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Early and Late Time Perception: on the Narrow Scope of the Whorfian Hypothesis

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Abstract

The Whorfian hypothesis has received support from recent findings in psychology, linguistics, and anthropology. This evidence has been interpreted as supporting the view that language modulates all stages of perception and cognition, in accordance with Whorf’s original proposal. In light of a much broader body of evidence on time perception, I propose to evaluate these findings with respect to their scope. When assessed collectively, the entire body of evidence on time perception shows that the Whorfian hypothesis has a limited scope and that it does not affect early stages of time perception. In particular, all the available evidence shows that the scope of language modulation is limited in the case of time perception, and that the most important mechanisms for time perception are cognitive clocks and simultaneity windows, which we use to perceive the temporal properties of events. Language modulation has distorting effects, but only at later stages of processing or with respect to specific categorization tasks. The paper explains what is the role of these effects in the context of all the available evidence on time cognition and perception.

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Notes

  1. There are different readings of “determines” which are relevant to understand how strong this claim by Whorf is. I focus on its scope and show that independently of how strongly one interprets this determination relation, the scope of Whorf’s hypothesis is narrow, at least in the case of time perception and representation. Establishing this narrow scope is the main goal of the paper. However, I briefly address the issue of linguistic-determination in the introduction.

  2. Because of the innate nature of the “language of thought,” at least as presented by Fodor, this version of the dependence of though on language is unlike Whorf’s original formulation, which postulates dependence of thought on specific spoken languages, thereby making it incompatible with a universalist interpretation. The debate on language-dependence and the Whorfian hypothesis rarely makes this distinction explicitly, which corresponds to Chomsky’s (1986) distinction between I-language (internal representations of language) and E-language (external language), which correlates with the distinction between competence and performance. As far as the debate is concerned, many of the findings on linguistic relativity may indicate aspects of performance, rather than competence, but I shall not elaborate on this objection here because my main goal is to show that language does not modulate early stages of time perception, regardless of the universality or relativity of linguistic modulation.

  3. As mentioned, Fodor, who defended the language of thought hypothesis, argued that the scope of language modulation is restricted (1983, 2007, 2008). Fodor proposed a universalist view, but I think the issue of modulation is independent of universalism or relativism and that this issue requires more careful analysis than it has been given. In any case, the focus of this paper is the limited scope of language modulation, as proposed by Whorf’s linguistic relativity view.

  4. A precise definition of language, as opposed to other forms of communication, is required to rigorously assess the Whorfian hypothesis. Language, however, is notoriously difficult to define (i.e., is it a single capacity or multiple capacities? Is syntax what characterizes it; if not, what characterizes it? Is it uniquely human? Is it essentially representational? Is it essentially compositional (and/or conceptual) and if so, how?) This cluster of problems presents other major difficulties that I shall not pursue here.

  5. For more on this issue see (Montemayor 2010, 2013; and Montemayor and Haladjian 2015). In particular, the evolutionary approach to early and late-time perception can allow for important new insights concerning cognitive penetration, the representation of magnitudes, and the development of conceptual capacities for time cognition.

  6. A different approach to this issue is to focus on the early and late processing of frames of reference for navigation (egocentric and allocentric). As the cognitive integration of frames of reference for action become uniformly represented into the first person perspective, such integration could produce more complex and less encapsulated forms of voluntary action (Merker 2005, 2007a, b). However, none of the early navigational frames depends on linguistic modulation.

  7. I would like to thank two anonymous Reviewers for valuable feedback on previous drafts. Thanks to Fuat Balci, Randy Gallistel and Zenon Pylyshyn, for inspiring conversations on the relationship between language and time perception.

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Acknowledgements

The author received valuable feedback from Argiro Vatakis, Alex Holcombe, and Harry H. Haladjian.

Some aspects of this paper are discussed in “Conscious awareness and time perception.” https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/28745453

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Montemayor, C. Early and Late Time Perception: on the Narrow Scope of the Whorfian Hypothesis. Rev.Phil.Psych. 10, 133–154 (2019). https://doi.org/10.1007/s13164-018-0405-4

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