. Nollkaemper, and by Professor L.J. van den Herik, Professor J.G. Lammers and Dr G.R. den Dekker of the CAVV. The CAVV discussed the structure of the report on 23 February 2017. In addition, a procedure allowing all CAVV members to respond to draft versions of the advisory report by email was used. The EVA and the CAVV adopted the final text on 3 March 2017.

1 Introduction: point of departure and key terms

This advisory report examines the scope for and the significance and desirability of the use of the term ‘genocide’ by politicians. In accordance with the minister’s suggestion, the term ‘crimes against humanity’ will also be examined in the report.

The question of how politicians in general and parliament in particular use terms defined in public international law and the implications of that usage is not unique to the terms ‘genocide’ and ‘crimes against humanity’. This issue can arise in a variety of contexts, including with regard to intervention, the use of force, aggression or war crimes. For instance, parliamentary debates about the Netherlands’ contribution to missions in Iraq and Syria include implicit and explicit determinations pertaining to the legitimacy of the use of force from the perspective of international law. In accordance with the request for advice, the advisory report will address only the terms ‘genocide’ and ‘crimes against humanity’.

Before the issues of scope, significance and desirability are addressed, the meaning of the key terms used in the report will be explained in this introduction.

In order to answer the question posed in the motion, it is important to define what is meant by the word ‘politicians’. To begin with, this advisory report refers only to politicians at the central level of the state, to the exclusion of politicians at other levels of government. The report also makes a distinction between politicians who are members of government and politicians who are members of parliament. The focus is on the latter group and, more specifically, on motions that can be adopted by parliament and as such can be considered to convey parliament’s position. This choice is in keeping with the examples given in the first paragraph of the motion upon which the request for advice is based. Positions of individual politicians expressed within parliament or elsewhere (for example, in the media) fall outside the scope of this report.

The request for advice refers to ‘the use’ of the term genocide by politicians in reference to particular crimes. In this report, the EVA and the CAVV use the phrase ‘determination of genocide’. In this context, making a ‘determination’ means judging that a particular set of circumstances amounts to genocide. As explained in sections 3 and 4, the legal consequences under public international law hinge on the nature of the expression and the actor.

It is also important to define the terms ‘genocide’ and ‘crimes against humanity’. Genocide is defined in the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide.¹ The Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court contains the same definition.² According to this definition, genocide covers a number of crimes committed with intent to destroy a national, ethnical, racial or religious group. Genocide therefore concerns not just crimes against a group, but crimes specifically committed with the intention of destroying the group as such. The Rome Statute contains an additional dimension in that the crimes must have taken place in the context of a manifest pattern of conduct that threatens the existence of the group as such.³

Unlike the position with regard to genocide, there is no general convention on crimes against humanity. A definition of crimes against humanity can now be found in the Rome Statute and the general consensus is that this definition is largely consistent with customary international law. According to this definition, crimes against humanity are acts committed as part of a widespread or systematic attack directed against any civilian population, with knowledge of the attack.⁴ Such crimes can be committed in times of war and of peace.

Genocide and crimes against humanity are closely related in terms of the development of the law and by their nature. There is also a degree of overlap in terms of substance. For acts to be characterised as genocide or crimes against humanity they must be committed systematically or on a certain scale. State involvement is not necessarily a requirement. Such acts can also be committed by non-state actors and groups. However, there is as yet no definitive answer to the question of what type of non-state groups can commit these offences. Important criteria mentioned in the debate on crimes against humanity are organisational structure, having the resources and capability to mount attacks, the group’s objective and the acts committed by the group.⁵

Before the questions concerning scope, significance and desirability posed in the motion are addressed (in sections 3, 4 and 5, respectively) a number of examples will be given in the next section to illustrate parliamentary practice with respect to making determinations of genocide and/or crimes against humanity.

2 The practice of other parliaments

As the motion observes, there are multiple examples of situations in which parliaments have made determinations of genocide or of crimes against humanity.

