Abstract
One of the contributions of this work is to formulate the problem of energy-efficient power control in multiple access channels (namely, channels which comprise several transmitters and one receiver) as a stochastic differential game. The players are the transmitters who adapt their power level to the quality of their time-varying link with the receiver, their battery level, and the strategy updates of the others. The proposed model not only allows one to take into account long-term strategic interactions, but also long-term energy constraints. A simple sufficient condition for the existence of a Nash equilibrium in this game is provided and shown to be verified in a typical scenario. As the uniqueness and determination of equilibria are difficult issues in general, especially when the number of players goes large, we move to two special cases: the single player case which gives us some useful insights of practical interest and allows one to make connections with the case of large number of players. The latter case is treated with a mean-field game approach for which reasonable sufficient conditions for convergence and uniqueness are provided. Remarkably, this recent approach for large system analysis shows how scalability can be dealt with in large games and only relies on the individual state information assumption.
Similar content being viewed by others
References
Agarwal M, Honig M (2012) Adaptive training for correlated fading channels with feedback. IEEE Trans Inf Theory 58(8):5398–5417
Basar T, Olsder GJ (1999) Dynamic noncooperative game theory, 2nd edn. Classics in applied mathematics. SIAM, Philadelphia
Belmega EV, Lasaulce S (2011) Energy-efficient precoding for multiple-antenna terminals. IEEE Trans Signal Process 59(1):329–340
Belmega EV, Lasaulce S, Debbah M (2009) Power allocation games for MIMO multiple access channels with coordination. IEEE Trans Wirel Commun 8(5):3182–3192
Bonneau N, Debbah M, Altman E, Hjørungnes A (2008) Non-atomic games for multi-user system. IEEE J Sel Areas Commun 26(7):1047–1058
Bressan A (2010) Noncooperative differential games. A tutorial
Buzzi S, Saturnino D (2011) A game-theoretic approach to energy-efficient power control and receiver design in cognitive CDMA wireless networks. IEEE J Sel Top Signal Process 5(1):137–150
Cover TM, Thomas JA (1991) Elements of information theory. Wiley-Interscience, New York
Dumont J, Hachem W, Lasaulce S, Loubaton P, Najim J (2010) On the capacity achieving covariance matrix of Rician mimo channels: an asymptotic approach. IEEE Trans Inf Theory 56(3):1048–1069
Evans L (2010) Partial differential equations. American Mathematical Society, Providence
Fette BA (2006) Cognitive radio technology. Elsevier, Amsterdam
Fleming W, Soner H (1993) Controlled Markov processes and viscosity solutions. Applications of mathematics. Springer, Berlin
Foschini GJ, Miljanic Z (1993) A simple distributed autonomous power control algorithm and its convergence. IEEE Trans Veh Technol 42(4):641–646
Goodman DJ, Mandayam NB (2000) Power control for wireless data. IEEE Pers Commun 7:48–54
Gupta P, Kumar PR (1997) A system and traffic dependent adaptive routing algorithm for ad hoc networks. In: IEEE conf on decision and control (CDC), San Diego, USA, pp 2375–2380
Karatzas I, Shreve S (1991) Brownian motion and stochastic calculus. Springer, Berlin
Lasaulce S, Tembine H (2011) Game theory and learning for wireless networks: fundamentals and applications. Academic Press, New York
Lasaulce S, Hayel Y, Azouzi RE, Debbah M (2009) Introducing hierarchy in energy games. IEEE Trans Wirel Commun 8(7):3833–3843
Lasry JM, Lions PL (2007) Mean field games. Jpn J Math 2(1):229–260
Le Treust M, Lasaulce S (2010) A repeated game formulation of energy-efficient decentralized power control. IEEE Trans Wirel Commun
Mériaux F, Hayel Y, Lasaulce S, Garnaev A (2011) Long-term energy constraints and power control in cognitive radio networks. In: IEEE proc of the 17th international conference on digital signal processing (DSP), Corfu, Greece
Mériaux F, Treust ML, Lasaulce S, Kieffer M (2011) Energy-efficient power control strategies for stochastic games. In: IEEE proc of the 17th international conference on digital signal processing (DSP), Corfu, Greece
Meshkati F, Poor HV, Schwartz SC, Narayan BM (2005) An energy-efficient approach to power control and receiver design in wireless data networks. IEEE Trans Commun 53:1885–1894
Meshkati F, Chiang M, Poor HV, Schwartz SC (2006) A game-theoretic approach to energy-efficient power control in multi-carrier CDMA systems. IEEE J Sel Areas Commun 24(6):1115–1129
