Abstract
With the development of e-commerce, online retailers has increasingly developed their own store brand to compete with the national brand. It is necessary for the manufacturers who sell national brand products through these online retailers to consider strategically when making the selling mode decisions. Motivated by such practice issue, we consider a theoretic model comprised of a national brand manufacturer and an online retailer. The retailer chooses to introduce an average store brand, a premium store brand or neither, and the manufacturer sells national brand products through the retailer under reselling or agency selling mode. Comparing and analyzing the six possible scenarios, we investigate the interaction between the retailer’s store brand strategy and the manufacturer selling mode selection. We find that the unit production cost and the quality of the national brand affect the retailer’s store brand strategy. Under the reselling format, the retailer prefers to introduce a premium store brand when the national brand cost is relatively low. While under the agency selling format, the retailer prefers to introduce a premium store brand when the cost is low but the quality is high. Interestingly, we further find that the manufacturer may benefit from the premium store brand introduction. Whether for the reselling or agency selling, there exists the “win–win” situation for the manufacturer and the retailer with a higher national brand quality. Overall, our results provide several management insights for the online retailer’s store brand introduction and the manufacturer’s selling mode selection.
Similar content being viewed by others
References
Abhishek V, Jerath K, Zhang ZJ (2016) Agency selling or reselling? channel structures in electronic retailing. ManageSci 62(8):2259–2280. https://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.2015.2230
Chen PP, Zhao RQ, Yan YC, Li X (2020) Promotional pricing and online business model choice in the presence of retail competition. Omega 94:102085. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.omega.2019.07.001
Chung H, Lee E (2017) Store brand quality and retailer’s product line design. J Retail 93(4):527–540. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jretai.2017.09.002
CNBC (2018) Amazon is doubling down on its private label business, stoking ’huge fear’ in some sellers. Preprint at https://www.cnbc.com/2018/10/06/amazon-doubling-down-on-private-label-sellers -see-huge-fear.html?&qsearchterm=Amazon%20huge%20fear
CNBC (2019) Jeff bezos told employees last year that other companies shouldn’t be so afraid of amazon—some rivals are proving him right. Preprint at https://www.cnbc.com/2019/02/22/jeff-bezos-told-employees-amazon-is-not-that-scary-he-was-right.html?&qsearchterm=amazon%20private%20label
Daymon Worldwide (2021) The development of China’s private brand industry in 2021. Preprint at http://www.daymonchina.cn/
Ha AY, Tong SL, Wang YJ (2021) Channel structures of online retail platforms. Manuf Serv Oper Manage. https://doi.org/10.1287/msom.2021.1011
Heese HS (2010) Competing with channel partners: supply chain conflict when retailers introduce store brands. Naval Res Logist (NRL) 57(5):441–459
JD.com (2021) Various project tariffs on jd open platform. Preprint at https://rule.jd.com/rule/ruleDetail.action?ruleId=638209647311982592
Jin YN, Wu XL, Hu QY (2017) Interaction between channel strategy and store brand decisions. Eur J Oper Res 256(3):911–923. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ejor.2016.07.001
Kaplan S (2022) We tested amazon’s affordable midcentury-modern and farmhouse-chic furniture - the quality is comparable to cb2 and west elm. Preprint at https://www.insider.com/guides/home/amazon-furniture-rivet-stone-and-beam-review
Li D, Liu YM, Hu JH, Chen XH (2021) Private-brand introduction and investment effect on online platform-based supply chains. Transport Res E: Logist Transport Rev 155:102494
Li H, Leng KJ, Qing QK, Zhu SX (2018) Strategic interplay between store brand introduction and online direct channel introduction. Transport Res E Logist Transport Rev 118:272–290. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.tre.2018.08.004
Marketplace Pulse (2020) Marketplaces year in review 2020. Preprint at https://www.marketplacepulse.com/marketplaces-year-in-review-2020sellercohorts
Mills DE (1995) Why retailers sell private labels. J Econ Manage Strat 4(3):509–528. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1430-9134.1995.00509.x
