Abstract
We consider allocation problems with indivisible goods when preferences are single-peaked. In this paper we identify the family of efficient, non-manipulable, consistent, and balanced solutions. We refer those solutions as Temporary Satisfaction Methods,that can be viewed as extensions to the indivisible case of the so-called uniform rule.
Article PDF
Similar content being viewed by others
Avoid common mistakes on your manuscript.
References
Barberà S, Jackson MO, Neme A (1997) Strategy-proof allotment rules. Games Econ Behav 18:1–21
Benassy JP (1982) The economics of market disequilibrium. Academic Press, London
Ching S (1994) An alternative characterization of the uniform rule. Soc Choice Welf 11: 131–136
Chun Y (1999) Equivalence of axioms for bankruptcy problems. Int J Game Theory 28: 511–520
Dagan N (1996) A note on Thomson’s characterizations of the uniform rule. J Econ Theory 69: 255–261
Herrero C, Martínez R (2008) Balanced allocation methods for claims problems with indivisibilities. Soc Choice Welf 30: 603–617
Moulin H (1999) Rationing a commodity along fixed paths. J Econ Theory 84: 41–72
Sönmez T (1994) Consistency, monotonicity, and the uniform rule. Econ Lett 46: 229–235
Sprumont Y (1991) The division problem with single-peaked preferences: a characterization of the uniform allocation rule. Econometrica 59: 509–519
Thomson W (1994a) Consistent solutions to the problem of fair division when preferences are single-peaked. J Econ Theory 63: 219–245
Thomson W (1994b) Resource-monotonic solutions to the problem of fair division when preferences are single-peaked. Soc Choice Welf 11: 205–223
Thomson W (1998a) Consistency and its converse: an introduction. Center for Economics Research, University of Rochester, Rochester, pp 448
Thomson W (1998b) The replacement principle in economies with single-peaked preferences. Soc Choice Welf 15(1): 57–66
Young HP (1994) Equity: theory and practice. Princeton University Press, Princeton
Author information
Authors and Affiliations
Corresponding author
Additional information
We are grateful to José Alcalde, François Maniquet, Jordi Massó, Juan D. Moreno-Ternero, William Thomson, Antonio Villar and an anonymous referee for their helpful and stimulating comments. All errors are our sole responsibility. We acknowledge financial support from the Ministerio de Educación y Ciencia and Feder Funds under projects SEJ2007-62656, SEJ2007-67734, ECO2008-03674, Junta de Andalucía under project P06-SEJ-1645 and Grupo PAI SEJ426, and finally from the Instituto Valenciano de Investigaciones Económicas.
Rights and permissions
Open Access This article is distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution 2.0 International License (https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/2.0), which permits unrestricted use, distribution, and reproduction in any medium, provided the original work is properly cited.
About this article
Cite this article
Herrero, C., Martínez, R. Allocation problems with indivisibilities when preferences are single-peaked. SERIEs 2, 453–467 (2011). https://doi.org/10.1007/s13209-011-0046-7
Received:
Accepted:
Published:
Issue Date:
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s13209-011-0046-7
Keywords
- Allocation problem
- Indivisibilities
- Single-peaked preferences
- Priority standard
- Temporary satisfaction methods