Introduction

Globally, small-scale fishers need help maintaining their livelihoods, including limited market access, capital scarcity, declining fish stocks, and continuous livelihood diversification (Chuenpagdee 2011). Small-scale fishers, particularly those in the Global South, frequently need more financial resources and are in debt, intensifying the difficulty of diversifying their livelihoods. For example, in many coastal areas of India, the fishing industry has been usurped by moneylenders and traders exploiting financial crises, marginalizing small-scale fishers (Vipinkumar and Swathi Lekshmi 2012). The availability of flexible and easily accessible credit and other financial services is crucial for vulnerable fishers to overcome these challenges and diversify inside and outside the fishery sector (Islam et al. 2006).

Intermediaries or mediators interact directly with fishers at landing sites and often act as agents for more prominent collectors (Crona et al. 2010; Ayilu et al. 2023). The relationship between these intermediaries and small-scale producers is likely as old as that of trade. These relationships, including reciprocal agreements and credit arrangements, have been discussed extensively, primarily in the context of rural agriculture and small-scale fisheries (Simmance et al. 2022; González-Mon et al. 2023). However, these discussions have primarily focused on the social implications of such arrangements as social insurance for fishermen and market access, with less attention being paid to how these agreements might impact ecosystem services and human well-being (Porras et al. 2017).

The relationship between fishers and local intermediaries in artisanal fisheries, primarily in developing countries, has been documented globally (Crona et al. 2010). Several factors converge to make reciprocal agreements between small-scale producers and intermediaries attractive. These include uncertain production outcomes, relative inaccuracy, and slow spread of market information among producers (Ferris et al. 2014). Intermediaries often provide producers with credit, ensuring priority access to harvested goods and a steady supply of products (Ayilu et al. 2023). This creates a labor-tying loan system in which fishers are bound to intermediaries through loans. Various studies have analyzed the roles of intermediaries and their relationships with small-scale producers, focusing on their roles as credit providers and the resulting power dynamics and dependencies, as well as the impact of loans and credits on fisheries’ resilience and fishers’ livelihoods (Merlijn 1989; Mozumder et al. 2019; Pedroza 2013; Pomeroy et al. 2020).

Hilsa fish (Tenualosa ilisha) are of significant value in Bangladesh because they contribute to the country’s nutrition, economy, and culture. It accounts for nearly 11% of Bangladesh’s total fish production and approximately 1% of its gross domestic product (GDP), directly and indirectly supporting more than 2.5 million people (Islam et al. 2016). Hilsa, once found in over 100 rivers in Bangladesh, has become a traditional staple food source for people experiencing poverty. The hilsa fish is recognized for its exceptional texture and flavor, making it highly regarded as one of the most delectable fish varieties. Hilsas possess considerable amounts of vital polyunsaturated fatty acids (PUFA), amino acids, minerals, and other lipids, making them highly nutritious. Hilsa fish is rich in high-density lipoprotein (HDL) and low-density lipoprotein (LDL), which helps lower the risk of various serious illnesses such as heart disease, diabetes, cancer, and obesity (Alam et al. 2012). Historically, cooked hilsa has been renowned for its high digestibility and is commonly used as a dietary option for individuals recovering from an ailment.

However, there is a lack of adequate support from Bangladeshi institutions for those affected by the losses caused by the degradation of fisheries resources, partly because of poor collaboration between authorities and local stakeholders (Haque & Uddin 2013). Recent discussions have highlighted the need to address this issue, and several studies have focused on hilsa fishery management in Bangladesh (Mozumder et al. 2019). However, despite the widespread interest in hilsa, the economic life of hilsa fishers’ households and their reliance on a system of seasonal loans called “dadon” have been relatively underexplored in the literature. Dadon originates from a Persian verb meaning “to give” and is a formal loan arrangement used for working capital in Bengal. During the late seventeenth century, the dadon loan system was critical for securing goods for long-distance trade. Its growth was primarily fueled by the rising demand for products and the expansion of European trade. However, it fell out of favor toward the end of the eighteenth century and the beginning of the nineteenth century, as the British East India Company began to abandon the dadon loan system in many of its export trade divisions (Bhattacharya 1982; Raychaudhuri 1982).

Dadon creates a debt trap for fisher households, as many borrowers still pay off loans from previous seasons. Despite this, dadon remains a critical functional component of the hilsa fishery because institutional lending opportunities for fishers are often limited and do not cater to their specific needs. Thus, there is a pressing need for effective alternatives to dadondars (moneylenders). Microcredit from non-governmental organizations (NGOs), which could have been an alternative source of financial capital, has mainly proven ineffective (Song et al. 2017). The pressure to repay microcredit often leads fishers to resort to illegal fishing, which is engaging in fishing activities that violate the law, trapping them in a cycle of endless debt and noncompliance with fishery regulations. Negotiating hilsa prices with aratdars (fishing entrepreneurs) is also far from satisfactory, and fishers require more leverage. The unavoidable presence of calendars or avatars and their inherent technical incompetence have sparked debates on whether the current system should be maintained (Islam et al. 2017). The ban period (Table 1) is responsible for the worst financial condition of the fishers in Bangladesh. The fish-banning season significantly affects small-scale hilsa fishermen. Most fishers (79%) depend solely on hilsa fishing, so their incomes were about to end during prohibition. They barely had enough money for food and other necessities. Therefore, these fishers had to borrow from moneylenders/Mohajan/boat owners, microcredit organizations, or neighbors, which led to an endless debt cycle and illegal fishing to survive and repay their loans. Aratders offer boats, nets, and loans on various terms. In Bangladesh, strict regulations are in place to conserve hilsa fish, a vital marine resource. Fishing for hilsa is prohibited within the exclusive economic zone (EEZ) in the Bay of Bengal from 20th May to 23rd July. Furthermore, a comprehensive ban is enforced on five vital spawning grounds for 22 days, starting 4 days before the full moon of the Bengali month Ashwin and extending for the subsequent 17 days. A similar 22-day ban, spanning 4 days before and 17 days after the Full Moon in October, is implemented in the principal spawning grounds of the river Meghna and its estuary to safeguard the hilsa breeding process. Additionally, regulations prohibit the fishing of hilsa under 25 cm body size and using current nets throughout the year, contributing to sustainable fisheries management and the preservation of hilsa populations (Ahmed et al. 2021a, b).

Table 1 Spatial and temporal extents of the hilsa ban period regarding sanctuary area
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Small-scale hilsa fishers in Bangladesh are integral to the country’s economy and contribute significantly to seafood production. However, they are trapped in a destructive debt cycle, threatening their social well-being and the ecological resilience of the hilsa fishery. The interdependence of ecological and social systems highlights the need for holistic strategies to break this cycle and promote socio-ecological resilience, which is defined as the ability of SES to absorb disturbances, adapt, and transform when necessary while maintaining their core functions and structures (Bollettino et al. 2017). In the case of the hilsa fishery, the system’s resilience is undermined by the prevailing debt cycle, which links socioeconomic hardships to concerns about ecological sustainability.

