Abstract
We study the effect of dynamic and investment externalities in a one-sector growth model. In our model, two agents interact strategically in the utilization of capital for consumption, savings, and investment in technical progress. We consider two types of investment choices: complements and substitutes. For each case, we derive the equilibrium and provide the corresponding stationary distribution. We then compare the equilibrium with the social planner’s solution.
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Notes
Capital externalities are called biological externalities in the context of natural resources.
We consider the equilibrium path of capital corresponding to the Cournot equilibrium. For the study of the equilibrium path of capital in a decentralized economy, see [17].
The investment externality in this paper is different from the biological (or capital) externality studied in two-sector growth models [4–7]. The biological externality arises directly from the presence of two goods. That is, the future stock of one type of capital depends on the interaction of the savings for both types of capital. In our one-sector growth model, there is only one stock of capital, i.e., aggregate capital.
A tilde sign distinguishes a random variable from its realization.
To simplify the discussion, we omit the finite-horizon case. Our results on the tragedy of the commons hold for any finite horizons.
Recall that in our model investment is required to maintain the capital. Without investment, the stationary distribution is degenerate at zero.
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Appendix: Solution of the Social Planner
Appendix: Solution of the Social Planner
In this Appendix, we derive the social planner’s solution in the case of complementary and substitutionary investment choices. We consider the infinite horizon by conjecturing that the value function is of the form \(W^{\infty }(y) = \kappa _{\infty } \ln y + \Psi _{\infty }\). As noted, the linear conjecture can be inferred by solving the problem recursively.
Given \(W^{\infty }(y) = \kappa _{\infty } \ln y + \Psi _{\infty }\), (62) is rewritten as
if investment choices are complementary and
if investment choices are substitutionary.
For complements, for \(j=1,2\), the first-order conditions corresponding to (76) are
which yields
Plugging (80) and (81) back into (76) implies that
Plugging (82) into (80) and (81) and summing over \(j\) yields (63) and (65). Plugging (63) and (65) into \(\sum \nolimits _{j=1}^{2} C^{*\infty }_{j}(y) = \sum \nolimits _{j=1}^{2} (E^{*\infty }_{j}(y) - I^{*\infty }_{j}(y))\) yields (64).
For substitutes, for \(j=1,2\), the first-order conditions corresponding to (77) are
which yields
since the social planner only needs to solve for total investment. Plugging (85) and (86) back into (77) yields
Plugging (87) into (85) and summing over \(j\) yields (66). Plugging (87) into (86) yields (68). Plugging (66) and (68) into \(\sum \nolimits _{j=1}^{2} C^{*\infty }_{j}(y) = \sum \nolimits _{j=1}^{2} (E^{*\infty }_{j}(y) - I^{*\infty }_{j}(y))\) yields (67).
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Fesselmeyer, E., Mirman, L.J. & Santugini, M. Strategic Interactions in a One-Sector Growth Model. Dyn Games Appl 6, 209–224 (2016). https://doi.org/10.1007/s13235-015-0150-6
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s13235-015-0150-6