1 Introduction

Tying and bundlingFootnote 1 are common business practices. Under competition law and economics, tying by dominant undertakings is regarded as a controversial practice that may generate both pro-competitive effects and leveraging effects.Footnote 2 Economists, therefore, suggest using a case-by-case assessment to deal with such behavior.Footnote 3 While there has been an increasing debate about whether statutory dominance should imply a lower threshold for assessing possible abusive conduct,Footnote 4 most economic literature and competition rules on tying do not distinguish between tying by statutory dominant firms and tying by other dominant firms.

To fill in this gap, this article looks at both economic theory and competition practice of tying by statutory dominant firms in China and the EU. The aim is to assess whether, why, and how a differentiated (stricter) scrutiny should be applied to address such behavior. In Sect. 2, we examine and compare the economic effects of tying by statutory dominant firms with the effects of tying by other dominant firms. Section 3 provides a law and economics analysis of whether and to what extent the legally protected market positions of statutory dominant firms have affected competition provisions and the assessment of tying cases in China and the EU. It highlights the shortcomings of the current approach, showing the value of applying a differentiated (stricter) scrutiny on such behavior. Based on Sect. 2 and Sect. 3, Sect. 4 explores potential ways of applying a differentiated (stricter) scrutiny of tying by statutory dominant firms to enhance the effectiveness of competition law. The last section concludes the findings of this article.

2 The economics of tying by statutory dominant firms

2.1 “Statutory dominant firms” as a double-edged sword

Ramos (2020) defines “statutory dominant firms” as firms that “owe their market positions to a discretionary choice of the State”.Footnote 5 Different from other settings where the state intervenes but a process of competition is institutionalized in public auction processes or intellectual property rights, market power enjoyed by statutory dominant firms does not result from an ex-ante competitive process.Footnote 6 Once designated by the state, such firms are subject to little ex-post competition restraints from potential challengers.Footnote 7 According to this definition, all enterprises, regardless of whether they provide services of general economic interest or whether they are SOEs or private undertakings, could be designated as statutory dominant firms.Footnote 8

Many jurisdictions attach importance to designating statutory dominant firms for social and public interests. State-owned enterprises have played a significant role and have accounted for a large part of the assets in both China’s and the EU’s economy.Footnote 9 Services of general economic interest, like gas, electricity, water, and postal services, may be operated by the state on the grounds of applying a pricing policy to ensure lower prices for life necessities and raw materials for consumers and manufacturers, responding to differences in income and elasticity of demand.Footnote 10 It is also possible for private enterprises, such as firms providing cremation services, to be permitted to operate exclusively in the relevant markets.

Despite the public and social interests (Ai and Philipsen 2023) involved, statutory dominant firms may, at the same time, create challenges and raise anti-competitive concerns. In the absence of both ex-ante and ex-post challenges to their market positions, statutory dominant firms enjoy a static life with absolute advantages over other undertakings.Footnote 11 Their legally protected market positions grant these firms absolute advantages when they compete with firms in other markets. Their leveraging of market power into other markets has become a substantial challenge for competition law.Footnote 12 In the following two sections, we examine the economic effects of tying by statutory dominant firms and compare these effects with tying by other dominant firms.

2.2 “Pernicious” tying by statutory dominant firms

Unlike dominant undertakings that have gained their market power through competition on the merits, for whom price mechanisms play an essential role in restraining excessive pricing (because a high price makes it more likely that rival firms will enter the market),Footnote 13 the designation of statutory dominant firms does not result from an ex-ante competitive process, and they are not subject to potential competition. As warned by Laffont and Tirole (2001), “in the absence of competition for the market, ‘winning’ generates no information.”Footnote 14 In order to avoid excessive prices being charged to consumers, the prices of goods offered by statutory dominant firms may be subject to certain types of state control. For life necessities and raw materials for consumers and manufacturers, these firms are often granted subsidies to ensure lower prices for the fulfillment of social needs. Under these circumstances, tying can be used as a profitable method to evade such control in the tying product.Footnote 15 Through the combined sales of tying products and tied products, the “uncollected consumer surplus” of the tying products, benefiting from state regulation and subsidies, will now be directly transferred to capture the tied product. In particular, statutory dominant undertakings may also have incentives to use tying as a cross-subsidization method to raise prices in the tied market in order to compensate for the loss of revenue in the tying market.Footnote 16

Furthermore, statutory dominant firms often offer public necessities or raw materials with inelastic demand that can only be operated by designated firms in the relevant market. The more inelastic the demand, the less possible it is for consumers to reject the bundle, and the less likely it is for competitors to survive in competition. As a result, it is nearly impossible for an efficient stand-alone competitor to compete with the unique advantages enjoyed by statutory dominant firms. Namely, such practices can seriously restrict consumers’ choices, while the dominant firms can easily leverage their market power to a competitive tied product market and charge monopolistic prices for the tied products.

