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The internal governance of sporting organisations: international convergences on an idea of democracy

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Abstract

This research takes into account recent reforms concerning the sporting organisations and examines their internal democratic structure. In the first place, it addresses the international convergences on the elections of the governing bodies, analysing the issue of the eligibility criteria and the fundamental elements of the internal control system. Secondly, it examines the coherence of the ‘external’ control of the sporting organisations with the principle of the autonomy of sport, investigating the implications of the general principle of cooperation and transparency. The study illustrates what idea of democracy is emerging from the metamorphosis of sporting organisations at national and international level, introducing some interpretations of the juridical nature of the sport legal order.

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Notes

  1. “Sport is a widespread activity of a society where the economic individualism of the capitalist regime has transformed customs raised mental freedom and built opposition tolerance alongside economic and political freedom”. See Gramsci (1960, pp. 433–434).

  2. See Liguori (1997).

  3. The Sport Department of the Council of Europe organised, for example, a series of conferences and workshops called the “European Crossroads—sport, the front door to democracy” in partnership with the European Sports NGO (ENGSO). See Berg-Sorensen (2004).

  4. See Committee of Ministers of Council of Europe (CM Rec 2005) the principles of good governance in sport, p. 1.

  5. In this respect see the Resolution of the United Nations General Assembly (GAUN 2014) Sport as a means to promote education, health, development and peace. In this context, see also the UNESCO Kazan Action Plan (2017).

  6. See, for example: Weatherill (2014), Gardiner et al. (2009), Giummarra (2012), Depré (2007) and Tognon and Stelitano (2011).

  7. IOC (2008) BUP.

  8. IOC Code of ethics (2018), D art. 11.

  9. CM Rec (2005) the principles of good governance in sport, recommendation 1.

  10. See: PACE (2012) Good governance and Ethics in sport; PACE (2015) The reform of football governance; PACE (2018) Towards a framework for modern sports governance; PACE (2018) Good football governance.

  11. In this respect see: European Commission (2013) Principles of Good Governance of Sport in the UE; Good Governance in Grassroots Sport project (GGGS). The GGGS is a transnational project, supported by the European Commission DG for Education and Culture under the 2011 Preparatory Action in the Field of Sport. It has elaborated the Guidelines for Good Governance in Grassroots Sport (GGGGS).

  12. This is the case of the good governance standards developed by: the Association of Summer Olympic International Federations—ASOIF (2016)—; the Sport Integrity Global Alliance—SIGA (2016) and SIGA FIUS (2016)—; the Institut de hautes études en administration publique of the University of Lausanne—BIBGIS (2013)—; Play the Game/Danish Institute for Sports Studies—AGGIS (2013) and SGO (2015)—.

  13. See: IAAF Constitution (in force in 2019), Final Proposal for Governance Structure Reform of the IAAF “Time for change” (2017) (TC), IAAF Integrity Code of Conduct (2015) (ICC).

  14. See: UEFA Statutes (2017) (US); UEFA Organisational Regulations (2017) (UOR); UEFA Disciplinary Regulations (2017) (UDR).

  15. See: Statutes of FIFA (2016) (SF); FIFA Governance Regulations (2016) (FGR).

  16. This code, known as ‘Code Muyters’, is based on indicators of good governance in Flemish sport federations developed by Dr. Arnout Geeraert in collaboration with Prof. Dr. Edith Drieskens. It entered into force on January 2017.

  17. This code was drawn up by UK Sport and Sport England in 2016. UK Sport is the nation’s high performance sports agency investing in Olympic and Paralympic sport. Sport England is a non-departmental public body under the Department for Culture, Media and Sport.

  18. This code was adopted by the Australian Sports Commission (ASC) in 2012. ASC is the Australian Government’s statutory authority responsible for developing and funding Australian sport.

  19. See, for example, Grcic (1985).

  20. See Ellerman (1990).

  21. On the notion of ‘Democratic corporation’ see, for example, Ellerman (1997).

  22. On this unanimous position, shared by IO, NGOs, nationals authorities and ISF, please see PACE (2018) Addendum to the Report Towards a framework for modern sports governance, p. 8.

  23. IOC (2008) BUP, Structures, regulations and democratic process, point 2.9, p. 4.

  24. IOC (2016) The Consolidated minimum requirements for the implementation of the basic principles of Good Governance point 2.9, p. 22.