In 1987 the European Parliament adopted a resolution on the Armenian Question stating that the events of 1915–1917 constituted genocide within the meaning of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide.⁶ The European Parliament also recognised the persecution of Roma by Nazi Germany during the Second World War⁷ and the events in Srebrenica of July 1995⁸ as genocide. In a resolution adopted in 2016, the European Parliament stated that Islamic State (IS) is committing genocide against Christians, Yazidis and other religious and ethnic minorities, and urged states to fulfil their obligations under international law (including the Genocide Convention).⁹

Members of the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe issue written declarations with some regularity characterising the Armenian Question as genocide.¹⁰ In a 1994 resolution the Parliamentary Assembly also referred to the acts of Saddam Hussein’s Iraqi regime against the Ma‘dān (Marsh Arabs) as genocide.¹¹ In a resolution adopted in 2016 the Assembly urged states to act on the assumption that Islamic State (IS) is committing genocide and to fulfil their obligations under the Genocide Convention.¹²

The US House of Representatives and the US Senate have used the term ‘genocide’ in the Armenian context,¹³ and in the context of events in Bosnia and Herzegovina (1992–1995), in particular in Srebrenica.¹⁴ The US House of Representatives and/or the US Senate have also used the term ‘genocide’ in other cases, primarily in the context of the protection of religious and ethnic minorities in the Middle East. For example, Congress has called for the acts of Islamic State (IS) in Iraq and Syria, in particular those targeting Christians and Yazidis, to be recognised as war crimes, crimes against humanity and genocide.¹⁵

Parliaments of a number of other states have also made determinations of past and present acts of genocide. For example, the parliaments of France and Germany have characterised the mass murder of Armenians in 1915 as genocide,¹⁶ and Sweden’s parliament included the attacks against the Assyrians in the same period.¹⁷ The question of whether the mass killings in Namibia should also be designated as genocide was answered in the affirmative by the German government at the urging of the German parliament.¹⁸ Another example is the 1932-33 famine in Ukraine, known as the Holodomor, which the Ukrainian parliament characterised as genocide in 2006.¹⁹

A more recent example is a motion adopted by the UK House of Commons concerning the violence against Christians and other minorities in Syria and Iraq. It bluntly observes that ‘this disgusting behaviour clearly falls within the definition of genocide’.²⁰ The Canadian parliament adopted a motion in October 2016 characterising the violence against the Yazidis as genocide and referring to the report issued by the United Nations Commission of Inquiry on Syria of June 2016.²¹

Occasionally, determinations by parliaments are linked to proposals to introduce a day of remembrance marking a specific event²² or a day of remembrance connected in a more general sense to preventing and combating violence against ethnic and/or religious groups.²³ Parliamentary determinations can also be related to debates regarding genocide denial and financial compensation or other forms of reparation, including the making of formal apologies.

Two general points drawn from this brief overview can be carried forward to the analysis below. First, there seems to be a certain degree of selectivity. Parliaments appear to be more prepared to make determinations of genocide in cases where mass killings were not perpetrated in or by their own state or in cases in which the victims were their own nationals and the killings took place in another era (Holodomor). Adopting a selective stance carries political risks, as will be discussed in the section on desirability.

Second, a distinction can be made between determinations regarding historical genocides on the one hand and mass killings perpetrated in an ongoing conflict on the other. This distinction has legal relevance. In relation to historical genocides, the primary legal issues pertain to reparations and apologies. In turn, legal issues pertaining to the obligation to prevent genocide and crimes against humanity are particularly relevant where they relate to determinations concerning ongoing situations. In this advisory report, the EVA and the CAVV have confined themselves to addressing determinations regarding ongoing situations.

3 Scope

The first question that the motion poses concerns the scope parliament has for using the terms ‘genocide’ and ‘crimes against humanity’.

There is no rule of international law that would prevent governments or parliaments from making a determination that ‘genocide’ and ‘crimes against humanity’ have been, are being or are about to be committed in a certain state.

The motion suggests that only the courts can make such determinations. This is a position that needs to be qualified. It is inherent in the international law system that states pronounce on questions of international law. Often there is no judicial body with the necessary jurisdiction, and international law would lose a great deal of its efficacy if it could not be applied without court decisions. In principle, therefore, it is up to states to make pronouncements on conduct of other states or persons that is relevant to international law.²⁴ This implies, too, that parliaments are not fettered by any rule prescribing that only courts are permitted to pronounce on genocide or crimes against humanity.