Although numerous studies have examined hilsa fishery management in Bangladesh (Bladon et al. 2016; Dewhurst-Richman et al. 2016; Hossain et al. 2019; Mozumder et al. 2019; Rahman et al. 2018, 2020), the intricate relationship between the economic life of hilsa fisher households and the prevailing debt cycle still needs to be explored. There needs to be more understanding of the full socio-ecological impacts of the dadon loan system in the hilsa fishery.

According to the primary findings of the Household Income and Expenditure Survey 2022, the poverty rate in the country decreased to 18.7 percent at the national level. In rural areas, the poverty rate was 20.5%, while in urban areas, it was 14.7%. The fisheries sector sustains the livelihoods of almost 18 million individuals in the country, directly and indirectly (FRSS (Fisheries Resources Survey System), 2017). This sector exhibits significant potential for contributing to the country’s economic development. Fishermen are driven to engage in dadon to alleviate persistent poverty. This study aims to delve into the dynamics of the debt cycle, its effects on small-scale fishers, and its implications for the socioecological resilience of the hilsa fishery. We seek to bridge the existing knowledge gap by exploring potential solutions to break the debt cycle and enhance the strength of the SES within the hilsa fishery. This study combines qualitative and quantitative research methods, including literature reviews, field studies, interviews, and data analysis, to provide a holistic understanding of the issues.

This study has the potential to influence or guide policy choices, promote sustainable fishing practices, enhance the welfare of the hilsa fishing community, and contribute to the broader sustainable management of natural resources in Bangladesh. Based on the identified issues, this study aims to answer the following key questions:

  • What are the underlying causes of fishers’ dependence on non-formal credit (dadon)?

  • What are the socio-ecological implications of the non-formal credit system in the hilsa fishery?

  • Can we propose a fisher-friendly credit system that positively contributes to the sustainable management of hilsa fisheries?

Theoretical framework

SES are complex, integrated systems in which humans and nature co-evolve. The interactions and feedback loops between the social and ecological components characterize these systems. They emphasize that humans are part of nature and that our social structures and economies are deeply intertwined with and dependent on the health and functionality of ecological systems (Refulio-Coronado et al. 2021; Cantareli et al. 2016; Koontz et al. 2015;). The theoretical foundation of SES has evolved from fields such as ecology, sociology, economics, and anthropology (Fabinyi et al. 2014). The fundamental premise of this theoretical approach is that any attempt to understand or manage ecological issues cannot be separated from their social context and vice versa (Cumming 2014).

In the context of the hilsa fishery, the SES comprises fishers (and their social and economic conditions), hilsa fish (and their ecological conditions), and the interactions between them. The social system of the hilsa fishery involves fishers, their communities, their economic conditions, and the broader institutional structures in which they are embedded. It includes social elements, such as fishers’ knowledge, fishing practices, the culture and traditions of fishing communities, market structures, and fishing policies and regulations. The hilsa fish population, habitats (rivers and estuaries), and the broader ecosystem represent the ecological system. This includes fish biology, population dynamics, the health and status of their habitats, and the impact of climatic factors on hilsa fish. The socio-ecological perspective emphasizes that these two systems are not separate but are continually interacting. For example, fishers’ practices affect the hilsa population and ecosystem health. Changes in the hilsa population (due to overfishing, habitat degradation, or climate change) affect fishers’ livelihoods and well-being. Thus, the theoretical framework of SES helps us understand that challenges, such as the debt cycle among hilsa fishers or the decline in hilsa stocks, are not just social or ecological problems in isolation. Instead, they are symptoms of an interconnected SES in distress. Therefore, solutions must address both social and ecological aspects to be effective.

The Bay of Bengal is susceptible to natural disasters, making it one of the most disaster-prone areas globally. The region experiences yearly occurrences of cyclones and tropical storms. Moreover, the tidal action intensifies, rendering fishing operations perilous and limited (Giri 2018).

The phenomenon of climate change is affecting small-scale fisheries and fishers through multiple routes. The direct and indirect effects of climate change on the lives and means of subsistence of the majority of small-scale fishermen in tropical regions, which make up more than 90% of the world’s fishers and fish traders, have not been thoroughly studied and comprehended (Badjeck et al. 2010). Climate change is concerning due to its explicit and implicit connections to food security, poverty, economies, well-being, and sustainable fish production. Bangladesh is very susceptible to climate variability and change effects on its fisheries, which serve as the primary source of economic sustenance for millions of impoverished fishermen and contribute to around 80% of the nation’s animal protein supply—enhancing the ability of fishers to cope with both immediate fluctuations in climate and long-term shifts in weather patterns by promoting the diversification of their livelihoods, alongside other necessary development initiatives that are still pending.

A total of 73% coastal and 45% floodplain fishers have elicited their food insecure condition (“pete bhat nai,” literally no rice in the belly), followed by their worry about a decline in natural resource base—the very basis of their livelihood making, and an increasing trend in climatic uncertainties and shocks (Deb & Haque, 2017).

Co-management, community engagement, climate adaptation strategies, policy support, education, and awareness efforts are needed to arrest climate change and avoid pushing the fishers deeper into the debt cycle.

Socio-ecological resilience emphasizes the intertwined relationship between social and ecological systems and the importance of their mutual and interactive influence (Cretney 2014). It originates from resilience theory in ecology, initially proposed by Holling in 1973, which focused on the persistence of relationships within systems and the ability of these systems to absorb change and persist (Garmestani et al. 2019).

The term socio-ecological resilience emerged between the late 1990s and the early 2000s to encompass social dimensions (Berkes et al. 1998). This development was motivated by the increasing recognition that humans are integral parts of ecosystems and that social and ecological processes are intricately linked (Clifton 2010). From this perspective, SES are viewed as related systems of people and nature, where the system’s resilience is not only about being able to withstand a shock but also about the ability to rebuild and renew after a crisis (Wilkinson 2012).

Applying the concept of socio-ecological resilience to the hilsa fishery industry would mean looking at the fishery’s capacity to deal with changes and shocks, such as fluctuating fish stocks or changes in market conditions, while still maintaining the functionality of the social (fishers and their communities) and ecological (hilsa fish and their habitats) components of the system. This could involve understanding and enhancing a system’s absorptive, adaptive, and transformative capacities (Fallon et al. 2022). The consideration of socio-ecological resilience acknowledges that the resilience of the hilsa fishery and its associated communities is influenced by an array of factors, ranging from environmental conditions and fishing practices to socioeconomic factors, such as the debt cycle among fishers. This underscores the importance of a holistic approach to enhance resilience, considering social and ecological factors (Dakey et al. 2023).

Materials and methods

Study area

This study focused on four significant fishing locations in Bangladesh, each unique in its relationship with the dadon loan system and small-scale fishers. These were Chittagong and Cox’s Bazar, bustling coastal regions known for their fish markets and traditional fishing methods influenced by the dadon loan system; Chandpur, a central inland fisheries hub on the Meghna River, where the dadon loan system guided river fishing methods; and Patuakhali, a southern region displaying estuarine and riverine fisheries, where the local ecosystem and the dadon loan system were intricately linked. These diverse locations offered comprehensive insights into the impacts of the dadon loan system on various fishing communities and market dynamics (Fig. 1).