  25. IOC (2009) The Olympic movement in Society, point 44.

  26. PACE (2012) Good governance and Ethics in sport, points 20–21.

  27. See: BIBGIS (2013), Democratic process, point 4.4, p. 13; AGGIS (2013), Democratic process, point 7, p. 219; ASOIF (2016), Democracy, point 1, p. 7; SIGA (2016), Board Governance and Oversight, point 17, pp. 18–19.

  28. European Commission (2013), principle 4, e), 7), p. 9.

  29. AGGIS (2013, pp. 190–202).

  30. SGO (2015), Democratic process, indicator 2.6, p. 57.

  31. UK code, principle 2 (People), requirement 5, p. 20.

  32. Ibid. p. 33.

  33. On this point see, for example: Cohen and Spitzer (1992), Garrett (1996) and Huefner (2004).

  34. In addition to the previous notes, please see: BIBGIS (2013), Democratic process, point 4.4, p. 13; AGGIS (2013), Democratic process, point 7, p. 219; ASOIF (2016), Democracy, point 1, p. 7; SIGA (2016), Board Governance and Oversight, point 17, pp. 18–19.

  35. PACE (2015) report The reform of football governance, points 46 and 51.

  36. IOC (2008) BUP, Structures, regulations and democratic process, point 2.9, p. 4.

  37. PACE (2015) report The reform of football governance, appendix 1, point 27. In this respect, the PACE stressed that: “according to Rule 20 of the Olympic Charter, the President of the IOC is elected for a term of 8 years renewable once for 4 years. The duration of the terms of office of the vice-presidents and of the other members of the IOC executive board is 4 years and they can serve for a maximum of two successive terms. After two successive terms of office, they may be elected again as members of the IOC executive board after a minimum period of 2 years (Rules 19.2.2 and 19.2.3 of the Olympic Charter). In addition, Rule 16.3.3 of the Olympic Charter provides that any IOC member ceases to be a member at the end of the calendar year during which he reaches the age of 70. I believe that these provisions reach a reasonable balance between different interests at stake and should be a benchmark for all sports organisations” (Ibid., point 84).

  38. Cornering the national codes, please see: AUS code, principle 1, Board composition, roles and powers, point 1.8, p. 7; UK code, principle 2 (People), requirement 5, p. 20, and principle 1 (Structure), points 1.6, 1.13, 1.15, pp. 24–25; Flemish code, Democracy and social responsibility, principle 15, p. 19. As regard the ISF, please see: artt. 33.2, 33.3, 39.4, 52.5, 52.6 SF and 20.1 FGR; artt. 22.1, 22.2, 32.2, 39 US; artt. 44.1, 44.2, 53.1, 53.2, 67.2 and 67.4. IAAF Constitution.

  39. IOC (2014) Olympic Agenda 2020, Recommendation 37, Address IOC membership age limit, pp. 24–25.

  40. See: BIBGIS (2013), Democratic process, point 4.7, p. 13; SGO (2015), Democratic process, operationalization of indicator 2.6, pp. 57; art. 22.2 US.

  41. Art. 63.1 IAAF Constitution.

  42. The CEO, role commonly assigned in ISF to the Secretary General, is normally responsible for the day-to-day management of SOs and he/she acts as first and the principal ‘structural’ and ‘operational’ support of the executive board (art. 37 SF and 15 FGR; art. 30 US and 81–83 UOR; art. 61 IAAF Constitution). He/she represents the ‘corporation component’ of SOs; according to FIFA regulations, for instance, the “Secretary General shall be recorded in the Commercial Register of the Canton of Zurich” and he/she “shall be employed by FIFA on the basis of an employment agreement governed by private law” (art. 15, 2 FGR).

  43. See: SIGA (2016), Board Governance and Oversight, point 17, p. 18; UK code, principle 4 (Standards and conduct), points 4.1 and 4.2, p. 50; AUS code, principle 1, Board composition, roles and powers, point 1.7, p. 6; Flemish code, Internal accountability and control, principle 36, p. 34; art. 47.3 IAAF Constitution; European Commission (2013), principle 6, a), 7) p. 10.

  44. On the term limits in corporation governance see, for example: Elson and Gyves (2003), Fanto (2004), Whitehead (2011), Dou et al. (2015) and OECD (2015) G20/OECD Principles of Corporate Governance, p. 19.

  45. See, PACE (2008) The need to preserve the European sport model, point 14.

  46. IOC (2008) BUP, Highest level of competence, integrity and ethical standards, point 3.1, p. 5.

  47. IOC (2008) BUP, Structures, regulations and democratic process, point 2.9, p. 4.

  48. IOC (2016) The Consolidated minimum requirements for the implementation of the basic principles of Good Governance, point 2.3, p. 13.

