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Preserving the Gordian Knot: UN Legal Accountability in the Aftermath of Srebrenica

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Abstract

To ensure the effective and independent exercise of its functions, the United Nations is endowed with ‘immunity from every form of legal process’, as Section 2 General Convention phrases it. The Supreme Court of the Netherlands perceived this immunity as absolute, clearing away assertions that the UN’s immunity should not be impervious to alleged ius cogens violations and for the failure to subsequently provide alternative dispute settlement. However, a critical examination of both of these arguments reveals that the UN’s immunity in relation to its legal accountability is a proverbial Gordian knot: seemingly impossible to smoothly disentangle so that the UN’s functional capacities in the realm of international peace and security are effectively protected whilst the need for greater accountability is satisfied.

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Notes

  1. On the term accountability see White (2005), p. 189 and Brunnée (2005), p. 22; on the different forms of accountability (political, democratic, administrative, financial or legal) see International Law Association (2004), p. 5.

  2. Security Council Resolution 819 (1993) of 16 April 1993.

  3. Secretary-General (1999), p. 106.

  4. E.g. on the occasion of the 10th anniversary of the genocide Secretary-General (2005).

  5. Nollkaemper (2008), p. 346.

  6. In contrast, the UN has been active through its judicial organ (ICJ) and subsidiary judicial organ (ICTY) to establish individual criminal responsibility (ICTY Radislav Krstić case; Dragan Obrenović case; Vidoje Blagojević and Dragan Jokić case) as well as state responsibility for the genocide (ICJ, Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (Bosnia and Herzegovina v. Serbia and Montenegro), Judgment, ICJ Reports 2007, p. 43); on multi-level accountability in the aftermath of Srebrenica see Nollkaemper (2008), p. 345.

  7. District Court of The Hague (Rechtbank ’s-Gravenhage) 10 July 2008, Mothers of Srebrenica et al . v. The State of the Netherlands and the United Nations, ECLI:NL:RBSGR:2008:BD6795 (Dutch) and ECLI:NL:RBSGR:2008:6796 (English translation), available at http://uitspraken.rechtspraak.nl/inziendocument?id=ECLI:NL:RBSGR:2008:BD6796; Court of Appeal of The Hague (Gerechtshof ’s-Gravenhage) 30 March 2010, Mothers of Srebrenica et al. v. The State of The Netherlands and the United Nations, ECLI:NL:GHSGR:2010:BL8979 (in Dutch), English translation available at http://www.asser.nl/upload/documents/20120420T023804-Decision%20Court%20of%20Appeal%2030%20March%202010%20(English).pdf; Supreme Court of the Netherlands (Hoge Raad) 13 April 2012, Mothers of Srebrenica et al. v. the State of the Netherlands and the United Nations, ECLI:NL:HR:2012:BW1999 (in Dutch), English translation available at http://www.asser.nl/upload/documents/20120905T111510-Supreme%20Court%20Decision%20English%2013%20April%202012.pdf; the latter’s immunity decision was confirmed by the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR), Stichting Mothers of Srebrenica v. The Netherlands, App. no. 6542/12, 11 June 2013.

  8. Court of Appeal of the Hague (Gerechtshof ’s-Gravenhage) 5 July 2011, Mustafić v. The State of the Netherlands, ECLI:NL:GHSGR:2011:BR0132 (Dutch) and Court of Appeal of the Hague (Gerechtshof ’s-Gravenhage) 5 July 2011, Nuhanović v. The State of the Netherlands, ECLI:NL:GHSGR:2011:BR0133 (Dutch), English translation available at: http://www.asser.nl/default.aspx?site_id=36&level1=15248&level2=&level3=&textid=39985.

  9. Supreme Court of the Netherlands (Hoge Raad), State of the Netherlands v. Mustafić et al., ECLI:NL:HR:2013:BZ9228 (advisory opinion of Advocate General Vlas: ECLI:NL:PHR:2013:BZ9228); State of the Netherlands et al. v. Nuhanović, ECLI:NL:HR:2013:BZ9225 (advisory opinion of Advocate General Vlas: ECLI:NL:PHR:2013:BZ9225), all in Dutch. The full English translations of both judgments, including the advisory opinions of the Advocate General, can be found at the website of the Supreme Court at http://www.rechtspraak.nl/Organisatie/Hoge-Raad/Supreme-court/ (through: Summaries of some important rulings of the Supreme Court). The English translation of the Supreme Court’s judgment in the case of Mustafić et al. was also reprinted in 60 NILR (2013), pp. 447–485, with an introduction and commentary by Ryngaert (2013).

