Abstract
A necessary and sufficient condition for the uniqueness of the weights in Harsanyi-type aggregation theorems is obtained as an application of Phelps’ theorem on the uniqueness of Hahn–Banach extensions.
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Notes
The axiom of weak Pareto states that if every individual in the society weakly prefers alternative a to alternative b, then the society must rank a higher than b.
A referee graciously pointed out the paper of Weymark (1994), who gives a thorough account of the history of the Independent Prospect Condition. The same paper also contains a formal proof of the Fishburn’s observation mentioned later in the text.
References
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I am very grateful to two anonymous referees for their comments and suggestions.
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Amarante, M. Uniqueness of the weights in Harsanyi-type theorems. Econ Theory Bull 5, 175–178 (2017). https://doi.org/10.1007/s40505-016-0111-2
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s40505-016-0111-2