  49. FIFA, Electoral regulation for the FIFA Presidency, art. 13, § 1, a).

  50. FIBA, Internal regulation, Book 1, Eligibility, point 274, b) and c).

  51. AUS code, principle 1, Board composition, roles and powers, point 1.8, p. 7.

  52. UK code, principle 1 (Structure), point 1.10, p. 35.

  53. Flemish code, Democracy and Social responsibility, principle 12, p. 16.

  54. Ibid., p. 17. On this point, the commentary of the Flemish code specifies that “[i]n terms of professional competences, every board should have both generalists and specialists on board. Relevant specialised areas of expertise include accounting and finance, legal affairs, HR management, marketing and communication and sport-technical matters. Relevant generic skills include negotiation skills, experience in obtaining sponsorships, and management experience. Personal characteristics of board members may also be highly relevant to the functioning of the board. A president should have good communication skills, should be able to reconcile opposing views, has leadership qualities and may formulate a critical opinion. Finally, the social function of a member of the board may also be relevant. A board member with good contacts in the business world, politics or sports may for example be very useful for the organisation”.

  55. Please see: AUS code, principle 3, Governance systems, point 3.9, p. 16; UK code, principle 1 (Structure), point 1.23, p. 39; Flemish code, Democracy and Social responsibility, principle 13, p. 18.

  56. Ibid.

  57. SIGA (2016), Board Governance and Oversight, point 18, p. 20.

  58. See: art. 40, §§ 5–6, SF.

  59. See: art. 66 IAAF Constitution; FIBA, Internal regulation, Book 1, Nomination Panels, points 275–285.

  60. On the role of the nomination committee in the corporative governance, please see: Davies et al. (2013).

  61. See: SIGA (2016), Board Governance and Oversight, point 17, p. 18; UK code, principle 4 (Standards and conduct), points 4.1 and 4.2, p. 50; AUS code, principle 1, Board composition, roles and powers, point 1.7, p. 6; Flemish code, Internal accountability and control, principle 36, p. 34; art. 47.3 IAAF Constitution; European Commission (2013), principle 6, a), 7), cit., p. 10.

  62. Please see: PACE (2018) Addendum to the Report Towards a framework for modern sports governance, p. 10.

  63. The audit committee is envisaged by FIFA (art. 51.7 SF), UEFA (art. 45 US) and IAAF (art. 58.2 IAAF Constitution), but it is not foreseen by UIC and FIBA, which provide only the external auditor (art. 26 FIBA and art. 70 UIC).

  64. See: UK code, principle 1 (Structure), point 1.23, p. 39; AUS code, principle 3, Governance systems, point 3.5, p. 14; Flemish code, Internal accountability and control, principle 34, p. 35.

  65. According to IOC this committee should be “in charge of overseeing financial reporting and disclosure matters” (IOC (2016) The Consolidated minimum requirements for the implementation of the basic principles of Good Governance”, point 4.5, p. 22). In general terms, the role of the audit committee in SOs focuses on the compliance of the SOs’ action with significant applicable legal, ethical and regulatory requirements. In this sense please see: UK code, principle 1 (Structure), points 1.24, p. 40; AUS code, principle 3, Governance systems, point 3.8, p. 15; Flemish code, Internal accountability and control, principle 34, p. 33; art. 37.8 FGR; art. 45 US and 58.1 IAAF Constitutions.

  66. On the traditional role of the audit committee in corporate governance please, see: van der Elst (2015) and Curtis (2008).

  67. The adoption of an ethics/integrity code for all SOs’ members and officials is unanimously envisaged by IO and NGOs. The ethical rules should refer to and be inspired by the IOC Code of Ethics, incorporating rules on conflicts of interests, but also address specific areas of risk by making procedures covering the offer or receipt of gifts, hospitality or expenses from individuals or organisations. It is almost unanimously foreseen that the adoption of ethical practices should be completed by the implementation of World Anti-Doping Code and of disciplinary rules to combat match-fixing. In this sense please see, PACE (2018) Addendum to the Report Towards a framework for modern sports governance, p. 10.

  68. Independent Ethics and Disciplinary Committees are foreseen by the most important ISF and they are highly recommended by NGOs, which suggest to make public their disciplinary and ethical decisions as envisaged by FIFA and IAAF Code of ethics. In addition, some NGOs, national codes and ISF establish that the ethical and disciplinary control should be supported by a confidential reporting mechanism to manage comments and allegations by “whistle-blowers”. The PACE, in turn, stressed the importance of the protection of whistle-blowers and their role in preventing and identifying offences, and in strengthening democratic accountability and transparency. In this sense please see, PACE (2018) Addendum to the Report Towards a framework for modern sports governance, p. 10.