In this context, it is important to emphasise that, under international law, parliamentary determinations have a different legal significance than the acts of a government. From a legal perspective, states operate by means of their organs and in principle it is national law that determines which organs make up the state. This is not to say that each organ of state has the same significance in international relations.²⁵ For instance, in treaty negotiations, only the government of a state and, acting on its behalf, the head of state, head of government or the minister of foreign affairs have the authority to perform all the acts required to conclude a treaty. Other individuals may be able to perform certain acts that bind the state but only within the limits of the authority vested in them by the government of the state. With respect to the development of customary international law, in principle the acts of all organs of the state can contribute to this process. In particular, the determinations and positions expressed by the government both within and outside parliament can be deemed to be expressions of state practice and as such can contribute to the development of customary international law.²⁶

As the chief representative of the state in international relations, it is up to the government to determine that genocide or crimes against humanity have been or are being committed in another state.

This does not mean that parliament cannot express an independent position, for example by adopting a motion. One could even say that, in a democratic legal order such as that in the Netherlands, parliament has an obvious contribution to make in forming a judgment as to whether or not certain conduct constitutes genocide or crimes against humanity. However, positions taken by parliaments have no special significance in international law.

Besides making independent pronouncements on genocide and crimes against humanity, parliament can exert influence via the government, by inviting it to adopt the position that an act of genocide or crimes against humanity have occurred. If the government takes such a position at the request of parliament, this could have significance in international law (see section 4).

Although there are no obstacles in international law preventing governments or parliaments from using the terms ‘genocide’ or ‘crimes against humanity’, it is the view of the EVA and the CAVV that restraint should be exercised. Two considerations are of particular importance:

• Thorough investigation of the facts is essential and in the absence of sufficiently reliable findings of fact, restraint is to be preferred.

Legal precepts are applied to facts. Consequently, a determination that an international standard has been violated can be made only on the basis of a rigorous and meticulous investigation of the facts. Determinations of genocide and crimes against humanity are extremely serious and it is essential that they be based upon thorough investigation. Furthermore, in determining whether particular conduct constitutes genocide, it is necessary to ascertain whether the acts were committed with the intent to destroy a particular group, as set out above. The burden of proof is substantial. In the absence of sufficiently reliable findings of fact, restraint is to be preferred.

• Given the Netherlands’ commitment to advancing the international legal order, the preferred course of action is to support international determinations, but this need not be a reason to delay making national determinations.

Given the Netherlands’ commitment to advancing the international legal order, the preferred course of action is for the government and parliament to support the determinations made by the relevant UN bodies.²⁷ A distinction can be made between (1) determinations by the UN Security Council or the General Assembly, in which the underlying facts are not stated in detail, (2) determinations by UN commissions of inquiry, in which facts are ascertained and characterized in a more detailed and meticulous fashion, and (3) determinations made by international courts and criminal tribunals.

The EVA and the CAVV see a role for parliament in calling for international procedures such as these to be carried out, in particular UN inquiries.

The preference for determinations to be made at international level need not be seen as a reason for delaying determinations at national level. It is also important to stress that not all international determinations are worthy of support; parliaments and governments should not base their own determinations on international findings that are merely political in nature and insufficiently supported by facts.

4 Significance

The EVA and the CAVV have interpreted the question regarding the significance of using the terms ‘genocide’ and ‘crimes against humanity’ as an inquiry into the legal implications, in particular for the Netherlands, of making such a determination.

In subsection 4.1 the obligation to prevent and punish the crime of genocide is examined more closely. Subsection 4.2 addresses the legal basis and substance of obligations to prevent and punish crimes against humanity and the extent to which these obligations differ from those pertaining to genocide. Subsection 4.3 explains that the two crimes are of equal gravity. Lastly, subsection 4.4 presents an interim conclusion that, because there is no essential difference in the gravity of the two crimes, the obligations to prevent them should, in substance, be the same too. More generally, this subsection asserts that the difference between genocide and crimes against humanity is irrelevant in the prevention phase, and that attention (including that of parliaments) should not be focused on terminological issues but rather on specifying the obligation to prevent both crimes and, in particular, which preventive acts and measures are called for.