Fig. 1
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Geographical location of the study area

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Methods

This study employed a mixed-method approach. Quantitative data were obtained through surveys targeting small-scale fishers, moneylenders, boat owners, and fish traders/sellers to capture age, family size, education, living conditions, assets, and monthly income/expenditure information. Qualitative data were collected through in-depth interviews, key informant interviews (KII), and focus group discussions.

This study included qualitative and quantitative research methods to assess the informal credit system and its impact on small-scale fishers. Furthermore, we employed diverse qualitative methodologies to gather empirical data, such as conducting in-depth interviews and organizing focus group discussions (FGDs). The study used qualitative approaches to address inquiries on individuals’ experiences, interpretations, and viewpoints, mainly from the participants’ vantage points. Data was gathered from individuals of both genders in the vicinity. The “snowballing” sample approach (Trotter 2012) was selected to identify suitable interviews. A purposive sample technique (Tongco 2007) was employed to interview individuals with extensive fishing, farming, business, and boating knowledge.

A total of 240 questionnaire surveys/interview schedules were conducted. This study was conducted in four coastal districts in Bangladesh: Chittagong, Chandpur, Patuakhali, and Cox’s Bazar. In each district, various stakeholders were engaged, including small-scale fishers (10), moneylenders (15), boat owners (2), fish traders (2), local government representatives (3), administrative personnel (5), local NGO representatives (5), community leaders (3), bank representatives (5), local cooperative organization representatives (5), and micro-credit specialists/academics (5) (Table 2).

Table 2 Sample distribution of the study
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We utilized statistical methodologies and the principle of saturation to calculate the overall number of respondents. The sample size for the interview was determined based on the necessary information and by the principle of data saturation (Mason 2010). Seven key informants (KII) from the study area were interviewed: local government representatives, administrative personnel, local NGO representatives, community leaders, bank representatives, local cooperative organization representatives, and micro-credit specialists/academics. Aside from conducting in-depth interviews, a total of seven focused group discussions (FGDs) were carried out among different groups of individuals, including small-scale fishers (n = 07), fisher’s wives (n = 04), moneylenders (n = 06), boat owners (n = 06), and fish traders (n = 05). These FGDs are summarized in Table 3.

Table 3 Stakeholder engagement in FGD
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The focus group discussions (FGDs), as indicated in Table 2, had an average duration of 50–60 min. After completing the sign-in consent form, the statements or key points were recorded digitally with the participants’ permission. In this study segment, semi-structured interview questions were created to facilitate open-ended discussions. Extensive notes were taken during the conversation when informants preferred to maintain anonymity. The communities engaged in a pilot interview to assess the questionnaire’s suitability.

Subsequently, the questionnaire was suitably modified before its administration. Furthermore, the questionnaires were customized for each interview, considering the interviewee’s specific function and representation. We devised analogous inquiries for the focus groups, although we permitted the introduction of novel subjects during the deliberations. The utilization of focus groups facilitated the maintenance of open and deliberative discussions on sensitive matters, particularly among individuals with divergent perspectives and interpretations.

The data from interview schedules and focus group discussions were transcribed into English and analyzed using thematic analysis on relevant subjects (Braun & Clarke 2006). The specified approach for flexible data reduction is thematic analysis (Nowell et al. 2017). To validate and elucidate the respondents’ viewpoints, we frequently incorporated verbatim quotes from the interviewed individuals. Preliminary data analysis was performed with the respondents to mitigate any subjective biases in interpretation. Furthermore, these initial evaluations were conducted in the focus groups to validate the credibility of the participants’ statements. Using field notes during the data collection phase facilitated the data processing.

This study used NVivo version 14 for quantitative data processing and qualitative analysis. As one of the most advanced tools for qualitative and mixed-method data analysis, NVivo enables researchers to analyze diverse types of content, from interviews and academic texts to multimedia content, such as audio, videos, and images (Edhlund & McDougall 2019). Identifying and visualizing sentiments, themes, and attributes within these materials makes them invaluable tools for understanding the structure of underlying concepts (Amrutha & Geetha 2020).

The NVivo program was used to do cluster analysis. Confirming manually coded phrases was the purpose of this action. A dendrogram is typically used to display the findings of a cluster analysis and highlight the similarities and differences among the identified items (Hair et al. 2017).

Cluster analysis is a method used to explore and identify patterns in a project. It involves grouping sources or nodes based on their language, attribute values, or coding similarities. In the cluster analysis diagram, the proximity of sources or nodes indicates their level of similarity. Those that are closer together are more similar, while those that are farther apart are less similar. A word tree was utilized in NVivo 14 to do cluster analysis and demonstrate the patterns of similarities across codes and subcodes. The respondents’ reviews were examined by clustering them based on the closeness of words within the classification of different parent theme codes. The machine algorithm employs concurrent axial codes based on their contextual groupings.

Based on the frequency and occurrence of words, sources or nodes with a higher degree of similarity are displayed clustered together. Based on the frequency and occurrence of terms, sources or nodes with lower degrees of similarity are shown farther apart.

Initially, interviews were conducted using semi-structured questionnaires that included open-ended inquiries. Subsequently, the responses were transcribed and translated. Data analysis was commenced by employing the NVivo software for coding. Constructing codes in NVivo 14 using qualitative data or respondents’ descriptive remarks involves identifying and labeling relevant text units, sometimes called “segments,” with descriptive codes. The codes were created by following a series of processes. Parent codes were formed under the “Coding” tab by right-clicking on an existing code and choosing the option “New Parent Code,” while child codes were made by right-clicking on the parent code and selecting “New Child Code.” Child codes were given descriptive names representing a subtype or feature of the central theme or concept indicated by the parent code. The selected text was coded by dragging it into a suitable child code. The coding process was iterated for all pertinent text segments, and the coded results were assessed and interpreted. Following the coding process, the subsequent stage entailed doing a cluster analysis.

Initially, interview transcripts underwent processing utilizing the NVivo software suite (version 14). The results were verified by cluster analysis, which offered a comprehensive comprehension.

Quantitative analysis was performed using IBM SPSS Statistics for Windows version 26. After the field data was cleaned and variables were recoded, descriptive statistics were calculated for each variable, and percentages were computed to provide a comprehensive view of the socioeconomic conditions of the fishers.

Results

Results are split into two sections. Quantitative comprises the “Socio-economic condition of the fishers” section, and qualitative includes the rest of the result section.

Socio-economic condition of the fishers

Most respondents (41.2%) were men aged 35–49 years. The majority had a primary education or below (47.1%). A considerable proportion (35.3%) had a secondary education or below, and 11.8% were illiterate (Fig. 2).

Fig. 2
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Socioeconomic conditions of fishers (N = 240)

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More than half of the respondents (52.9%) served as the sole breadwinners of their families. Regarding housing, 52.9% lived in semi-pucca houses (composed of pucca materials such as bricks, cement, iron, or tiles and kutcha materials such as mud, bamboo, grass, or thatch, roofs are generally made of hay or tin), 5.9% in pucca houses (composed of completely pucca materials such as bricks, cement, iron, or tiles), and the remaining respondents (41.2%) resided in kutcha houses (comprised of entirely kutcha materials such as mud, bamboo, grass, or thatch). Financially, the respondents faced significant challenges due to insufficient income. Many had to borrow or rely on dadon as they spent more than they earned.