Given the significant anti-competitive effects of tying by statutory dominant firms, even if pro-competitive effects may also exist, it is unlikely that the pro-competitive effects can outweigh the anti-competitive effects. Typically, one can regard such behavior as presumptively anti-competitive.

2.3 Comparing tying by statutory dominant firms with “normal” tying

For tying conduct applied by other (i.e. non-statutory) dominant firms, according to the Chicago school, it is not possible to achieve double monopolistic profits since any price increase for the tied product above the competitive price will cause a reduction in demand for the tying product. The firm has to reduce its package price in the end.Footnote 17 The Chicago School scholars thus argue that tying can only be employed for efficiency reasons.Footnote 18 However, their argument is based on assumptions that make it not as robust as it seems. The Post-Chicago School scholars have challenged those views, holding that tying may lead to significant foreclosure effects. For example, Whinston (1990) considers the situation that the tied good market is oligopolistic and subject to fixed costs of entry and economies of scale, showing that tying may still be profitable through successfully inducing the exit of rivals in the tied market.Footnote 19 Despite these challenges, under the influence of the Chicago School, tying by non-statutory dominant undertakings is believed to be a controversial topic that can generate both significant anti-competitive effects and significant pro-competitive effects.Footnote 20

Comparing the economic effects of tying by statutory dominant firms with those of tying by other dominant undertakings, considerable differences can be observed. First, the incentives for statutory dominant firms to employ exploitative and exclusionary ties are more significant than tying by other dominant undertakings. Second, after the Chicago School’s theory, tying by other dominant undertakings is believed to generate both significant anti-competitive effects and pro-competitive effects, whereas the Chicago School by virtue of the pricing mechanisms does not account for tying by statutory dominant undertakings. Overall, from an economic perspective, it seems reasonable to regard the more “pernicious” tying by statutory dominant firms as presumptively anti-competitive, with a distinction between the more “ambiguous” tying by other dominant undertakings that deserves a case-by-case analysis.

3 A law and economics analysis of competition rules in China and the EU

3.1 The differentiated but incomplete competition provisions in China and the EU

Examining the competition provisions in China and the EU, we find that both jurisdictions tend to treat tying practices by statutory dominant firms differently from tying practices by other dominant undertakings.

In China, the central competition authority (SAMR) released Interim Provisions on Prohibiting Abuse of a Dominant Market PositionFootnote 21 that are applicable to all sectors and markets, which include, on the one hand, general tying rules in Article 18, and on the other hand, a separate provision in Article 22 regarding public utilities’ abusive behaviors.

Article 18 provides that,

Dominant undertakings shall be prohibited from tying practices without justifiable reasons if these practices are in violation of trading practices and consumption habits, or in disregard of the functions of the commodities; and the justifiable reasons include reasons in line with proper industry practices and trading habits; reasons necessary to meet product safety requirements; reasons necessary to realize specific technology; and other reasons that can justify the conduct.

Article 22 regarding public utilities’ abusive behavior states that,

Operators of public utilities such as water supply, power supply, gas supply, heat supply, telecommunications, cable television, postal services, and transportation shall operate according to law and shall not abuse their dominant market position to harm the interests of consumers.

The separate provision in Article 22 seems to suggest that the SAMR might follow a differentiated approach to assessing abusive behavior by public utilities from those by other undertakings. Nevertheless, the SAMR only separately lists abusive behavior by public utilities and does not incorporate detailed economic analysis, which may lead to several problems. First, it does not consider tying by other statutory dominant firms, e.g., undertakings under public regulation. Second, this provision does not clarify whether, why, and how tying by statutory dominant firms deserves a differentiated scrutiny.

Also in the EU, with regard to the assessment of abuse of dominance, in December 2008, the Commission published the Guidance on the Commission’s enforcement priorities in applying Article 82 of the EC Treaty to abusive exclusionary conduct by dominant undertakings.Footnote 22 In this guidance, the Commission lists several criteria that may help to identify anti-competitive effects of tying and bundling.