5.1 4.1 The obligation to prevent and punish genocide

The obligation to prevent and punish genocide arises from article 1 of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide. The obligation to prevent genocide is vaguely formulated and the Convention provides no further specification of what it precisely entails. The only provision that gives any further detail is article 8, which allows Contracting Parties to the Convention to call upon the competent organs of the United Nations to take action under the Charter of the United Nations. The obligation to prevent stated in article 1 of the Convention must be interpreted within the confines of the UN Charter and does not provide an independent basis for military intervention beyond the scope of the UN Charter. The R2P doctrine,²⁸ which emphasises the responsibility of every state and the international community to protect populations from genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity, can be seen as a further specification of these provisions of the Genocide Convention. As the Advisory Council on International Affairs (AIV) stressed in a 2010 advisory report, this doctrine likewise cannot serve as an autonomous basis for the use of force without the authorisation of the UN Security Council.²⁹ The obligation to prevent genocide therefore does not in itself directly give rise to a duty to engage in military intervention, nor does it provide any legal justification for such an intervention.

In Bosnia and Herzegovina v. Serbia and Montenegro case (referred to below as ‘the Genocide Case’) the International Court of Justice made it clear that the obligation to prevent is a binding legal norm, not just a moral principle. The most important questions are who is subject to this obligation, what the obligation entails, and precisely what circumstances activate the obligation. The ICJ’s judgment in the Genocide Case went some way to answering these questions. The Court found that the obligation to prevent is not limited by territory.³⁰ However, it added that the substance of the obligation to prevent genocide depends on the state’s ‘capacity to influence the action of persons likely to commit, or already committing genocide’ and that this ‘varies greatly from one state to another’.³¹ Factors that determine a state’s capacity to exercise influence include (i) the geographical distance from the state in question or the locality of the events, (ii) the closeness of political relations or other ties between the state and the most important actors in the events, (iii) the legal position of the state vis-à-vis the situation and those at risk of or being subjected to genocide, (iv) the state’s degree of awareness of events.³² The ICJ also ruled that the obligation to prevent is one of conduct, not one of result that would require a state to succeed in preventing the commission of genocide.³³ In addition the ICJ specified that the obligation to prevent arises when a state becomes or should have become aware of the existence of a serious risk of genocide being committed.³⁴ Despite these clarifications, the obligation to prevent has not as yet been fully defined. The precise substance of the obligation and in particular what types of preventive actions and measures states are expected to take remain largely unspecified.

The obligation to punish is more concrete in nature and is elaborated in multiple provisions of the Genocide Convention. It includes an obligation for states to cooperate with the international tribunals whose jurisdiction they have accepted. The Rome Statute, too, refers to the duty to prosecute international crimes. That being said, neither the Genocide Convention nor the Rome Statute explicitly requires states to establish universal jurisdiction. Nevertheless, a relatively large number of states, including the Netherlands, have implemented the Rome Statute in a way that creates universal jurisdiction over the crimes enumerated in the Statute. Clearly, prosecutors and courts, at both national and international level, have a decisive role to play in fulfilling the duty to punish perpetrators of international crimes. In addition, other national and international bodies have an independent responsibility to facilitate trial. The Syria Investigative Mechanism recently established by the UN General Assembly is a fitting example of an expression of this responsibility.

5.2 4.2 The obligation to prevent and punish crimes against humanity

The prohibition on genocide is contained in an international treaty regime that explicitly formulates states’ obligations to prevent and punish genocide. There is no separate convention on crimes against humanity. The Genocide Case provides no clarification of the legal basis and substance of the obligations to prevent and punish crimes against humanity, or the extent to which these obligations differ from those relating to genocide. The ICJ clearly indicated that its judgment in that case pertained exclusively to the obligation to prevent genocide and that it did not intend to make any pronouncement on a general duty of states to prevent other violations of international law.³⁵ Nevertheless, an obligation to prevent crimes against humanity could be based on customary international law.

In his preparatory work for an international convention on crimes against humanity, Sean Murphy, Special Rapporteur of the International Law Commission (ILC), addresses the existence, substance and scope of an obligation to prevent crimes against humanity.³⁶ He provides a detailed analysis of the obligation to prevent in various conventions on human rights and transnational crimes. With reference to these international instruments and the ICJ judgment in the Genocide Case, the ILC adopted, in 2015, draft article 4, containing a general obligation to prevent crimes against humanity, complemented by a more specific obligation for states to take measures to prevent these crimes in territory under their jurisdiction.³⁷ The differentiation in draft article 4 between obligations for territorial states and other states is consistent with ICJ case law. Until such time as a provision similar to draft article 4 is incorporated into a convention, the obligation to prevent crimes against humanity must be based on customary international law or on more specific instruments such as those enumerated in Special Rapporteur Murphy’s report. In the case of crimes against humanity, too, the substance of the obligation of prevention needs to be further specified.