  10. District Court of The Hague (Rechtbank Den Haag) 16 July 2014, Mothers of Srebrenica et al. v. State of the Netherlands, ECLI:NL:RBDHA:2014:8562 (in Dutch) and ECLI:NL:RBDHA:2014:8748 (English translation), available at http://deeplink.rechtspraak.nl/uitspraak?id=ECLI:NL:RBDHA:2014:8748 (under appeal).

  11. Schmalenbach (2013), p. 185.

  12. Mégret (2013), p. 161.

  13. Reinisch (2011), p. 134.

  14. See e.g. ECtHR, Stichting Mothers of Srebrenica v. The Netherlands, supra n. 7, para. 154: ‘To bring such operations within the scope of domestic jurisdiction would be to allow individual States, through their courts, to interfere with the fulfilment of the key mission of the United Nations in this field including with the effective conduct of its operations’.

  15. Cf. Reinisch (2000), p. 335.

  16. Supreme Court of the Netherlands (Hoge Raad) 13 April 2012, Mothers of Srebrenica et al. v. the State of the Netherlands and the United Nations, ECLI:NL:HR:2012:BW1999, supra n. 7, para. 4.2.

  17. ECtHR, Stichting Mothers of Srebrenica v. The Netherlands, supra n. 7, para. 154.

  18. Court of Appeal of The Hague 30 March 2010, Mothers of Srebrenica et al. v. The State of The Netherlands and the United Nations, ECLI:NL:GHSGR:2010:BL8979, supra n. 7, para. 5.10.

  19. ICJ, Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (Bosnia and Herzegovina v. Serbia and Montenegro), supra n. 6, p. 43, para. 161.

  20. Ibid., para. 162; see also Ventura and Akande (2013); Den Dekker and Schechinger (2010), p. 6 note with reference to the judgment of The Hague Court of Appeal 30 March 2010, Mothers of Srebrenica et al. v. The State of The Netherlands and the United Nations, ECLI:NL:GHSGR:2010:BL8979, supra n. 7, para. 5.10 that the Court of Appeal may have overruled the immunity of the UN if the Organization had been accused of committing or knowingly assisting in committing the genocide as opposed to failing to prevent it. This aspect has been evidently overruled by the Supreme Court of the Netherlands (Hoge Raad) 13 April 2012, Mothers of Srebrenica et al. v. the State of the Netherlands and the United Nations, ECLI:NL:HR:2012:BW1999, supra n. 7, para. 4.3.6: ‘That immunity is absolute’.

  21. ICJ, Jurisdictional Immunities of the State (Germany v. Italy: Greece intervening), Judgment, ICJ Reports 2012, p. 99, para. 93.

  22. ECtHR, Al Adsani v. United Kingdom, App. no. 35763/97, Judgment of 21 November 2001, para. 61.

  23. Supreme Court of the Netherlands (Hoge Raad) 13 April 2012, Mothers of Srebrenica et al. v. the State of the Netherlands and the United Nations, ECLI:NL:HR:2012:BW1999, supra n. 7, para. 4.3.7; ECtHR, Stichting Mothers of Srebrenica v. The Netherlands, supra n. 7, para. 158.

  24. ICJ, Jurisdictional Immunities of the State (Germany v. Italy: Greece intervening), supra n. 21, p. 99, para. 97.

  25. De Boer (2013), p. 130.

  26. ICJ, Jurisdictional Immunities of the State (Germany v. Italy: Greece intervening), supra n. 21, p. 99, paras. 80–97.

  27. Orakhelashvili (2005), pp. 67–69.

  28. Cf. ICJ, Certain Expenses of the United Nations (Article 17, paragraph 2 of the Charter), Advisory Opinion of 20 July 1962, ICJ Reports 1962, p. 151 at p. 168.