Of all respondents, 29.4% earned a monthly income ranging from 20,000 to 30,000 BDT, while 23.4% earned less than 10,000 BDT per month, highlighting the prevalence of poverty among fishers’ families. Only a tiny percentage (5.9%) of respondents had an income exceeding 50,000 BDT. Most respondents (41.2%) spent between 26,000 and 15,000 BDT per month, with those earning more than 50,000 BDT spending over 42,000 BDT per month (Fig. 2).

According to the fishers, for a family of five members, the average monthly cost is around 15,000 to 18,000 BDT. However, monthly income varies based on fish availability and the ban period. There are different types of sudden expenses for a fisher. For example, fishers’ children’s educational expenses, medical treatments, daughters’ marriage, repaying the dadon’s money after 1 year, and so on. To bear those expenses, fishers take loans from banks and NGOs. The amount is varied according to their need.

Regarding fishing gear and equipment, most respondents (47.1%) owned two boats as their assets. Only a tiny percentage (5.9%) had five or more boats. Regarding nets, most fishers (31.6%) owned only one net, whereas only 2.6% owned five or more nets. Surprisingly, 15.8% of the respondents needed nets.

In addition to fishing, the respondents had various occupations, especially during the ban period. Approximately 10.5% of the population was involved in farming during this time. Some respondents (7.9%) were engaged in boat or net making, while others worked as garment workers (5.3%) or day laborers (5.3%). However, fishing remained the central focus of their livelihoods throughout the year, as it served as the primary source of income.

The origin and factors driving the dadon loan system

The addon loan system is driven by various factors that lead fishers to seek addons from the calendars. These factors include limited access to formal credit systems and banks, high costs of fishing inputs, insufficient government support during non-banned periods, natural disasters, lack of capital to start a fishing business, poor financial conditions of fishers, need for immediate cash for family expenses, absence of quick borrowing options, limited bargaining power in selling catch, reliance on dadondar for fishing operations and distribution, the cycle of debt and potential exploitation, fluctuating fish availability and income, lack of insurance coverage, insufficient access to modern technology and equipment, and environmental factors affecting fish populations.

Fishers mainly take dadon for fishing purposes, such as repairing boats or trawlers and purchasing new boats, nets, and gear. One fisherman explained, “To get money easily when needed, we usually go to dadondars. For example, we lack the financial means to make or repair boats or nets. That’s why we turn to dadon.”

Dadon is also used for family subsistence. An official from the Department of Fisheries (DFO), Cox’s Bazar, stated, “When fishers are in dire situations, they take money from dadondars to support their families. Borrowing from dadondars is convenient because getting instant and easy money from the government or non-government banks involves complex procedures and mortgage requirements.”

Fishers are compelled to rely on dadondars because of government-imposed ban periods and natural disasters. During the ban periods, limited government assistance forced fishers into debt. Additionally, fishers need more alternative income sources and help to obtain financial aid from the government during natural disasters. Consequently, they turn to the dadondars for immediate funding.

Fishers who plan to establish independent fishing businesses require immediate capital. However, the lack of access to formal credit systems leads them to seek assistance from dadondars, who are often willing to lend significant sums without undergoing extensive procedures.

Emergencies during fishing activities, such as accidental loss of equipment or pirate attacks, require immediate cash for rescue. Fishers face life-threatening situations when they encounter robbers who may harm them if they do not provide the required funds. In these cases, borrowing money from the dadondars is the only option for immediate assistance. Fishers may also experience substantial financial losses when their nets get entangled in the navy or large ship propellers, further driving them to seek compensation through dadon from dadondars.

In summary, the dadon loan system is influenced by various factors, and fishers primarily utilize dadon for fishing and family subsistence. Ban periods, natural disasters, the need for immediate capital, and emergencies during fishing activities also contribute to reliance on dadondars for financial support.

The dendrogram (Fig. 3) illustrates that “high cost of inputs for hilsa fishing” and “investing capital in fishing business” are closely related and share similarities. Similarly, “limited access to formal credit systems” and “inadequate government support for hilsa fishers” are grouped, indicating their close relationship. This implies that the high cost of inputs and the need to invest capital in fishing businesses are interconnected. Consequently, limited access to credit systems and inadequate government support are interlinked. Insufficient government support and limited access to credit systems have led fishers to take dadon. The dendrogram uses different colors to distinguish the branches and highlight the connections between the elements. More similar elements are positioned closer together, whereas elements with greater distances between them are less comparable.

Fig. 3
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Cluster analysis of reasons behind dadon using Pearson correlation coefficient (similarity matric) and clustered by-word similarity

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Mechanism of the dadon loan system and its intricacy

Fishers must adhere to several conditions to access dadon. Boat owners must sell their harvested fish to a specific aratdar or dadondar who earns a commission (usually 5–10% for fresh fish and 2% for dried fish) when selling to third parties. Additionally, signing a stamp or a blank check is a prerequisite for receiving dadon. Working for the entire fishing season on a designated boat is also a requirement, especially for helper fishers who assist boat owners or majhi.

Before giving the dadon, the dadondar investigates the current financial situation of the fishers. A respondent stated, “We provide dadon only to individuals we know or fishers with a good reputation. We carefully assess their current financial situation and the number of boats and nets they own. The amount of dadon granted is determined by the assets available to fishers. As standard practice, we collect a copy of their NID cards and require them to sign a blank check or stamp as evidence. This is a mandatory requirement for all dadon recipients regardless of our familiarity with them.”

Furthermore, when fishers sell their catch at an arat (wholesale market) after receiving a dadon, the dadondar deducts a specific percentage daily as a commission. A dadondar from Chattogram explained, “Fishers need to deliver the fish to the designated arat (fixed wholesale fish market), where the aratdar sells the fish and deducts a commission of around 5 to 6 percent from the selling amount. The commission percentage can vary between 5 and 8% and even go up to 10%, depending on the amount of dadon provided and the personal relationship between the fishers and the dadondar. The percentage may also differ in different regions; for example, in the Chandpur region, it is around 4% to 5%, while in Patuakhali, it ranges from 6 to 8%.” Additionally, a government tax of 5% is imposed on fish sold at the arat, which applies to all fishers, regardless of whether they receive dadon.

Dadon can be categorized into two types: aratdar to mohajon (boat owners) and from mohajon to bhagi (helper fishers on a boat). The monetary value of a dadon is higher in the first category, with the primary purpose of facilitating business expansion for fishers. Helper fishers receive smaller amounts of dadon to support their livelihoods and meet their family expenses, including their children’s education costs.