With respect to the obligation to punish perpetrators of crimes against humanity, the absence of a separate convention elaborating this obligation is offset to some extent by the Rome Statute. Most states parties to the Statute have incorporated its definition of crimes against humanity in their national criminal law, in some cases making provision for universal jurisdiction as in the case of genocide. The Netherlands has done this in the International Crimes Act (Wet internationale misdrijven, WIM). As observed above, the Public Prosecution Service and the courts bear the largest share of the responsibility for fulfilling the obligation to punish. The Public Prosecution Service’s role comprises conducting criminal investigations and initiating prosecutions. In addition, it is inherent in criminal law that individual criminal responsibility must be established by the court in accordance with certain procedural safeguards. Also other organs of the state may have a responsibility to enable the state to fulfil its obligation, for example by facilitating trial.

5.3 4.3 Is genocide more serious than crimes against humanity?

A question that arises from the foregoing is whether the obligation to prevent genocide is or should be the same as the obligation to prevent crimes against humanity, or whether there is reason to take a different approach to each of them. An argument for equating the two obligations on substance and taking the same approach would be that the two crimes are closely related in nature and substance and in terms of the development of the law. An argument for taking different approaches would be that genocide is more serious and therefore requires a more rigid regime. This subsection examines the question as to whether there is indeed a difference in severity between the two crimes.

Genocide is sometimes called ‘the crime of crimes’,³⁸ which suggests that it is the most serious international crime there is. Emotionally and intuitively people tend to believe that genocide is more serious, and this is expressed in a strong desire for this particular label to be used to condemn certain crimes. The term ‘crimes against humanity’ is more generic, and consequently may not evoke the same immediate associations and emotions as genocide. Whether acts of genocide are actually deemed more serious than crimes against humanity depends upon the point of reference. If intention is the point of reference, it could be argued that genocide is the more serious of the two because it is committed with the intention of destroying a group; this intention is not a necessary criterion for conduct to be characterized as a crime against humanity. If scale or the brutality of the underlying conduct is taken as the point of reference, in specific cases crimes against humanity may be more serious than acts of genocide, making it impossible to generalise that one is inherently more serious than the other. Another argument against hierarchical classification is that ranking the two crimes in this way would also lead to groups of victims being ranked hierarchically: those targeted by crimes against humanity would be deemed to be victims of a less serious crime. This is not desirable; the case law of the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY) and the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR) repeatedly and emphatically states that genocide and crimes against humanity are equally grave offences.³⁹

Likewise, the International Commission of Inquiry on Darfur was clear on this point:

‘[G]enocide is not necessarily the most serious international crime. Depending upon the circumstances, such international offences as crimes against humanity or large scale war crimes may be no less serious and heinous than genocide.’⁴⁰

Given the emotive value that the genocide label has for many people, the Darfur commission felt obliged to add:

‘The conclusion that no genocidal policy has been pursued and implemented in Darfur by the Government authorities, directly or through the militias under their control, should not be taken as in any way detracting from or belittling the gravity of the crimes perpetrated in that region.’⁴¹

Consequently, the question as to whether genocide is, in a legal sense, a more serious offence than crimes against humanity is generally answered in the negative. In individual cases, however, it is possible to differentiate between the two, for example in sentencing, but the underlying complex of facts is more likely to play a decisive role than the characterisation of those facts as such.

5.4 4.4 Interim conclusion: differentiation not necessary in the prevention phase

Genocide and crimes against humanity are closely related, even largely overlapping offences. It therefore stands to reason that the obligation to prevent each of them should be deemed to be the same in terms of nature, substance and scope. If it is assumed that the obligation to prevent is the same for genocide and crimes against humanity, there is no need to differentiate between the two in the prevention phase. This position is consistent with the way in which the R2P doctrine is formulated. The Responsibility to Protect applies to both genocide and crimes against humanity. In addition, it bears mentioning that the recent French-Mexican proposal to restrict the right of veto in the Security Council (which the Netherlands supports) does not distinguish between the two offences either. This proposal uses the non-legal term mass atrocities, thereby emphasising that in the context of prevention, differentiating between international crimes is not of paramount importance.⁴² In keeping with this, it would be preferable to consistently use the terms ‘genocide’ and ‘crimes against humanity’ together during the prevention phase, so that attention can be focused on continuing to equalise and specify the substance and scope of the obligation to prevent both crimes. This recommendation is directed towards both the government and parliament. Only the courts will distinguish between the two terms, in establishing liability; in the prevention phase, this kind of differentiation is of subsidiary importance.