Mitola J, Maguire GQ (1999) Cognitive radio: making software radios more personal. IEEE Pers Commun 6(4):13–18
Olama M, Djouadi S, Charalambous C (2006) Stochastic power control for time-varying long-term fading wireless networks. EURASIP J Appl Signal Process 2006:1–13
Rodriguez V (2003) An analytical foundation for resource management in wireless communication. In: IEEE proc of Globecom, pp 898–902
Saraydar CU, Mandayam NB, Goodman DJ (2002) Efficient power control via pricing in wireless data networks. IEEE Trans Commun 50(2):291–303
Tembine H, Huang M (2011) Mean field difference games: McKean-Vlasov dynamics. In: CDC-ECC, 50th IEEE conference on decision and control and European control conference
Tembine H, Lasaulce S, Jungers M (2010) Joint power control-allocation for green cognitive wireless networks using mean field theory. In: IEEE proc of the 5th intl conf on cognitive radio oriented wireless networks and communications (CROWNCOM), Cannes, France
Tse D, Hanly S (1999) Linear multiuser receivers: effective interference, effective bandwidth and user capacity. IEEE Trans Inf Theory 45:641–657
Tulino A, Verdú S (2004) Random matrices and wireless communications. Foundations and trends in communication and information theory. Now, Hanover. The essence of knowledge
Yates RD (1995) A framework for uplink power control in cellular radio systems. IEEE J Sel Areas Commun 13(7):1341–1347
Author information
Authors and Affiliations
Corresponding author
Appendices
Appendix A: Proof of Proposition 1
Both results can be proven by using Ito’s formula (see, e.g., [16]). For the mean, from (5), one has
then \(\mathbb{E}[\underline{h}_{i}(t)] = \underline{\mu}(1 - e^{-\frac{t}{2}}) + \underline{h}_{i}(0)e^{-\frac{t}{2}}\). The limit when t goes to +∞ writes
For the variance, assume that for the two components x i and y i of h i :
with \(\mathbb{W}_{x}\) and \(\mathbb{W}_{y}\) two independent Wiener processes of dimension 1. Then
and
If g x (t)=0, \(\mathbb{E}[x_{i}(t)^{2}] = x_{i}(0)^{2} + \eta^{2} t\) and \(\lim_{t \to\infty} \mathbb{E}[x_{i}(t)^{2}] = \infty\). That is the reason why a deterministic term is needed in (5). With \(g_{x}(t) = \frac{1}{2}(\mu_{x} - x_{i}(t))\), one has
then
The solution of this differential equation has the form
thus
The analogous is true for y i . Hence, we have
and finally
Regarding to the probability density functions, applying the Kolmogorov forward equation to the state \(\underline{h}_{i}\) with the dynamics given in (5), one has for the component x i
The stationary case gives
One can check that \(\hat{m}_{x}(x_{i}) = \frac{1}{\eta\sqrt{2 \pi}} e^{-\frac{(x_{i} - \mu_{x})^{2}}{2 \eta^{2}}}\) is a solution of (56). This is the stationary density of x i . The analogous can also be written for y i : \(\hat{m}_{y}(y_{i}) = \frac{1}{\eta\sqrt{2 \pi}} e^{-\frac{(y_{i} - \mu_{y})^{2}}{2 \eta^{2}}}\).
Appendix B: Proof of Proposition 4
The proof follows the same principle as in chapter Risk-sensitive mean-field games in the notes Mean-field stochastic games by Tembine. Only the sketch of the proof is given here. To prove the uniqueness of the solution, we suppose that there exists two solutions (v 1,t ,m 1,t ),(v 2,t ,m 2,t ) of the above system. We want to find a sufficient condition under which the quantity \(\int_{\underline{s}} (v_{2,t}(\underline{s})-v_{1,t}(\underline {s}))(m_{2,t}(\underline{s})-m_{1,t}(\underline{s}))\,\text {d}\underline{s}\) is monotone in time, which is not possible.
Compute the time derivative
To express the first term, the difference between the two HJBF equations is taken and multiplied by m 2,t −m 1,t :
For the second term, the difference between the two FPK equations is taken and multiplied by v 2,t −v 1,t :
By integration by parts
then
The full derivative writes
We now introduce
and in the same way
We study the auxiliary integral
which derivative is
Note that \(\frac{\partial}{\partial m} \tilde{H}(\cdot)\) and \(\frac {\partial^{2}}{\partial m \partial u'} \tilde{H}(\cdot)\) are functional derivatives. They are defined such that for all m′∈ℙ(ℝ3)
and
A sufficient condition for the uniqueness of the solution to the mean-field response problem is the monotonicity of the operator associated to
with
This is true if
Rights and permissions
About this article
Cite this article
Mériaux, F., Lasaulce, S. & Tembine, H. Stochastic Differential Games and Energy-Efficient Power Control. Dyn Games Appl 3, 3–23 (2013). https://doi.org/10.1007/s13235-012-0068-1
Published:
Issue Date:
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s13235-012-0068-1