For boat owners whose main occupation is fishing, one of the most challenging conditions for dadon is the requirement to sell their entire catch to the designated aratdar or dadondar from whom they receive the dadon. They are not allowed to sell their fish elsewhere, often leaving them without fish. Helper fishers must work exclusively on specific boats during the fishing season. They are prohibited from receiving dadon from another dadondar or working on another boat simultaneously. Before joining another boat, they must first repay the dadon they received. These conditions pose unique challenges and opportunities for fishers to shape their selling practices and work commitments in the dadon loan system. In this context, the conditions of “selling catch at a specified arat or dadondar,” “working for the whole fishing season in a specified boat,” and “specific percentage commission of selling catch daily” were identified to have similarities and were grouped in one cluster (Fig. 4). These conditions are closely related and share common characteristics within the dadon loan system. However, the condition of “signing on the stamp or blank cheque” was dissimilar and distinct from the previous cluster. This is a separate requirement within the dadon loan system.

Fig. 4
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Cluster analysis of conditions of dadon using Pearson correlation coefficient (similarity matric) and clustered by-word similarity

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Dadon and financial workflow

The diagram in Fig. 5 illustrates two types of money flow: the typical financial workflow and the dadon workflow. In a standard financial workflow, NGOs, the government, and non-government banks act as primary sources of funds. NGOs provide microcredits to three categories of individuals: mohajon (boat owners), helpers or shares (assistant fishers), and fish merchants or retail fish sellers. By contrast, government and non-government banks offer loans based on property mortgages. These loans are not specifically tailored for fishers or the fishing industry but are extended to mohajon, helpers, fish merchants, and even dadonders (stockists or aratdars) against property mortgages. These loans require proper documentation and are part of the formal credit system within a standard financial workflow.

Fig. 5
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Dadon and financial workflow

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However, another type of loan within the dadon workflow operates less formally. In this system, mahajon or aratdar provides loans to helper fishers who require proper documentation. Dadondars borrow money from government or non-government banks and distribute it as dadon to mahajon, helpers, and fish merchants. The recipients of dadon continue to give a percentage of their income to the dadondars until the debt is repaid. Mahajon may also provide loans as dadon to helpers who work on their boats for a certain period. These informal credits circulate within the dadon workflow, as shown in Fig. 5.

Let us examine a case study to understand further the impact of dadon on the lives of fishers. Md Mustofa (not his real name) is a fisher residing in Bohoriabazar, Chandpur District. Mustofa, who is 51 years old, lives with his wife, son, and daughter. He previously owned a fishing boat and net and caught and sold fish in the market. During that time, there were two types of dadon: one from aratdar to mohajon and another from mohajon to bhagi. However, there was no connection between the two kinds of dadon. Mustofa provided dadon to some fishers in Chandpur, but the presence of dadon led to moneylenders seizing the boats and resources of certain fishers. Dadondars would often harass fishers, resulting in widespread conflict.

Mustafa worked on a fishing trawler for two years at Cox’s Bazar in his early years. He observed that banks and NGOs provided agricultural loans but did not offer fish-related loans to fishers. During this time, fishers obtained agricultural loans from NGOs. The amount of dadon received varied depending on the fisher’s experience and the company they worked for. More experienced fishers or companies received more significant amounts of dadon for fishing. As a vagi (assistant fisher), Mustofa received less money than dadon.

As Mustofa’s life progressed, his circumstances improved, and he eventually became the owner of a company that employed helpers to assist him. He saved money from his dadon business. However, recently, due to rising commodity prices, he has depleted his savings. Fishers no longer catch enough fish, and dadondars must help fishers when they encounter robberies. Consequently, Mustofa transitioned to selling fish and leads his life as a seller.

This case study highlights the challenges and transformations experienced by fishers within the dadon loan system, shedding light on the complexities of their financial situations and the evolving nature of their livelihoods.

Benefits of dadon

Fishers who receive dadon express that they opt for it because of its easy terms and conditions and low-interest rates. The advantages of taking dadon from aratdar, as summarized in Fig. 6 and based on the findings of this study, are as follows.

  • Immediate financial support: fishers can access dadon when needed and fulfill their immediate needs. This is particularly beneficial during the ban period when fishers face financial crises. Dadon funds support their families, repair homes and boats, fund children’s education, and cover basic needs.

  • Simplicity and speed: dadon offers immediate benefits without formalities, paperwork, or mortgages. Fishers can quickly request and receive money without undergoing lengthy processes. Dadon also benefits the dadondar or moneylenders. According to an NGO official in Chandpur, dadondar gains more money by investing less. Fishers can borrow from dadondar as required but may not fully realize that dadondar earns a commission on the catch from fishers. The dadondar provides dadon for business purposes and generates additional income through commissions. If fishers want to sell fish in other markets, they must repay the entire dadon to the dadondar to ensure that the dadondar recovers the invested money. Thus, dadondars do not face financial losses.

Fig. 6
figure 6

Cluster analysis of advantages of dadon using Pearson correlation coefficient (similarity matric) and clustered by-word similarity

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Even dadondars acknowledge the benefits of dadon to fishers. A moneylender from Patuakhali states that dadon is helpful for fishers as it enables them to start fishing and generate income. Fishing allows them to provide for their families and sustain their livelihoods, which would not be possible without dadon. Moreover, dadons are readily available, unlike banks, which may wait to lend large sums to buy new boats or nets or carry out repairs.

Overall, the easy accessibility, immediate financial support, and flexibility of the dadon make it a preferred option for fishers, as it helps them overcome financial challenges and sustain their fishing activities and livelihoods.

The dendrogram (Fig. 6) shows that the factors “ability to borrow multiple times in a season or year” and “quick access to credit without extensive paperwork or collateral requirements” are grouped, indicating their similarity. Similarly, the factors “availability of credit in emergencies” and “often available when other formal credit sources are not” are closely related and placed in the same branch. The dendrogram uses color coding to illustrate the relationships and distinguish between branches. Components closer to each other are more similar, whereas those farther apart are less comparable.

Cause and effect of dadon loan system on small-scale fishers’ life

The dadon loan system has multiple disadvantages that significantly affect small-scale fishers. These disadvantages include high-interest rates that lead fishers to long-run debt traps and cycles of poverty, lack of transparency in lending practices and conditions, and fishers needing help to obtain actual profits by selling their caught fish.

The dadon loan system has both causes and effects that affect fishers (Fig. 7). Fishers rely on dadon because of their limited access to formal credit systems and the high costs of fishing inputs. However, this reliance increases dependency and debt accumulation and hinders long-term financial stability. The lack of government support, inadequate capital to start fishing, and poor economic conditions further contribute to the fishers’ vulnerability and limited growth. The dadon loan system perpetuates financial distress, erodes savings, and limits market access, resulting in prolonged misery for fishers.

Fig. 7
figure 7

Cause and effect of the dadon loan system on small-scale fishers’ lives

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A significant disadvantage of dadon is its high interest rate. Fishers often need to receive a fair price for their fish as they are bound to the aratdar for their dadon. Aratdar takes advantage of this situation, misrepresents prices when selling fish, and engages in fraudulent price fixing. This unfair pricing further harms fishers, preventing them from earning a rightful profit from their harvests.

