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The Information Liar Paradox: A Problem for Floridi’s RSDI Definition

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Abstract

In this commentary, I discuss the effects of the liar paradox on Floridi’s definition on semantic information. In particular, I show that there is at least one sentence that creates a contradictory result for Floridi’s definition of semantic information that does not affect the standard definition.

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Notes

  1. The author is aware that the idea presented by Floridi is not a novel one. Floridi himself refers to it as the”Dretske-Grice approach” (Floridi 2005:366).

References

  • Floridi, L. (2005). Is semantic information meaningful data? Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 70, 351–70.

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  • Floridi, L. (2012). Semantic information and the network theory. Synthese, 184, 431–54.

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Correspondence to Björn Lundgren.

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Lundgren, B. The Information Liar Paradox: A Problem for Floridi’s RSDI Definition. Philos. Technol. 28, 323–327 (2015). https://doi.org/10.1007/s13347-014-0155-x

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s13347-014-0155-x

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