  69. For a definition of the Corporate Social Responsibility please see Watts and Holme (1999).

  70. IOC (2008) BUP, Accountability, transparency and control, point 4.1, p. 7.

  71. On the notion of stakeholders please see: Ilmonen (2015), Esser et al. (2018) and Donaldson and Preston (1995).

  72. Ibid.

  73. Please see PACE (2018) Addendum to the Report Towards a framework for modern sports governance, p. 10. The obligation of establishing an internal control system actually ‘completes’ the requirement of “adequate standards and processes” able to guarantee the SOs’ accountability (see IOC (2008) BUP, Accountability, transparency and control, point 4.5, p. 8).

  74. In this regard, the IOC recommends that the SOs’ general assembly should meet at least once a year, so as to “give to members the possibility to scrutinise the financial accounts and the general policy of the past year” [see SGO (2015), Democratic process, indicator 2.7, p. 58]. This is almost unanimously indicated as a basic guarantee of the democratic nature of the decision-making process (IOC (2008) BUP, Structures, regulations and democratic processes, point 2.7, p. 4), together with other procedural guarantees. Please see: PACE (2018) Addendum to the Report Towards a framework for modern sports governance, p. 8.

  75. IOC (2008) BUP, Structures, regulations and democratic processes, point 2.6, p. 3.

  76. See AGGIS (2013, p. 16).

  77. The principle of separation of powers is explicitly underlined only by SIGA. See SIGA (2016), Organisation, point 1, pp. 4–5.

  78. See European Commission (2013, p. 6).

  79. According to the BUP “a clear allocation of responsibilities between the different bodies such as general assembly, executive body, committees or disciplinary bodies, should be determined” (IOC (2008) BUP, Structure, regulations and democratic processes, point 2.6, p. 4).

  80. The obligation for SOs to apply a clear governance structure, taking into account the principle of separation of powers, is explicitly envisaged, for example, by the Flemish code (see Flemish code, principle 30, p. 29).

  81. See: art. 24 SF; art. 11, 12, 23.1 and 33 US; art. 24.1, 40.1, 56.1 and 70.1 IAAF Constitution; art. 27, 45, 58, 66 UCI; chapter 3 and 7 FIBA.

  82. See: AGGIS (2013, p. 212); SIGA (2016, p. 8).

  83. This is the case of FIFA, underlined recently by the PACE (see, please, PACE (2017), report Good football governance, points 24–51).

  84. On this point, in addition to the bibliography mentioned in the footnote 66, please see: Malik (2014) and Abbott et al. (2004).

  85. On this point see, for example: Louizi and Kammoun (2016) and Ertugrul and Hedge (2019).

  86. According to the PACE, the sports world should “set up an independent sports ethics rating system, which should be created and operated by independent professional agencies with an impeccable international reputation, similar to existing environmental, social and governance rating agencies. In the same way as in the corporate world, introducing a rating system would enable sports organisations to prove and make visible their efforts towards enhanced governance and management strategies. A sports ethics rating system would be the first tool to enable the systematic assessment of any organisational culture change” [PACE (2018) Towards a framework for modern sports governance, point 12].

  87. See PACE (2015) Good football governance, point 17.

  88. The principle of the autonomy of Sport is codified on the Olympic Charter, in particular on the paragraph 5 of the Fundamental Principles of Olympism which states: “Recognising that sport occurs within the framework of society, sports organisations within the Olympic Movement shall have the rights and obligations of autonomy, which include freely establishing and controlling the rules of sport, determining the structure and governance of their organisations, enjoying the right of elections free from any outside influence and the responsibility for ensuring that principles of good governance be applied” (IOC (2015) Olympic Charter, point 4, p. 13).

  89. On the traditional configuration of SOs’ legal as “autonomous”, see, for example: De Silvestri (1992), Cesarini Sforza (1969), Giannini (1992), Modugno (1983), Di Nella (1999) and Manzella (1993).

  90. The principle of autodicy (autodichia) is the idea that constitutional institutions should be in charge of their own internal regulation and that they exercise judicial powers without using external courts. On the principle of autodicy see: Scoca (2011) and Occhiocupo (1988).