Among these criteria, the Commission explicitly and separately considers certain differentiated incentives and effects of tying by statutory dominant firms, stipulating that,

If the prices the dominant undertaking can charge in the tying market are regulated, tying may allow the dominant undertaking to raise prices in the tied market in order to compensate for the loss of revenue caused by the regulation in the tying market.Footnote 23

Although the EU notices the cross-subsidization effects of tying by statutory dominant firms, it does not incorporate a full-fledged economic analysis.

3.2 The emerging but inefficient competition practice in China and the EU

Both China and the EUFootnote 24 have condemned many tying cases by statutory dominant firms. In particular, in China, a majority of illegal tying cases condemned by competition authorities are about tying by statutory dominant firms while only very limited tying cases by other dominant firms are deemed as illegal.Footnote 25 These cases involve not only tying by public utilities operating in natural monopoly industries, such as operators of water,Footnote 26 gas,Footnote 27 and digital televisionFootnote 28; but also tying by firms operating under strong levels of regulation or administrative licenses, such as firms providing products and services of tobacco,Footnote 29 salt,Footnote 30 medical insurance payment software,Footnote 31 and cremation.Footnote 32 Chinese courts also follow a stricter approach in addressing tying by statutory dominant firms than tying by non-statutory dominant undertakings.Footnote 33

Despite the emerging tying practices by statutory dominant firms, competition authorities and courts in both China and the EU usually do not explicitly consider the role of the differentiated position of statutory dominant firms in the assessment of the concerned exploitative and exclusionary effects, which may lead to both error costs and enforcement costs in practice. Taking the Chinese case of Wu Xiaoqin v.Shanxi BroadcastFootnote 34 as an example, the plaintiff Wu Xiaoqin was charged an additional fee for television programs when paying a basic maintenance fee for watching television by the only public firm carrying on broadcaster public obligations in the relevant market. The SPC held that as the only operator legally engaged in cable TV transmission business and centralized broadcast controller of TV programs in a specific region, the firm had advantages in market access, market share, business status, and business scale that could be regarded as holding a dominant market position in the relevant market. This firm, taking advantage of its dominant market position, restricted consumers’ right to choose by tying basic viewing and maintenance fees of digital TV and the paid program fees and was not conducive to other service providers entering the digital TV service market. Such behavior constituted tying prohibited by the AML.

From a law and economics perspective, both the exploitative and exclusionary effects of this behavior are obvious. On the one hand, the basic viewing and maintenance fees of TV are regulated by the state for the benefits of consumers. Tying additional fees to these basic fees makes price regulation ineffectiveFootnote 35. On the other hand, TV services could be regarded as life necessities with inelastic demand, at least, at that time; irrespective of the increased prices, counterparties generally have very few options but to accept the bundle. Such practices can seriously restrict consumers’ choices with significant leveraging and exclusionary effects. These two kinds of effects, relating to the protected market position of a statutory dominant undertaking, are, nevertheless, not reflected in the case rulings. Failing to consider the relevant economic theory may lead to error costs and enforcement costs: although the anti-competitive effects could have been demonstrated clearly from an economic perspective, this case has gone through the first instance, the second instance, and the retrial proceeding.

3.3 Why is a differentiated (stricter) scrutiny important?

The above law and economics analysis shows that it is important to apply a differentiated scrutiny on tying by statutory dominant firms. On the one hand, a differentiated scrutiny will reduce false negatives and be unlikely to lead to false positives. On the other hand, tying has become a frequently employed method by statutory dominant firms to undermine economic reform, as it allows those firms to evade price control, compensate for the loss of revenue in the tying product, leverage and gain additional profits in the liberalized product markets.Footnote 36 To ensure that consumers can benefit from state regulation and economic reforms, a differentiated scrutiny on tying by statutory dominant firms is both reasonable and valuable.Footnote 37

Furthermore, applying a differentiated (stricter) scrutiny can serve as an effective deterrent for tying by statutory dominant undertakings, which is in line with the principle of proportionality that requires competition enforcement to choose proportionate measures according to the severity of the concerned behavior.Footnote 38 In addition, the application of more explicit and clearer rules can also reduce the uncertainties during the enforcement.