Mills DE (1999) Private labels and manufacturer counterstrategies. Eur Rev Agric Econ 26(2):125–145. https://doi.org/10.1093/erae/26.2.125
Nielsen (2018) The rise and rise again of private label. Preprint at https://www.plmainternational.com/industry-news/private-label-today
Pauwels K, Srinivasan S (2004) Who benefits from store brand entry? Market Sci 23(3):364–390. https://doi.org/10.1287/mksc.1030.0036
PLMA (2021) 2021 International private label yearbook. Preprint at https://www.plmainternational.com/industry-news/private-label-today
Ru J, Shi RX, Zhang J (2015) Does a store brand always hurt the manufacturer of a competing national brand? Prod Oper Manage 24(2):272–286. https://doi.org/10.1111/poms.12220
Shen YL, Willems SP, Dai Y (2019) Channel selection and contracting in the presence of a retail platform. Prod Oper Manage 28(5):1173–1185. https://doi.org/10.1111/poms.12977
Shi CL, Geng W (2021) To introduce a store brand or not: Roles of market information in supply chains. Transport Res E Logist Transport Rev 150:102334. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.tre.2021.102334
SICQ (2020) 2020 smart speaker comparison test report. Preprint at https://www.sicq.org/2020%e5%b9%b4%e6%99%ba%e8%83%bd%e9%9f%b3%e7%ae%b1%e6%af%94%e8%be%83%e8%af%95%e9%aa%8c%e6%8a%a5%e5%91%8a.html
The Third Eye In Retailing. Suning jiwu’s style of anti-muji: 40% off pricing for the same quality standard products, (2019). Preprint at https://zhuanlan.zhihu.com/p/82747332
Tian L, Vakharia AJ, Tan YL, Xu YF (2018) Marketplace, reseller, or hybrid: strategic analysis of an emerging e-commerce model. Prod Oper Manage 27(8):1595–1610. https://doi.org/10.1111/poms.12885
Zhang SC, Zhang ZX (2020) Agency selling or reselling: E-tailer information sharing with supplier offline entry. Eur J Oper Res 280(1):134–151. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ejor.2019.07.003
Zhang XY, Hou WH (2022) The impacts of e-tailer’s private label on the sales mode selection: from the perspectives of economic and environmental sustainability. Eur J Oper Res 296(2):601–614. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ejor.2021.04.009
Zhang Z, Song HM, Gu XY, Shi V, Zhu J (2021) How to compete with a supply chain partner: retailer’s store brand vs manufacturer’s encroachment. Omega 103:102412. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.omega.2021.102412
Author information
Authors and Affiliations
Corresponding author
Ethics declarations
Conflict of interest
The authors declare that they have no conflict of interest
Ethics statement
This work did not involve any active collection of human data.
Additional information
Publisher's Note
Springer Nature remains neutral with regard to jurisdictional claims in published maps and institutional affiliations.
Appendices
Appendix A
Under the scenario RN, the profit functions of the retailer and the manufacturer are given in Eqs. (3) and (4). By backward induction, we can obtain the optimal prices, product demand and profits of the manufacturer and the retailer as follows
Under the scenario RA, the profit functions of the retailer and the manufacturer are given in Eqs. (5) and (6). By backward induction, we can obtain the retailer and the manufacturer’s optimal decisions as follows
Under the scenario RP, the profit functions of the retailer and the manufacturer are given in Eqs. (7) and (8). Similarly, we can obtain the optimal prices and profits as follows
Under the scenario AN, the profit functions of the retailer and the manufacturer are given in Eqs. (9) and (10). By backward induction, we can obtain the optimal prices and profits as follows
Under the scenario AA, the profit functions of the retailer and the manufacturer are given in Eqs. (11) and (12). Similarly, we can obtain the optimal prices and profits of the retailer and the manufacturer’s as follows
Under the scenario AP, the profit functions of the retailer and the manufacturer are given in Eqs. (13) and (14). Similarly, we can obtain the optimal prices and profits as follows
Appendix B
1.1 B.1 Proof of Proposition 2
-
(1)
\(\pi _R^{RA}-\pi _R^{RN}=\frac{4(c-\gamma _{s})^2+\gamma _{s}(\gamma _{n}-\gamma _{s})}{16\gamma _{s}}-\frac{(c-\gamma _{n})^2}{16\gamma _{n}}=\frac{4\gamma _{n}c_2-6c\gamma _{n}\gamma _s+3\gamma _n\gamma _s ^2-c^2\gamma _{s}}{16\gamma _{s}\gamma _n}.\) Since \(4\gamma _{n}c_2-6c\gamma _{n}\gamma _s+3\gamma _n\gamma _s ^2-c^2\gamma _{s}=3\gamma _n(c-\gamma _{s})^2+c^2(\gamma _{n}-\gamma _{s})\), we can obtain that \(\pi _R^{RA}-\pi _R^{RN}>0\).
