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Abstract

The right of communication to the public has been one of the most hotly contested EU copyright issues. In the latest phase of the right’s development, the additions of Art. 17 of the Digital Single Market Directive together with the YouTube case and the Regulation on a Single Market for Digital Services have solidified the shift towards a responsibility-based approach whereby a private ordering mechanism has been employed for entities to regulate their behaviour to avoid liability. This shift towards the responsibility-based approach challenges the traditional understanding of “communication to the public” arising from Art. 3 of the Information Society Directive and its resulting case law. Consequently, this article will assess the shift in approach and the resultant challenges in employing it.

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Notes

  1. Case C-135/23 Gesellschaft für musikalische Aufführungs- und mechanische Vervielfältigungsrechte eV (GEMA) v. GL [2024], Opinion of Advocate General Szpunar, ECLI:EU:C:2024:151, para. 1. Also see Torremans arguing that there is no universal approval of the CJEU’s case law concerning the right of communication to the public – Torremans (2022), p. 2.

  2. Case C-306/05 Sociedad General de Autores y Editores de España (SGAE) v. Rafael Hoteles SA [2006] ECLI:EU:C:2006:764.

  3. Case C-466/12 Nils Svensson and others v. Retriever Sverige AB [2014] ECLI:EU:C:2014:76.

  4. Case C-160/15 GS Media BV v. Sanoma Media Netherlands BV and others [2016] ECLI:EU:C:2016:644.

  5. Case C-610/15 Stichting Brein v. Ziggo BV and XS4All Internet BV [2017] ECLI:EU:C:2017:456.

  6. Case C-527/15 Stichting Brein v. Jack Frekerik Wullems (also trading under the name Filmspeler) [2017] ECLI:EU:C:2017:300.

  7. Directive (EU) 2019/790 of the European Parliament and of the council of 17 April 2019 on copyright and related rights in the Digital Single Market and amending Directives 96/9/EC and 2001/29/EC [2019] OJ L 130/92.

  8. Cases C-682/18 and C-683/18 Frank Peterson v. Google LLC, YouTube Inc, YouTube LLC and Google Germany GmbH and Elsevier Inc v. Cyando AG [2021] ECLI:EU:C:2021:503.

  9. Regulation (EU) 2022/2065 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 19 October 2022 on a Single Market for Digital Services and amending Directive 2000/31/EC (Digital Services Act) [2022] OJ L 277/1.

  10. Directive 2001/29/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 22 May 2001 on the harmonisation of certain aspects of copyright and related rights in the information society [2001] OJ L 167/10.

  11. See Makeen (2000); Depreeuw (2014); Koo (2019); Marusic (2023).

  12. See Rafael Hoteles [2006]; Cases C-403/08 and C-429/08 Football Association Premier League (FAPL) and others v. QC Leisure and others and Karen Murphy v. Media Protection Services Ltd [2011] ECLI:EU:C:2011:631; Cases C-431/09 and C-432/09 Airfield NV and another v. Belgische Vereniging van Auteurs, Componisten en Uitgevers CVBA (SABAM) and Airfield NV v. Agicoa Belgium BVBA [2011] ECLI:EU:C:2011:648; Case C-135/10 Societa Consortile Fonografici (SCF) v. Marco del Corso [2012] ECLI:EU:C:2012:140; Case C-162/10 Phonographic Performance (Ireland) Ltd v. Ireland [2012] ECLI:EU:C:2012:141; Case C-607/11 ITV Broadcasting Ltd and others v. TVCatchup Ltd [2013] ECLI:EU:C:2013:147.

  13. See Svensson [2014], GS Media [2016], Filmspeler [2017], and Ziggo [2017].

  14. See DSMD and YouTube [2021].

  15. “Communication” was defined as an intervention with full knowledge of the consequences to give access to a protected work – Rafael Hoteles [2006], para. 42.