  29. Cf. the detailed ultra vires analysis of Orakhelashvili (2014), pp. 153–164; Henquet (2010), p. 280.

  30. ICJ, Jurisdictional Immunities of the State (Germany v. Italy: Greece intervening), supra n. 21, p. 99, para. 82.

  31. Bayerischer Verwaltungsgerichtshof, 7. Senat, 7 B 92.2689, Judgment of 15 March 1995, para. 29.

  32. In practice the UN informs the court that it wishes not to waive its immunity via its Member State’s government, see e.g. The Practice of the United Nations, May 1967, UN Doc. A/CN.4/L.118, Add. l and 2 para. 72; Memorandum to the Legal Adviser, UNJY 1984, pp. 188–189.

  33. In the Srebrenica case, the UN requested the Dutch Permanent Representative to the UN to take appropriate steps in the proceedings, possibly to prevent default proceedings in which the UN’s immunity is not addressed, see de Boer (2013), p. 128.

  34. See in this regard the reasoning of Court of Appeal of The Hague 30 March 2010, Mothers of Srebrenica et al. v. The State of The Netherlands and the United Nations, ECLI:NL:GHSGR:2010:BL8979, supra n. 7, para. 5.10: ‘Besides, the Court of Appeal considers, as put forward before, that UN peacekeeping operations will usually occur in areas around the world where a hotspot has developed, and that a reproach that, although it did not commit crimes against humanity itself, the UN failed to act against it adequately, under the circumstances can be latched onto too easily, which could lead to misuse’.

  35. Article II Section 2 General Convention stipulates that ‘The United Nations […] shall enjoy immunity from every form of legal process except insofar as in any particular case it has expressly waived its immunity’; for the argument that Art. 105 UN Charter provides only the rationale of immunity whereas Section 2 defines the scope, see Reinisch (2000), p. 334.

  36. Orakhelashvili (2014), p. 164.

  37. Blokker (2013), p. 275.

  38. The majority of cases concern labour disputes with the organization’s staff, see the recent decision of the ECtHR in Klausecker v. Germany, App. no. 415/07, Decision of 29 January 2015, paras. 68–70.

  39. Harpignies (1971), p. 452; see generally Pingel-Lenuzza and Gaillard (2002), pp. 3–4.

  40. Miller (2009), p. 96.

  41. Secretary-General (1996), paras. 22–25.

  42. Secretary-General (1996), para. 22.

  43. Cf. Art. 51 of the Model Status-of-Forces Agreements, Secretary-General (1999), Annex, which was the template for SOFA up to 1998 when the General Assembly adopted a new liability policy (UNGA Res. 52/247, 26 December 1998). The composition of the commission remained unchanged in the post-1998 SOFA (Standard Art. VII, para. 55).

  44. Art. 33(1) UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules revisited in 2010, Annex to UN General Assembly Resolution 65/22 of 6 December 2010.

  45. Para. 48(1) Agreement between the Government of Bosnia and Herzegovina and the United Nations on the status of the United Nations Protection Force in Bosnia and Herzegovina, 1722 UNTS 78.

  46. Ibid.

  47. Beckett (1947), p. 12, para. 32 (emphasis in the original).

  48. The UN inserts this standard phrase in all Art. VIII, para. 55 SOFA concluded since 1998, see e.g. Agreement between the United Nations and Sierra Leone concerning the status of the United Nations Mission in Sierra Leone, 4 August 2000, 2118 UNTS 190.

  49. Under-Secretary-General for Legal Affairs, Letter to Mr. Brian Concannon, Director, Institute for Justice and Democracy in Haiti (21 February 2013), available at http://opiniojuris.org/wp-content/uploads/LettertoMr.BrianConcannon.pdf.

  50. ICJ, Reparation for Injuries Suffered in the Service of the United Nations, Advisory Opinion, ICJ Reports 1949, p. 174 at p. 180.

  51. Mégret (2013), p. 168.

  52. Schmalenbach (2004), pp. 229 et seq.

  53. Cf. Standard Art. VII, para. 55 of all SOFAs concuded since 1998: ‘[…] any dispute or claim of a private law character not resulting from operational necessity […] shall be settled by a standing claims commission to be established for that purpose’; see e.g. Agreement between the United Nations and Sierra Leone concerning the status of the United Nations Mission in Sierra Leone, 4 August 2000, 2118 UNTS 190.