  91. On sport justice please see: Colucci and Jones (2013), Chevé (2012) and Skander (2016).

  92. On the principle of the autonomy of Sport, please see also: CoE (2008) Autonomy in Sport; IOC (2009) The Olympic movement in Society, p. 20; CoE (2011) The principle of autonomy of sport in Europe; Chappelet (2010).

  93. For an in-depth analysis on the pyramid and decentralised structure of the ISM, in addition to the bibliography mentioned in the previous note, please see: Karaquillo (2011), Nafziger (2004), Siekmann and Conrad Rudolf Soek (2012), Greppi et al. (2010) and Rombolà et al. (2017).

  94. Any ISF’s statutes provides, for example, that one of their purpose is: “to direct, develop, regulate, control and discipline cycling under all forms worldwide (…) to organise, for all cycling sport disciplines, world championships of which it is the sole holder and owner (art. 2 Constitution of the Union Cycliste Internationale—UCI—, October 2016); “[to] establish, manage, control and supervise International Competitions and recognise records in Athletics from International Competitions (…) [to] regulate the sport of Athletics through the development of rules and regulations and a judicial system by which they are enforced (art. 4.1 IAAF Constitution); “to organise its own international competitions (…) to draw up regulations and provisions governing the game of football and related matters and to ensure their enforcement (art. 2 SF); “[to] control, regulate, supervise and direct, and to foster, encourage and advance the sport of basketball and the practice of men’s and women’s basketball in all its forms and in all age groups in every country worldwide (art. 4 of the General Statutes of Fédération internationale de basketball—FIBA–).

  95. In this sense, see for example: Rigaux (1989, p. 64).

  96. The author mentioned in the previous note underlines the similarities between the Canon law and the legal order of SOs. Both are envisaged as the typical examples of the transnational legal order, characterised by a ‘bond of affiliation’ and a ‘no territorial-space’. Ibid., p. 66.

  97. For an in-depth analysis on the IOC, please see: Gauthier (2017).

  98. Forster and Pope (2004, p. 107).

  99. Please see, IOC (2008) BUP, Structures, regulation and democratic processes, point 2.1, p. 3. FIFA, for example, “is an association registered in the Commercial Register of the Canton of Zurich in accordance with art. 60 ff. of the Swiss Civil Code (art. 1 SF), as well as IAAF, UCI and FIBA. Switzerland is the head office of several ISF, probably because the Swiss Confederation law gives the SOs the possibility to be registered in the form of a simple association of public utility, thus benefiting from an important tax exemption. For this reason, some authors envisage the Switzerland as a “legal paradise” for SOs (Buy et al. (2015), Law of Sport, LGDJ, Paris, p. 44).

  100. On the “private schemes” see Teubner (2005).

  101. On this point see Alaphilippe (1993).

  102. On this point see, in particular, van Kleef (2016), Doukas (2012) and Miège (2001).

  103. See: IOC (2008) BUP, Harmonious relations with governments while preserving autonomy, point 7.1, p. 12.

  104. Ibid.

  105. Ibid., point 7.2 p. 12.

  106. See: BIBGIS (2013), Sport integrity, point 6.8, p. 14; ASOIF (2016), Integrity, point 2, p. 7. SIGA, for example, underlines that SO has to cooperate “particularly at the level of law enforcement and anti-corruption regulation to eradicate the influence of criminal practices, networks and organisations” [SIGA (2016), External cooperation, point 22, p. 25].

  107. See: PACE (2015), report The reform of football governance, points 15.2 and 128; PACE (2012) Good governance and Ethics in sport, appendix point 6; PACE (2008) The need to preserve the European sport model, points 21, 22, 25, 28, 37.

  108. PACE (2012) report Good governance and Ethics in sport, point 110.

  109. IOC (2014) Olympic Agenda 2020, Recommendation 28, Support autonomy, p. 21.

  110. IOC (2017) Olympic Agenda 2020, Midway Report, Recommendation 28, Support autonomy, p. 72.

  111. GAUN (2014).

  112. This memorandum was signed the 30 may 2018 at the Council of Europe headquarters in Strasbourg, by the UEFA President, Aleksander Čeferin, and the Council of Europe Secretary General, Thorbjørn Jagland. The text is available on the CoE website (https://www.coe.int/en/web/portal/-/council-of-europe-and-uefa-sign-memorandum-of-understanding. Accessed 1 June 2018). A similar Memorandum of Understanding with FIFA was signed the 5 October 2018 by the FIFA President Gianni Infantino (https://www.coe.int/pt/web/sport/-/council-of-europe-and-fifa-sign-memorandum-of-understanding. Accessed 7 October 2018).