  16. “Public” was defined as a fairly large and indeterminate number of potential recipients – Case C-89/04 Mediakabel BV v. Commissariaat voor de Media [2005] ECLI:EU:C:2005:348, para. 30; Case C-192/04 Lagardere Active Broadcast v. Societe pour la perception de la remuneration equitable (SPRE), Gesellschaft zur Verwerung von Leistungsschutrechten mbH (GVL) [2005] ECLI:EU:C:2005:475, para. 31; Rafael Hoteles [2006], para. 37.

  17. “New public” was defined as an audience different from the one targeted by the original act of communication – Rafael Hoteles [2006], para. 40. It must be noted that “new public” remains a controversial element of the right of communication to the public – see Rosati (2020a), p. 802; Karapapa (2017), p. 63; Hugenholtz and Van Velze (2016).

  18. The CJEU attempted to reduce the consequences of the “new public” criterion by introducing a caveat whereby the “new public” criterion is inapplicable in situations where the subsequent communication is made by a different technical means – Case C-607/11 ITV Broadcasting Ltd and others v. TVCatchup Ltd [2013] ECLI:EU:C:2013:147, para. 26.

  19. It can be argued that the exhaustion of the right of communication to the public via the new public criterion creates an implied licence situation. See Rosati (2019), p. 101; Mysoor (2018), 666683. Also see Case C-392/19 VG Bild-Kunst v. Stiftung Preußischer Kulturbesitz [2021] ECLI:EU:C:2021:181, paras. 52 and 55, where the CJEU attempted to limit the reach of the exhaustion problem by holding that a hyperlink that circumvents a technological protection measure to provide access to a work by way of framing will amount to an act of communication to the public.

  20. GS Media [2016], paras. 4749.

  21. Strowel in Hugenholtz (2018), p. 239; Peguera (2018), pp. 2 and 12; Ohly (2018), p. 670; Dimita (2017), p. 157; Koo (2019), pp. 116117; Ginsburg (2017).

  22. Pappalardo (2023), pp. 24.

  23. Hugenholtz and Van Velze argued that the legislature should step in to develop appropriate harmonised rules for the right of communication to the public instead of the CJEU – Hugenholtz and Van Velze (2016), pp. 814815.

  24. Geiger and Jütte (2021), pp. 630631.

  25. Rendas (2017), p. 14.

  26. Angelopoulos (2017), pp. 65–66; Clark and Dickenson (2017), p. 277; Savola (2017), p. 143; Midelieva (2017), p. 487; Lim Saw (2018), p. 562; Nordemann (2018), p. 745; Ginsburg (2017) 3. Also note AG Szpunar in his Opinion on Ziggo stated that failing to expand the scope of the communication to the public right to address torrent files would undermine the objective of harmonising EU copyright law, given the divergent approaches to secondary liability at the domestic level – Case C-610/15 Stichting Brein v. Ziggo BV and XS4ALL Internet BV [2017] Opinion of AG Szpunar ECLI:EU:C:2017:99, para. 3.

  27. For general discussion on the potential issues with Art. 17 see Burri and Zihlmann (2020), pp. 5465.

  28. The basis for attribution of liability in Art. 17 seems to be akin to the US server test set out by the Ninth Circuit in Perfect 10Perfect 10 v. Google Inc (2006) 416 F Supp 2d 828, 839840 and 843844.

  29. See Recitals 6162 of the DSMD, Rosati (2021), pp. 301359; Husovec and Quintais (2021), p. 326.

  30. IFPI, IFPI Digital Music Report 2015: Charting the Path to Sustainable Growth (2015), pp. 2223, Rosati (2021) pp. 314315; Allgrove and Gordon (2020), pp. 525526.

  31. Directive 2000/31/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 8 June 2000 on certain legal aspects of information society services, in particular electronic commerce, in the Internal Market (Directive on electronic commerce) [2000] OJ L 178/1.

  32. It has been argued that online platforms avoided liability on the basis that they were seen as gatekeepers rather than “agents who normative decisions matter”, and moreover that it was too burdensome to hold them accountable for the acts of their users. See Kraakman (1986); Zittrain (20052006); Thompson (2016), p. 787; Bridy (2020), p. 326; Senftleben and Angelopoulos (2020), p. 6.