  54. See e.g. Security Council Resolution 1674 (2006), para. 4.

  55. Schmalenbach (2014), p. 248.

  56. Remarkably, the Court of Appeal in both the Mustavić and Nuhanović cases assessed Dutchbat’s conduct inter alia in light of the domestic law of Bosnia Herzegovina, applying conflict of law rules regarding torts. Supra n. 8.

  57. The District Court of The Hague in the case Stichting Mothers of Srebrenica et al v. The Netherlands refused to consider ultra vires acts of Dutchbat in respect of the Security Council mandate because ‘there are no grounds for attributing to the State Dutchbat’s acts for implementation of and within the framework of the mandate’. Supra n. 10.

  58. Para. 48 UNPROFOR SOFA reads: ‘any dispute or claim of a private law character to which UNPROFOR or any member thereof is a party and over which the courts of Bosnia and Herzegovina do not have jurisdiction because of any provision of the present Agreement, shall be settled by a standing claims commission to be established for that purpose’, 1722 UNTS 78.

  59. Tomuschat (2012), para. 109.

  60. ICJ, Difference Relating to Immunity from Legal Process of a Special Rapporteur of the Commission on Human Rights, Advisory Opinion, ICJ Reports 1999, p. 62, para. 51.

  61. On possible models of dispute settlement such as an independent claims commission or an ombudsperson see Schrijver (2013), p. 596.

  62. Schmalenbach (2014), p. 249.

  63. For a critical assessment of the private law limitation, see Alvarez (2014).

  64. Supreme Court of the Netherlands (Hoge Raad) 13 April 2012, Mothers of Srebrenica et al. v. the State of the Netherlands and the United Nations, advisory opinion of Advocate General Vlas, ECLI:NL:PHR:2012:BW1999 (in Dutch, no official translation available), supra n. 7, paras. 2.12, 2.13 and 2.25; it should be noted, though, that the SOFA argument was only made as a side note, the Advocate General dismissed the appeal on other grounds.

  65. Agreement between the Government of Bosnia and Herzegovina and the United Nations on the status of the United Nations Protection Force in Bosnia and Herzegovina, 1722 UNTS 78.

  66. Ibid., para. 50.

  67. Blokker (2013), p. 275.

  68. ECtHR, Waite and Kennedy v. Germany, App. no. 26083/94, Judgment 18 February 1999, para. 72.

  69. ECtHR, Stichting Mothers of Srebrenica v. The Netherlands, supra n. 7, para. 165.

  70. Ibid., para. 143.

  71. Ibid., para. 155.

  72. ICJ, Differences Relating to Immunity from Legal Process of a Special Rapporteur of the Commission on Human Rights, Advisory Opinion, ICJ Reports 1999, p. 62, para. 66 (Cumaraswamy Advisory Opinion).

  73. UN District Court, Southern District of New York, Cynthia Brzak and Nasr Ishak v. United Nations, et al., 597 F.3d 107 (2d Cir. 2010), 140–144.

  74. UN Doc. PC/EX/113/Rev.1 at p. 69, para. 2.

  75. For an early decision on the lack of conditionality even in the light of human rights law see Manderlier v. United Nations and Belgian State, Brussels Appeals Court, Decision of 15 September 1969, (1969) UNJYB 236; recently Entico Corporation Ltd v. United Nations Educational Scientific and Cultural Association (UNESCO) [2008] EWHC 531 (Comm) (18 March 2008); Brzak v. United Nations, 597 F.3d 107 (2d Cir. 2010), at 6; US District Court of the Southern District of New York in the Haiti cholera class action, George v. United Nations et al., 13-CV-7146 (JPO), Opinion and Order of 9 January 2015; for a more normative theoretical perspective on conditionality see Mégret (2013), p. 185 (‘l’idee d’une obligation impérieuse pour l’ONU’).

  76. Georges v. United Nations et al., supra n. 75.

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    Kirsten Schmalenbach

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Schmalenbach, K. Preserving the Gordian Knot: UN Legal Accountability in the Aftermath of Srebrenica. Neth Int Law Rev 62, 313–328 (2015). https://doi.org/10.1007/s40802-015-0028-8

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