5 Desirability

The third part of the question posed in the motion concerns the desirability of politicians’ using the terms ‘genocide’ and ‘crimes against humanity’. In light of the foregoing analysis, the EVA and the CAVV would make the following observations in this respect.

• A necessary step on the road to prevention and intervention

Use of the term ‘genocide’ or ‘crimes against humanity’ may constitute an important first step on the road to political decision-making on prevention and intervention,⁴³ thus serving various interests (e.g. preventing further suffering, stopping refugee flows, etc.). As the previous section set out, international law imposes an obligation to prevent. The steps that actually need to be taken to prevent such crimes require a political decision-making process, which must be prompted by the use of these terms by politicians. Parliament can play an important role either by calling on the government to make a determination or by making a determination itself.

As stated above, determinations of this nature should not be impeded by linguistic and legalistic discussions about the precise definition and specific use of the term ‘genocide’; such debates have in the past formed obstacles to timely and effective prevention.⁴⁴ In the light of the close connection between genocide and crimes against humanity it is neither necessary nor desirable to differentiate in the prevention phase between the two offences, as explained above.

• International cooperation

Determinations of genocide and crimes against humanity can also play an important role in bringing about international cooperation. Use of the terms ‘genocide’ and ‘crimes against humanity’ makes a strong moral and political appeal to other actors (e.g., states and international organisations) and public opinion. Because a state on its own is usually helpless in the face of impending or ongoing genocide or crimes against humanity, timely political recognition and acknowledgment of these international crimes is often the first step towards achieving the international cooperation necessary for intervention or prevention.⁴⁵

Using the terms ‘genocide’ and ‘crimes against humanity’ may, as stated above, be a necessary step in fulfilling the Responsibility to Protect.⁴⁶

• Interpreting the obligation to prevent genocide and crimes against humanity

As set out in section 3, what the obligation to prevent genocide and crimes against humanity exactly entails has not yet been clearly defined. Governments and parliaments can play a useful role by calling for or deciding on concrete measures aimed at prevention, and by doing so contribute to the further specification of this obligation.

In assessing whether it is desirable for parliaments to make determinations regarding genocide and crimes against humanity, it is, however, important to take into account the considerations set out in section 3 regarding the importance of conducting thorough investigations and supporting international determinations.

• Political risks in international relations

The EVA and the CAVV would observe that the use of the terms ‘genocide’ and ‘crimes against humanity’ also carries political risks. Unilateral use of these terms may render the state concerned part of a ‘hegemonic Western discourse’, which is not necessarily the most effective approach politically speaking. Using these terms is tantamount to an accusation against a foreign government and can prove counterproductive, for example when prevention measures necessitate obtaining that government’s consent to the deployment of UN peacekeepers⁴⁷ or even an international fact-finding commission. In this respect, too, reference is made to the remarks in section 3 on the preference for international determinations.

• Devaluation of the terms ‘genocide’ and ‘crimes against humanity’

If, after the terms ‘genocide’ and ‘crimes against humanity’ are used, effective measures are not taken, this can have the effect of devaluing these terms. The resulting disconnection between their use and concrete legal and political consequences undermines them and, consequently, the legal norm they represent.⁴⁸

6 Conclusion and recommendations

The advice given in this report can be summarised in 10 statements:

• 1. The assertion that only the courts can make a determination as to whether conduct meets the legal definition of genocide or crimes against humanity needs to be qualified.

• 2. As the chief representative of the state in international relations, the government bears primary responsibility for determining that genocide or crimes against humanity have been or are being committed in another state.

• 3. It is possible for a parliament to adopt an autonomous position but such a position has no special significance in international law. Parliament can invite the government to take the position that genocide or crimes against humanity have been or are being committed.

• 4. Although both governments and parliaments are at liberty to speak out about genocide and crimes against humanity, restraint is in order.

  (a) A thorough investigation of the facts is essential and in the absence of sufficient and reliable findings of fact, restraint is to be preferred.