  33. Husovec and Quintais (2021), pp. 336337.

  34. Gabison and Buiten (2020), pp. 248250; Shikhiashvili (2019) 24(1), p. 128; Quintais et al (2023), p. 22; Allgrove and Gordon in Aplin (2020), p. 506.

  35. Note, right holders cannot be for forced into authorising works under Art. 17(2) – Recital 61 DSMD, ALAI, First Opinion on certain aspects of the implementation of Article 17 of Directive (EU) 2019/790 of 17 April 2019 on copyright and related rights in the digital single market (2020) and p.2; and Husovec and Quintais (2021), p. 345. Furthermore, the operation of Art. 17(2) will inevitably mean cooperation with collective management organisations.

  36. Angelopoulos argued that the “best efforts” mechanism creates a duty of care where online platforms do not obtain a licence – Angelopoulos in Rosati (2023), p. 206.

  37. The Polish government sought to annul Art. 17(4) on the basis that it would ultimately require general monitoring, which would conflict with the fundamental right of freedom of expression and information – Case C-401/19 Republic of Poland v. European Parliament and Council of the European Union [2022] ECLI:EU:C:2022:297, paras. 24 and 7297.

  38. Senftleben and Angelopoulos (2020), pp. 1623.

  39. Case C-70/10 Scarlet Extended SA v. Société belge auteurs, compositeurs et éditeurs SCRL (SABAM) [2011] ECLI:EU:C:2011:771, paras. 4553.

  40. Case C-360/10 SABAM v. Netlog [2012] ECLI:EU:C:2012:85, paras. 3539 and 4551.

  41. Case C-484/14 Tobias McFaddden v. Sony Music Entertainment Germany GmbH [2016] ECLI:EU:C:2016:689, para. 87.

  42. Case C-18/18 Eva Glawischnig-Piesczek v. Facebook Ireland Limited [2019] ECLI:EU:C:2019:821, paras. 37 and 4146.

  43. Case C-324/09 L’Oreal SA and others v. eBay International AG and others [2011] ECLI:EU:C:2011:474, paras. 139144.

  44. Senftleben and Angelopoulos (2020), p. 23.

  45. Senftleben and Angelopoulos (2020), p. 28; Geiger and Jütte (2021), pp. 630631; ALAI (2020), p. 3.

  46. Geiger and Jütte (2021), p. 629.

  47. For general discussion on the challenges of using automated filtering tools see Marsoof et al (2022); Romero Moreno (2020), pp. 157161.

  48. Kraakman (1986), p. 101.

  49. YouTube [2021], para. 60. For the purposes of this article, the issues pertaining to YouTube will be focused on. It is arguable that YouTube and Uploaded are technically different and should not have been treated in the same manner.

  50. See ALAI, Opinion in respect of some of the question from the Federal Court of Justice of Germany for preliminary ruling by the CJEU, Case C-682/18 (YouTube) (2019).

  51. Where an act of communication is done “for profit”, there is a presumption of knowledge about the legitimacy of the work being communicated. See GS Media [2016], paras. 4751.

  52. Ohly stated that it was unclear how the threshold for the knowledge requirement in relation to platforms involved with both infringing and non-infringing would be addressed – Ohly (2018), p. 667.

  53. YouTube [2021], para. 84.

  54. Ibid, para. 85.

  55. The considerations adopted by the CJEU in dismissing liability for YouTube may prove useful in interpreting and applying Art. 17(4)(b) and (c) of the DSMD.

  56. YouTube [2021], para. 84.

  57. See Recital 28 Digital Services Act. Also see Tate (2021), p. 349.

  58. For more commentary on the Digital Services Act see van Hoboken et al (2023). Also see Arts. 16, 20, 23, 34 and 35 DSA.