Before undertaking financial commitments like dadon or loans, fishers actively discuss with their wives, collectively finalizing decisions. A specific case from Chattogram exemplifies the economic hardships faced by these women when their husbands are away at sea fishing. To cope with the financial strain during such absences, fishers’ wives often turn to neighbors for support. The narrative unveils the distressing reality that some moneylenders resort to tormenting the families of fishers if they struggle to repay dadon obligations. Furthermore, in dire financial situations, it was revealed that many wives of fishermen find themselves compelled to sell their gold ornaments as a last resort to raise funds. This comprehensive account highlights the multifaceted challenges faced by fishers’ wives.

A fisherman’s wife from Patuakhali told us that when their husbands go to sea for long days, they take money from dadondar in advance and do all the markets required for that period for the house. They also provide some cash to their wives to maintain the house expenses at that time, while the entire responsibility for the house expenses rests with the wife. These women demonstrate remarkable resilience and resourcefulness in supporting their families’ well-being during their husbands’ absences.

The informal credit system of dadon creates a lifetime debt cycle in which fishers are trapped. Dadondars cheat fishers by manipulating the weight and price of the fish. Those who cannot repay borrowed money become stuck in this cycle and face immense difficulties breaking free. This is exemplified by the case study of Abdur Rab, a fisher from Cox’s Bazar (56 years old), whom the dadon loan system has severely impacted. In his family, he has three sons and four daughters, which means, in total, nine family members live in his family, including himself and his wife. Aside from the Tentulia River, his hometown was in the Bhola district under the division of Barishal. Due to river erosion in 1982, he lost his hometown and moved to Chittagong. In Chittagong, he was involved in fishing, where the contract was 200 taka salary monthly. With this little amount of money, he hardly maintained his family. For that, after 4 years, in 1986, he came to Cox’s Bazar to live a better life. In 1987, he took 4000 taka as dadon for the first time because of the financial crisis. At that time, he had no own boats and nets for fishing. He was working as bhagi on other boats. Then, in Cox’s Bazar, the condition of the dadon was that the “total amount of catch was divided into three parts, two parts were for dadondars, and only one part was left for the fishers. So, the income was too low.” As dadon is an informal credit system, there were no written documents, and by utilizing this opportunity, dadondar could increase the amount of dadon’s money. Due to the absence of a written record, they often showed the increased amount of the dadon in front of everyone or claimed to have given more money than they did. Once, he was severely tortured when he could not provide him with fish properly in his arat. They even pressured him to catch fish during the ban period, too. After selling fish, he got a small amount of money, not enough for his family. He even could not bargain about the price of fish with dadondars. Because of high interest rates and conditions, Abdur Rob cannot repay the money to dadon yet. In his lifetime, he got arrested by police once because of fishing during the ban period, and dadondar saved him from going to jail. By these, Dadon’s money is increasing day by day. He is trapped in a debt cycle. They trapped him and his son in the cycle of dadon. They do not get any financial help for fishing from anywhere, not from banks and NGOs. Now, he has nothing of his own. Because of his age, nowadays, he cannot work for a long time, cannot catch big size fish, and cannot able to go into the deep sea. He only catches small fish from the beach side by the small net and boat of others. His existence is clung to by melancholy, and he is leading a miserable life. Dadan and its demonic influence have put his life in this situation.

The dendrogram (Fig. 8) reveals a clustering pattern among the codes, indicating similarities and relationships within the codes and subcodes. The items “increased bycatch and discards due to pressure to catch large quantities of fish” and “overfishing and depletion of hilsa populations” are grouped, suggesting their close similarity. Conversely, the items “fishers face obstacles to get profit by selling fish” and “reduced bargaining power for fishers” are placed further apart, indicating a lower degree of similarity and weaker relationship with the items in the cluster.

Fig. 8
figure 8

Cluster analysis of disadvantages of dadon using Pearson correlation coefficient (similarity matric) and clustered by-word similarity

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Social effects of the dadon

The dadon loan system creates a debt cycle for fishers, binding them to money lenders, which results in various social problems. These social effects include conflicts and riots that often lead to legal cases involving the police. Debt traps contribute to poverty, whereas the diminished bargaining power of fishers strains their relationships with lenders and social networks.

Fishers frequently face threats and intimidation from dadondars, as highlighted by an official from World Fish, who described the exploitative nature of their relationship. This debt burden affects fishers and their families, causing persistent poverty and disrupting social harmony. According to an NGO official from Chandpur, conflicts arise when fishers need more time to repay the borrowed money. Such conflicts lead to police cases, quarrels, and fights, creating social problems within the community. Disputes over fish ownership also lead to arbitration and meetings, ultimately deteriorating relationships between fishers and dadondars.

In this system, the powerful have significant influence, leading to corruption and further exacerbating the challenges faced by lower-middle-class fishers. Local government representatives and others tend to support dadondars, amplifying the difficulties experienced by fishers.

Socio-ecological impacts of the dadon loan system in the hilsa fishery

The dadon loan system, a prevalent form of informal credit in the hilsa fishery of Bangladesh, has profound implications not only economically but also on the socio-ecological resilience of the fishing communities. While providing immediate financial relief, this system perpetuates a cycle of debt and dependency that significantly influences the socio-ecological dynamics of the fishery.

Economic dependency and overfishing

One of the most direct impacts of the dadon loan system is the creation of a debt trap for fishers, compelling them to overfish to meet their debt obligations. This economic pressure often leads to unsustainable fishing practices, including capturing juvenile hilsa and fishing during breeding seasons, thereby threatening the fishery’s ecological balance and future viability. The depletion of hilsa stocks due to overfishing exacerbates the economic vulnerability of the community, creating a feedback loop that further entrenches the dadon loan system.

Social implications and community resilience

The dadon loan system also affects the social fabric of the hilsa fishing communities. The debt burden creates stress and conflict within families and communities, affecting social cohesion and collective action. Moreover, the system undermines traditional community-based resource management practices, which have historically played a vital role in sustaining the fishery. This disruption of social structures and traditional knowledge systems harms the community’s resilience, diminishing its capacity to adapt to socio-economic and environmental changes.

Environmental consequences and policy implications

The environmental impact of the dadon loan system extends beyond overfishing. The need to meet debt repayments often leads to neglecting sustainable fishing practices, such as mesh size regulations and no-catch zones. This scenario underscores the need for policy interventions that address the root causes of the dadon loan system. Policies that promote access to formal credit support alternative livelihoods and strengthen community-based resource management can mitigate the negative socio-ecological impacts of the Dadon loan system.

A DFO from Cox’s Bazar explained the ecological effect, stating there is no direct relationship between dadon and the environment. However, fishers often experience stress when they take dadon, leading to overfishing and the use of illegal fishing gear to generate sufficient income. Using illegal gear, such as current jal or net, contributes to biodiversity loss. Even during the ban period, fishermen venture into the river to catch fish, including jatka, which has a significant ecological impact.

Bipon Das, a 42-year-old fisher from Chattogram, highlighted the environmental effects of dadon by noting that when individuals take more dadon, they tend to engage in excessive fishing. Additionally, the aratdar (middleman) pressurizes fishers to overfish. Consequently, the overall number of fish caught continues to decrease over time.