  113. IOC (2014) Olympic Agenda 2020, Recommendation 29, Increase transparency, p. 21.

  114. According to the BUP, “The sports organisations should include as members legal or physical persons who constitute the organisation and contribute to form the will of the organisation. The stakeholders of the organisation encompass all members who make up the organisation as well as all external entities who are involved and have a link, relation with or interest in the organisation” [see IOC (2008) BUP, Structures, regulation and democratic processes, point 2.1, p. 3]. The IOC pointed out that “stakeholders are person, groups or organisations having an interest in the performance of an entity. Some examples of key stakeholders are suppliers, sponsors or partners” [see IOC (2016) The Consolidated minimum requirements for the implementation of the basic principles of Good Governance, p. 66].

  115. IOC (2008) BUP, Structures, regulation and democratic processes, point 2.2, p. 3.

  116. IOC (2016) The Consolidated minimum requirements for the implementation of the basic principles of Good Governance, point 2.2, p. 7.

  117. SGO (2015), Transparency and public communication, indicator 1.1, p. 40.

  118. See Asian Development Bank (1999, p. 11).

  119. The public dissemination of SO’s rules and regulations is unanimously indicated as a tool that consolidate the SOs’ authority by IO [see, for example, European Commission (2013, p. 13); GGGGS, p. 8] and NGOs [see BIBGIS (2013), Organisational transparency, points 1.1, 1.2, 1.5, p. 11; AGGIS (2013), Transparency and public communication, points 1–4, p. 219; ASOIF (2016), Transparency, point 1, p. 7; SIGA (2016), Organisation, point 4, pp. 6–7; SGO (2015), Transparency and public communication, indicator 1.1, p. 40].

  120. See Hood (2006).

  121. IOC (2008) BUP, Accountability, transparency and control, point 4, pp. 7–8.

  122. Ibid., point 4.3, cit., p. 7.

  123. IO and NGOs developed several standards and criteria in order to assess the implementation of SOs’ transparency. The international and national documents and practices seem to converge upon seven criteria aimed at evaluating whether transparency is effectively implemented by SOs. They concern the publication of: vision and mission; statutes, rules and regulations; identity and biography of members and officials of SOs; legislative activity; executive activity; general and financial activity of SOs. On the international and national convergences on ‘transparency’s criteria’, please see: PACE (2018) Addendum to the Report Towards a framework for modern sports governance, p. 7.

  124. IOC (2008) BUP, Accountability, transparency and control, point 4.1, p. 7.

  125. Ibid., point 4.2 p. 7.

  126. The pluralism theory assumes the existence of multiple legal systems within one population and/or geographic area. On the pluralism theory and the necessary coordination between different legal orders please see: von Bogdandy (2014), Klabbers and Piiparinen (2013), Vanderlinden (2013), Itzcovich (2012), Otis (2012), Melissaris (2009), Griffiths (1986) and Romano (1962, p. 116).

  127. In this respect, in addition to the bibliography mentioned in the note 93, please see Zatti (2007), in particular see pp. 327 ss.

  128. IOC (2015) Olympic Charter, point 4, p. 13.

  129. CoE (2018) International Declaration on Human Rights and Sport (Tbilisi Declaration), p. 5.

  130. On the neo-constitutionalism theory see, for example: Pozzolo (2001), Dworkin (1977), Alexy (1986), Habermas (1992), Zagrebelsky (1992), Carbonell (2003) and Amendola (2003).

  131. On the incidence of human rights to ‘open’ and make ‘inclusive’ the legal orders, according to the neo-constitutionalist theorists, see for instance: Martinico (2016), Krisch (2012), Joerges et al. (2004), Petersmann (2014), Schwöbel (2011) and Dunoff and Trachtman (2009).

  132. IOC Code of ethics (2018), D art. 11.

  133. See UK code, p. 18.

  134. Ibid., p. 24.

  135. IOC (2008) BUP, Democratic processes, point 2.4, p. 3.

  136. See: UK code, principle 2 (People), point 2.1, pp. 42; Flemish code, Democracy and social responsibility, principle 12, p. 16.

  137. PACE (2015) The reform of football governance, point 17.1.

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    Antonio Di Marco

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Di Marco, A. The internal governance of sporting organisations: international convergences on an idea of democracy. Int Sports Law J 19, 171–183 (2019). https://doi.org/10.1007/s40318-019-00144-9

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