  59. Quintais et al describe the difference between the Digital Services Act and Art. 17 of the DSMD as the regulation “of platforms” (Art. 17 DSMD) and regulation “by platforms” (Digital Services Act) – Quintais et al (2023), p. 3.

  60. Ibid, pp. 23.

  61. Hanuz argued that this shift towards holding online platforms liable for providing indirect access to works was facilitated by the CJEU adopting the perspective of an end user in determining who should be held responsible for acts of communication to the public and in so doing the technical nature of a communication is disregarded. In other words, the online platform is held responsible because it appears that it is the platform itself that make the communication to the public from the viewpoint of the average end user – Hanuz (2020) 11(3), pp. 320321. Also see Wischmeyer in Susi (2019), pp. 150153; Thompson (2016), p. 819.

  62. Angelopoulos argued that the conflation is not necessarily problematic because not all countries have a distinction between primary and secondary liability – Angelopoulos in Rosati (2023), p. 212.

  63. The EU approach in this regard reflects the strategy of claimants in pursuing secondary liability claims against entities that possess control over chokepoints that can stop infringement effectively and at a lower cost – Dinwoodie in Dinwoodie (2017), pp. 7 and 1617. Also see Marsoof (2019), p. 5.

  64. Giblin and Ginsburg argued that these are the wrong issues to focus on. Instead, emphasis should be placed on whether the act done should be considered infringement and moreover, the nature of the technology and the marketplace – Giblin and Ginsburg in Pistorius (2018), pp. 149151. For discussion on who is a suitable defendant see Riordan (2016), pp. 5459; Marsoof (2019), p. 106; Rosati (2017), p. 1242.

  65. Ziggo [2017], para. 36.

  66. See Angelopoulos (2017); Pappalardo (2023), chap. 2.

  67. See Art. 17(4) of the DSMD and YouTube [2021], paras. 8485 and 100102.

  68. See Recitals 61, 62 and 66.

  69. See Recitals 14, 75, 76 and 79.

  70. Pappalardo (2023), p. 57.

  71. It can be argued that this is a departure from the traditional tort law approach that has been employed in copyright law where it is necessary to establish a causal link between the infringer and the infringement – see Pappalardo (2023), pp. 5253. Also see, Rosati (2020b), p. 653.

  72. Foong argued that fault now underlies the approach to communication to the public in the EU. However, the EU right of communication to the public should more closely analyse the act in question rather than looking to culpability/fault – Foong (2020), pp. 234 and 237.

  73. Despite all of the recent developments concerning the right of communication to the public, there are still a number of cases concerning traditional broadcasting technologies – Case C-290/21 AKM (Fourniture de bouquets satellitaires en Autriche) [2023] ECLI:EU:C:2023:424, Grand Production v. GO4YU [2022] Opinion of AG Szpunar, Cases C-775-21 and C-826/21 Blue Air Aviation SA v. UCMR – ADA Asociaţia pentru Drepturi de Autor a Compozitorilor and Uniunea Producătorilor de Fonograme din România (UPFR) v. Societatea Natională de Transport Feroviar de Călători (SNTFC) “CFR Călători” SA [2023] ECLI:EU:C:2023:307, Case C-426/21 Ocilion IPTV Technologies GmbH v. Seven.One Entertainment Group GmbH and Puls 4 TV TV GmbH & Co KG [2023] ECLI:EU:C:2022:564, Case C-723/22 Citadines Betriebs GmbH v. MPLC Deutschland GmbH and GEMA v. GL [2024] Opinion of AG Szpunar.

  74. Depreeuw (2014), para. 501; Dreier (1993), p. 193. Also see Commission, Copyright and Related Rights in the Information Society (Green Paper COM (95) 382 final, 1995), p. 56.

  75. See Recitals 6465 of the DSMD and Commission, Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament and the Council on Guidance on Article 17 of Directive 2019/790 on Copyright in the Digital Single Market (COM(2021) 288 final, 2021), p. 2. For a different perspective see ALAI, Second Opinion on certain aspects of the implementation of Article 17 of Directive (EU) 2019/790 of 17 April 2019 on copyright and related rights in the digital single market (2020), p. 3.