Initiatives and alternatives to free fishers from dadon

The dadon loan system has various disadvantages, including social and ecological effects. However, there are alternative possibilities for providing loans to fishers and freeing them from the constraints of the informal credit system. A formal credit system can serve as an alternative to dadon by offering government-backed loans or subsidies, promoting fisher cooperatives or self-help groups, and implementing community-based financing schemes. Exploring alternative livelihoods or income streams, encouraging savings to reduce reliance on credit, and involving fishers’ spouses in the fishing process can also contribute to freeing society from the informal credit system.

Educational initiatives are crucial for addressing social prejudice and promoting financial literacy among fishers. Measures such as mass education, discouraging early marriage, and encouraging family planning can help improve fishing families’ financial situation. Developing saving habits among fishers and establishing community schemes, such as processing fish for home consumption during fishing bans, can provide stability and mitigate the impact of financial constraints. The government can play a significant role by giving interest-free or nominal-interest loans to fishing communities, taking them out of debt and poverty, and preventing them from falling into moneylender traps. Extensive education for fishers is also essential to empower them and enable their children to pursue different careers instead of relying solely on fishing. Organizing fishers’ wives through public–private organizations and providing alternative sources of income, such as goats and cows, can contribute to their livelihoods. Cultivating areas adjacent to their homes can further enhance economic prospects.

According to a professor from Chattogram, alternatives to dadon involve organizing fishers and promoting the formation of fishers’ associations. Providing access to water bodies for the fishing community to manage and utilize resources can be beneficial. Using available resources in the area, such as gardening or participating in income-generating initiatives, such as rickshaws or van operations, can provide additional opportunities with the support of relevant organizations. Establishing fishers’ cooperatives, where members deposit money regularly and can access funds in times of urgency, can serve as an alternative to dadon.

Although the government has implemented schemes to assist fishers during fishing bans, access to these opportunities is not universal, and proper distribution among fishers remains a challenge. The DFO of Cox’s Bazar highlighted recent government schemes and provided recommendations to free fishers from debt. Adequate food assistance and monetary support are provided to fishing families during the ban period, including compensation in the form of 86 kg of rice during the 65-day restriction period. However, the DFO suggests additional financial support, such as monthly allowances based on capacity and needs and the inclusion of fishers in the government’s life insurance scheme. Enhancing insurance schemes that mimic moneylenders’ lending methods can provide further financial security. Training programs that explore alternative income-generation opportunities can gradually help fishers move away from debt systems.

An NGO professional from Chandpur recommended alternatives, such as providing cows and goats to all fishers without favoritism. Introducing interest-free government loan arrangements and appropriate loan distribution by local government representatives can alleviate the burden of informal credit. Another DFO from Chandpur mentioned the ongoing hilsa development project, which involves providing nets to fisher groups and replacing illegal nets with legal and eco-friendly alternatives. Distributing weaned heifers as an alternative source of income and giving rice during the ban period offer substantial support to fishing families. Resources like goats, hens, sewing machines, and vans are distributed to create alternative income opportunities. These initiatives are carried out under the Greater Comilla District Fisheries Development Project to ensure fishers are not burdened with loan repayments during off-duty periods.

By implementing these alternative possibilities, society can break free from the shackles of the dadon loan system, promote sustainable financial practices among fishers, and ensure the long-term well-being of both fishers and the fishing industry while mitigating negative social and ecological impacts.

In the analysis (Fig. 9), it was observed that “government-backed loans or subsidies,” “interest-free loans from banks or microfinance institutions,” and “community-based financing schemes” were grouped, indicating their similarity as alternative options. However, the alternatives “look into alternative livelihoods or income streams” and “fishers’ cooperatives or self-help groups” were placed in a different cluster, suggesting their dissimilarity with the previously mentioned cluster.

Fig. 9
figure 9

Cluster analysis of alternatives for freeing fishers from debt cycle using Pearson correlation coefficient (similarity matric) and clustered by-word similarity

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Discussion

Understanding the dadon loan system and exploring alternatives for small-scale fishers in Bangladesh

This study provides valuable insights into the socioeconomic conditions, mechanics, advantages, disadvantages, and potential alternatives to the dadon loan system among small-scale fishers in Bangladesh. The findings shed light on the challenges fishers face, the factors driving their reliance on dadon, and the complex dynamics of the informal credit system. Furthermore, this study identifies the social and ecological impacts of dadon and explores potential initiatives and alternatives for freeing fishers from the debt cycle.

The socioeconomic conditions of the fishers depicted in this study align with previous research on vulnerable communities heavily dependent on fishing for their livelihoods (Béné, 2009; Rahman et al. 2020). Most fishers had limited education and lived in substandard housing, reflecting the socioeconomic hardships faced by this population. Insufficient income, highlighted by the prevalence of poverty and borrowing practices, further emphasizes the financial challenges faced by fishers (Macusi et al. 2022; Béné & Friend 2011).

This study elucidates the factors driving the dadon loan system, showcasing the multifaceted nature of the informal credit system. Limited access to formal credit systems, high fishing input costs, inadequate government support, and the need for immediate capital have emerged as prominent factors. These findings corroborate previous studies that identified similar factors contributing to the reliance on informal credit sources among fishing communities (Ruddle 2011; Deb & Haque 2017; Ahmed et al. 2021a, b). The presence of ban periods and natural disasters exacerbates the need for dadon, further reinforcing the interplay between environmental factors and the informal credit system (Islam 2011; Moni et al. 2018).

The mechanisms and intricacies of the dadon loan system uncovered in this study shed light on the conditions and obligations imposed on fishers. The requirement to sell the catch at specified arats or to designated dadondars restricts the autonomy of fishers and limits their ability to access alternative markets. The hierarchical relationship between aratdars and fishers and the deduction of commissions accentuate the power dynamics and potential exploitation within the dadon loan system (Rahman et al. 2020). The clustering of conditions related to selling catch and working exclusively for a specific boat reveals the interconnectedness of these requirements and their impact on fishers’ autonomy and income generation.

This study also explores the advantages and benefits of dadon from the perspectives of fishers, dadondars, and the wider community. The accessibility, simplicity, and speed of dadon emerge as significant advantages for fishers, enabling them to overcome immediate financial challenges. These findings align with previous studies highlighting the convenience and flexibility of informal credit sources for vulnerable communities (Kumar et al. 2020; Suresh 2023). Cluster analysis further supports the similarities between factors, such as the ability to borrow multiple times and quick credit access, underscoring the interconnected nature of these advantages.

However, the dadon loan system has disadvantages, as evidenced by the findings of this study. High interest rates, a lack of transparency, and unfair pricing practices by aratdars negatively impact fishers’ financial stability and income generation. These findings are consistent with previous research highlighting the exploitative nature of informal credit systems and the consequences borrowers face (Brock 2013; Tikadar et al. 2022). Clustering analysis further reveals the relationships between disadvantages, such as increased bycatch and discards, reduced bargaining power, and the detrimental ecological and social effects of dadon.

Pathways to freeing fishers from the dadon loan system

We investigate practical strategies to free fishers from Dadon. This section presents actionable solutions to empower fishers and break the debt-dependency cycle based on the creative approaches explored.