4 Policy recommendations

Based on the above analysis, we propose several policy recommendations to achieve this differentiated (stricter) scrutiny with regard to the identification of statutory dominant firms, the assessment of anti-competitive effects, and the assessment of pro-competitive effects.

As a precondition, competition authorities and courts could first identify the differentiated position of statutory dominant firms through two essential elements: (1) the findings of lawful exclusive status and (2) dominance deriving from such differentiated positions. Once a statutory position has been confirmed, competition authorities and courts can lower the threshold of establishing a dominant position for the undertaking concerned.Footnote 39

Then, as the anti-competitive effects and welfare-reducing effects of such behavior are clear and obvious, it is sufficient for policymakers to adopt a simpler assessment to presume the anti-competitive effects with no need for develop further economic analysis, as long as some ‘formalistic’ criteria of tying are satisfied. Typically, such criteria include the finding of a dominant undertaking, separate products (i.e. in the tying product market and the tied product market), and an element of coercion (i.e. that the undertaking forces consumers who want to purchase one product to buy another product). At least, the findings of statutory dominant firms should lower the thresholds of establishing harm to competition in specific case assessments.

As for the assessment of pro-competitive effects, given the limited possibilities of efficiencies as analyzed before, policymakers can impose high evidence standards in the assessment process. For example, they can require five cumulative conditions to be demonstrated by dominant undertakings: “(1) the efficiencies have been, or are likely to be, realized as a result of the conduct; (2) the conduct is indispensable to the realization of those efficiencies: there must be no less anti-competitive alternatives to the conduct that are capable of producing the same efficiencies; (3) the likely efficiencies brought about by the conduct outweigh any likely negative effects on competition and consumer welfare in the affected markets; (4) the conduct does not eliminate effective competition, by removing all or most existing sources of actual or potential competition;”Footnote 40 (5) consumers shall receive a fair share of the resulting benefits of the claimed efficiencies.Footnote 41 It is also noteworthy that the high standards for economic reasons of efficiencies shall not affect the assessment of non-economic reasons, including e.g., the consideration of transaction habits, health and safety reasons.

These policy recommendations could be incorporated as soft forms of governance in competition law, e.g., in the forms of guidelines and judicial interpretationsFootnote 42. Based on sound economic analysis, the differentiated scrutiny is not only not against, but more in line with, the trend to apply competition economics to competition practice to reduce error costs. As a result, the savings on enforcement costs can be used to handle more controversial competition cases.

5 Conclusions

In this article we explained that, from an economic perspective, tying by statutory dominant firms is more “pernicious” and therefore should be regarded as presumptively anti-competitive, different from tying by other dominant undertakings that deserves a case-by-case analysis. Nevertheless, these economic findings have not been fully reflected in competition provisions and competition practice, at least in China and the EU, which may lead to both error costs and enforcement costs and negatively affect consumer welfare. To deal with this, we proposed policy recommendations on how to achieve a differentiated (stricter) scrutiny, to reduce error costs and enhance the effectiveness of competition law. Given that the differentiated scrutiny of tying by statutory dominant firms stems from solid economic discussions, the findings of this article are in line with the tendency of incorporating more economic analysis into competition law.

It is also noteworthy that this study relates to a broader discussion regarding the application of a differentiated scrutiny on (other types of) abuses by statutory dominant undertakings in China and the EU. As discussed above, the SAMR provided a separate legal basis for abuses by public firms in Article 22 in the Interim Provisions on Prohibiting Abuse of Dominant Market Positions. In the EU, the Commission claimed to apply a lower threshold to assess predatory practices by legal monopolies, holding that,

The Commission will be more likely to find such an abuse of predatory practices in sectors where activities are protected by a legal monopoly, since it may use the profits gained in the monopoly market to cross-subsidize its activities in another market and thereby threaten to eliminate effective competition in that other market.Footnote 43

In the assessment of retroactive rebates in the case Post Danmark II, the CJEU held the following,

In a situation characterized by the dominant undertaking of a very large market share and by structural advantages conferred, inter alia, by that undertaking’s statutory monopoly, which applied to 70% of mail on the relevant market, applying the as-efficient-competitor test is of no relevance inasmuch as the structure of the market makes the emergence of an as-efficient competitor practically impossible.Footnote 44

Given the tendencies of applying a lower threshold to assess abuses by statutory dominant undertakings, we recommend further research on these topics.