  76. In Reha Training the CJEU declared that the concept of “communication to the public” under the InfoSoc Directive and the Rental and Lending Rights Directive must have the same meaning unless the legislature expressed a different intention. See Case C-117/15 Reha Training Gesellschaft für Sport- und Unfallrehabilitation mbH v. Gesellschaft für musikalische Aufführungs- und mechanische Vervielfältigungsrechte eV (GEMA) [2016] ECLI:EU:C:2016:379, paras. 2934 and affirmed in Case C-641/15 Verwertungsgesellschaft Rundfunk GmbH v. Hettegger Hotel Edelweiss GmbH [2017] ECLI:EU:C:2017:131, para. 19. Also see Koo (2019), pp. 5859, where it was argued that Reha Training harmonised the term “communication to the public” across all the existing Directives including – Council Directive 93/83/EEC of 27 September 1993 on the coordination of certain rules concerning copyright and related rights to copyright applicable to satellite broadcasting and cable retransmission [1993] OJ L 248/15, Directive 2006/115/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 12 December 2006 on rental right and lending right and on certain rights related to copyright in the field of intellectual property (codified version) [2006] OL J 376/28 and Directive 96/9/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 11 March 1996 on the legal protection of databases [1996] OJ L 77/20.

  77. It is arguable that YouTube and Uploaded are technically different and should not have been treated in the same manner because Uploaded’s users are not provided with the opportunity to share works using the Uploaded platform directly.

  78. See Recital 62 of the DSMD.

  79. Ibid, paras. 2, 18, 2223.

  80. See GEMA v. GL [2024] Opinion of AG Szpunar.

  81. YouTube [2021], para. 84.

  82. Ibid, paras. 9294.

  83. Commission, Guidance on Article 17 of Directive 2019/790 on Copyright in the Digital Single Market (2021) COM(2021) 288 final, p. 12.

  84. Ibid, pp. 1314. Also see YouTube [2021], para. 83 and Recital 71 DSMD.

  85. See Commission (2021), pp. 1213, 22 and 25.

  86. See Case C-355/12 Nintendo Co Ltd and others v. PC Box Srl and 9Net Srl [2014] ECLI:EU:C:2014:25.

  87. Samuelson (2020), p. 219.

  88. Rosati (2019), pp. 200201.

  89. Bridy (2020), pp. 326328.

  90. Gabison and Buiten (2020), p. 252; Riordan (2016), p. 40; Marsoof (2019), pp. 26.

  91. Marsoof (2019), pp. 78.

  92. It should also be noted that online platforms may not be able to rely on the licensing mechanism of Art. 17(1) alone and therefore, will have to rely on a combination of licensing and diligent proactive copyright management including filtering tools – Senftleben (2020), pp. 305307.

  93. Hesmondhalgh (2021); Yoong Hon (2023); Haampland et al (2022); Sisario (2021).

  94. For issues on licensing see Senftleben (2019), pp. 481482; Husovec and Quintais (2021), pp. 343345; Trapova (2020), pp. 278279.

  95. Frosio (2020), p. 721. Also see Rocha (2020), p. 1201.

  96. Krokida (2022a), p. 69

  97. Foong argued that persons tend to associate infringing behaviour with bad behaviour and as such ignore the value of competitive behaviours that should be encouraged – Foong (2020), pp. 236237. Also see Kraakman (1986), p. 75.

  98. Recital 61 DSMD and Commission (2021), p. 2 and Husovec and Quintais (2021), p. 342.

  99. Kraakman argued that even the most conservative gatekeepers will face legal risks and therefore their over or under monitoring will be contingent on the cost efficiency of avoiding legal liability – Kraakman (1986), p. 76. Also see Krokida (2022b), pp. 150152.

  100. Senftleben (2019), p. 481.

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Koo, J. The EU Right of Communication to the Public: From Liability to Responsibility. IIC (2024). https://doi.org/10.1007/s40319-024-01477-1

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