  (b) Given the Netherlands’ commitment to advancing the international legal order, the preferred course of action is to support international determinations, but this need not be a reason to delay making national determinations.

• 5. A determination that genocide or crimes against humanity are being or have been committed is a necessary first step in activating obligations, such as the obligation to prevent.

• 6. The precise substance of the obligation to prevent and the measures states are expected to take have not yet been clearly established. This is the case for both genocide and crimes against humanity.

• 7. Because genocide and crimes against humanity are closely connected, equivalent in terms of their nature and gravity, and largely overlap, the substance of the obligation to prevent should be the same for both offences.

• 8. The EVA and the CAVV recommend that there should be no differentiation between genocide and crimes against humanity during the prevention phase. They also advise using the two terms together as standard practice so that attention is focused not on terminological debates but on the more relevant question of what preventive acts and measures should be taken or continued.

• 9. Governments and parliaments can help further the development of the obligations to prevent genocide and crimes against humanity by calling for or deciding on concrete prevention measures.

• 10. The EVA and the CAVV recommend that the government support the ILC’s efforts with respect to drafting a separate convention on crimes against humanity. In this context, too, the obligation to prevent can be elaborated and further specified, and thus make a genuine contribution to prevention.

Annexe I: Request for advice on the use of the term ‘genocide’ by politicians, 19 December 2016

Postbus 20061

2500 EB Den Haag

Nederland

http://www.government.nl

Professor P.A. Nollkaemper

External Adviser on Public International Law

Professor R.A. Wessel

Chair

Advisory Committee on Issues of Public International Law

Date: 19 December 2016

Re: Request for advice on the use of the term ‘genocide’ by politicians

Dear Professors,

On 29 November 2016 the House of Representatives adopted a motion⁴⁹requesting that the government obtain advice from the External Adviser on Public International Law (EVA) and the Advisory Committee on Issues of Public International Law (CAVV) and ask them to prepare a joint report. The motion reads as follows:

‘The House, having heard the deliberations, observing that the European Parliament, the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe and the United States House of Representatives have characterised the atrocities committed by ISIS against Yazidis, Kurds, Christians and other ethnic and religious minorities, and against Muslims who disagree with ISIS’s extremist interpretation of Islam, as crimes against humanity and genocide;

considering that establishing whether conduct meets the legal definition of genocide is always a determination to be made by a court but that such determinations often take years, while the political recognition that the crime has been committed is of great importance, not least to enable the affected groups to process their grief;

requests that the government commission an advisory opinion from the External Adviser on Public International Law (Extern Volkenrechtelijk Adviseur, EVA) and the Advisory Committee on Issues of Public International Law (Commissie van advies inzake volkenrechtelijke vraagstukken, CAVV) and to request that they prepare a joint report for the purpose of creating clarity regarding the scope for and desirability and significance of politicians using the term “genocide”, both in general and in related to the aforementioned atrocities in the Middle East.’

I hereby ask you and your Committee to draft a joint advisory report in accordance with this motion. In view of the deliberations on the motion in the House of Representatives, the use of the term ‘crimes against humanity’ could also be examined in the report, if so desired.

Given the topicality of this issue, I ask that you issue the report by 1 March 2017 if possible.

Yours sincerely,

Bert Koenders

Minister of Foreign Affairs

Annexe II: Members of the Advisory Committee on Issues of Public International Law

Members of the Advisory Committee on Issues of Public International Law

Chair

Professor R.A. Wessel

Vice-chair

Professor L.J. van den Herik

Members

Dr C.M. Brölmann

Dr G.R. den Dekker

Professor A.G. Oude Elferink

Professor N.M.C.P. Jägers

Professor J.G. Lammers

Civil service adviser

Professor E. Lijnzaad

Executive secretaries

M.H. Broodman

E.M. van Rijssen

Postbus 20061

2500 EB Den Haag

Telephone: +31 (0)70 348 6724

Fax: +31 (0)70 348 5128

Website: www.cavv-advies.nl

The Advisory Committee on Issues of Public International Law is an independent body that advises the government and parliament on international law issues.

Annexe III: External Adviser on Public International Law

External Adviser on Public International Law

Professor P.A. Nollkaemper

The External Adviser on Public International Law is available at all times to provide independent advice on his own initiative or at the request of the minister on important foreign policy issues involving aspects of international law.