Dynamic Games and Applications

, Volume 6, Issue 2, pp 174–186 | Cite as

On the Computation of Value Correspondences for Dynamic Games

  • Christopher SleetEmail author
  • Şevin Yeltekin


Recursive game theory provides theoretic procedures for computing the equilibrium payoff or value sets of repeated games and the equilibrium payoff or value correspondences of dynamic games. In this paper, we propose and implement outer and inner approximation methods for equilibrium value correspondences that naturally occur in the analysis of dynamic games. The procedure utilizes set-valued step functions. We provide an application to a bilateral insurance game with storage.


Dynamic games Computation Approximation Value correspondences 


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Copyright information

© Springer Science+Business Media New York 2015

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Tepper School of BusinessCarnegie Mellon UniversityPittsburghUSA

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