Strengthening community institutions

A critical step is strengthening community institutions that can provide economic and social support to fishers. This includes the establishment of fisher cooperatives and community credit unions, which can offer fair and accessible financial services, reducing the fishers’ reliance on exploitative lending practices.

Government and NGO involvement

We advocate for the active involvement of government and non-governmental organizations (NGOs) in providing support and resources to these community initiatives. This could include funding, capacity building, and legal support to ensure these community-based solutions are sustainable and effectively managed.

Creating awareness and advocacy campaigns

Raising awareness among fishers about the dangers of the dadon loan system and the availability of alternatives is crucial. Advocacy campaigns can educate fishers on their rights and the resources available, empowering them to make informed decisions about their economic activities.

Sustainable fishing practices and consideration of small-scale fisheries

In addressing the complex challenges faced by small-scale fisheries in the hilsa fishery, particularly in the context of the Dadon loan system, it is imperative to emphasize sustainable fishing practices intimately connected to resource sustainability. This section discusses innovative approaches and critically examines conventional management measures to ensure they support small-scale fisheries rather than marginalize them.

Community-led conservation initiatives

Our study highlights the potential of community-led conservation efforts as a sustainable approach to managing the hilsa fishery. Based on traditional knowledge and local governance structures, these initiatives can be more effective in enforcing sustainable practices such as seasonal bans and protected breeding areas. By empowering communities to manage their resources, these initiatives promote ecological sustainability and strengthen fishers’ socio-economic resilience.

Critical analysis of conventional measures

While globally recognized for promoting sustainability, measures such as eco-labeling and certification often pose challenges for small-scale fishers due to their stringent requirements and high costs. Our analysis reveals that these measures can inadvertently marginalize small-scale fisheries by favoring more considerable, more industrialized operations. To address this, we propose adaptations to these measures that consider small-scale fishers’ capacities and unique challenges, ensuring that they are inclusive and beneficial to all stakeholders.

Innovative economic and social structures

Drawing from our interview data, we introduce innovative solutions that emerged directly from the fishers. These include localized credit systems managed by the fishing communities themselves, which can reduce dependency on the dadon loan system, and cooperative marketing strategies that enhance fishers’ bargaining power. Community-driven solutions are tailored to the hilsa fishery’s specific needs and can disrupt traditional power dynamics and foster greater economic independence.

References and broader context

To support our analysis, we incorporate references (Brewer and Moon 2015; Mangubhai and Lawless 2021; Valdez-Rojas et al. 2022) to studies that have critically examined the impacts of conventional management measures on small-scale fisheries. These references provide a broader context, highlighting the need for nuanced, adaptable, and context-specific management approaches that recognize the unique challenges faced by small-scale fisheries.

Enhancing resilience and overcoming barriers in hilsa fishery of Bangladesh

In Bangladesh’s hilsa fishery context, breaking the debt cycle and enhancing socio-ecological resilience involve a nuanced understanding of local barriers and strategically implementing tailored solutions.

Addressing local barriers:

  1. 1.

    Awareness and knowledge in hilsa fishery: a key barrier is the need for more awareness among hilsa fishers about sustainable fishing methods, microfinance opportunities, and empowerment initiatives. Targeted campaigns and educational programs can enhance understanding and participation in these programs, especially in crucial hilsa fishing regions like Chittagong, Cox’s Bazar, Chandpur, and Patuakhali.

  2. 2.

    Financial accessibility: hilsa fishers’ limited access to formal financial services and the high interest rates from informal lenders pose a significant challenge. Collaborative efforts between microfinance institutions, local government bodies, and NGOs can offer tailored financial solutions, such as low-interest microfinance options specific to the needs of hilsa fishers.

  3. 3.

    Institutional and policy support: inadequate policy support and institutional alignment often hinder effective implementation. Strengthening policy frameworks and enhancing collaboration among stakeholders, including local fishing communities, is vital for successfully delivering sustainable fishing practices and financial empowerment programs.

Strategies for building socio-ecological resilience:

  1. 1.

    Sustainable fishing practices for hilsa conservation: sustainable fishing is crucial for the long-term viability of the hilsa fishery. Measures such as implementing size limits, seasonal fishing bans during breeding periods, and promoting gear that minimizes by-catch can contribute significantly to the conservation of hilsa stocks and the health of marine ecosystems.

  2. 2.

    Microfinance schemes tailored for hilsa fishers: microfinance schemes should be specifically designed to cater to the unique needs of hilsa fishers, providing them with the necessary capital to invest in sustainable fishing gear and practices and to manage economic shocks effectively.

  3. 3.

    Community empowerment and capacity building: empowering hilsa fishing communities through capacity-building initiatives can foster better resource management and decision-making. Establishing fishers’ cooperatives and local organizations can lead to more effective hilsa fishery management and promote community-driven conservation efforts.

  4. 4.

    Alternative livelihoods to complement hilsa fishing: diversifying income sources through alternative livelihood options can reduce the economic pressure on hilsa fishing, allowing for more sustainable fishing practices and reducing the overall ecological impact on the hilsa population.

Integrating these strategies within the specific context of Bangladesh’s hilsa fishery—focusing on local awareness, financial accessibility, policy support, sustainable fishing practices, community empowerment, and livelihood diversification—is critical to overcoming barriers and enhancing the resilience of small-scale hilsa fishers. This approach aims to ensure the sustainable management of the hilsa fishery and the long-term well-being of the fishing communities in Bangladesh.

Conclusion

This study endeavors to unravel the complex dynamics of the dadon loan system in the small-scale hilsa fishery of Bangladesh, shedding light on its deep-rooted challenges and potential pathways toward resilience and sustainability. Through a comprehensive analysis, we have highlighted the multifaceted nature of fishers’ reliance on the dadon loan system, exploring its socio-economic and ecological implications.

Our findings reveal that sustainable fishing practices are not just a choice but a necessity for the long-term viability of the fishery sector. Implementing fishery management measures like size limits, gear restrictions, and seasonal closures is crucial to prevent overexploitation and ensure the sustainability of fish populations. These practices enable fishers to access premium markets, potentially breaking free from the cycle of debt and dependency inherent in the dadon loan system.

However, our study goes beyond merely identifying problems and proposing conventional solutions. We recognize the limitations of our research, particularly the reliance on self-reported data and its context-specific nature, which may need to be fully generalized to other regions or fishing communities. This acknowledgment drives home the need for further research to explore the effectiveness and scalability of the proposed alternatives and initiatives in different socio-ecological settings.

We see a pressing need to engage a broader range of stakeholders in the dialogue. The perspectives of dadondars, policymakers, and other vital actors are essential to understand the dadon loan system and its alternatives comprehensively. Their inclusion is critical for developing holistic strategies and ensuring the socio-ecological resilience of small-scale fishing communities.

Lastly, while our study provides valuable insights into the challenges and opportunities within the hilsa fishery, it also underscores the complexity of achieving resilience in small-scale fisheries. Our recommendations, rooted in empirical data and a deep understanding of the local context, aim to inspire further research and action toward empowering fishing communities, conserving fishery resources, and ultimately fostering the well-being of coastal communities.