-
(2)
\(\pi _R^{RN}-\pi _R^{RP}=\frac{(c-\gamma _{n})^2}{16\gamma _{n}}-\frac{(c-c_h\gamma _{n})^2}{16\gamma _{n}(1-\gamma _{n})}-\frac{4\gamma _{n}(1-\gamma _{n})(1-c_h)^2}{16\gamma _{n}(1-\gamma _{n})}\). Since \(c<c_h<1\), \(\frac{(c-\gamma _{n})^2}{16\gamma _{n}}<\frac{(c-c_h\gamma _{n})^2}{16\gamma _{n}(1-\gamma _{n})}\). We can further obtain \(\pi _R^{RN}<\pi _R^{RP}\).
-
(3)
Set \(\Delta \pi =\pi _R^{RA}-\pi _R^{RP}=\frac{4(c-\gamma _{s})^2+\gamma _{s}(\gamma _{n}-\gamma _{s})}{16\gamma _{s}}-\frac{4\gamma _{n}(1-\gamma _{n})(1-c_h)^2}{16\gamma _{n}(1-\gamma _{n})}-\frac{4\gamma _{n}(1-\gamma _{n})(1-c_h)^2}{16\gamma _{n}(1-\gamma _{n})}\). c has two solutions \(c_{RR1}=\frac{\gamma _{n}\gamma _{s}[(1-\gamma _{n})(4-\delta _1)-c_h]}{4\gamma _{n}(1-\gamma _{n})-\gamma _{s}}<0\) and \(c_{RR2}=\frac{\gamma _{n}\gamma _{s}[4(1-\gamma _{n}-\delta _1(1+\gamma _{n}-c_h))]}{4\gamma _{n}(1-\gamma _{n})-\gamma _{s}}\) when \(\Delta \pi =0\). \(\frac{\partial \Delta \pi }{\partial c}\vert _{c=c_{RR2}}>0\), so \(\Delta \pi\) is monotonically decreasing with respect to c under the constraint \(\bar{c}>c>0\). Since \(\Delta \pi \vert _{c=c_{RR2}}=0\), we can prove that \(\pi _R^{RA}<\pi _R^{RP}\) when \(0<c<c_{RR2}\) and \(\pi _R^{RA}\ge \pi _R^{RP}\) when \(c\ge c_{RR2}\). Set \(c_{RR}^*=c_{RR2}\). (Note that \(\delta _1=\frac{A}{\gamma _{n}\gamma _{s}(1-\gamma _{n})}\), where \(A=-12c_h^2\gamma _{n}^2+16c_h^2\gamma _{n}-4c_h^2\gamma _{s}+32c_h\gamma _{n}^2-8c_h\gamma _{n}\gamma _{s}-32c_h\gamma _{n}+8c_h\gamma _{s}+4\gamma _{n}^3-4\gamma _{n}^2\gamma _{s}-20\gamma _{n}^2+5\gamma _{n}\gamma _{s}+16\gamma _{n}+3\gamma _{s}^2-4\gamma _{s}\))
-
(4)
\(\pi _M^{RN}-\pi _M^{RA}=\frac{(c-\gamma _{n})^2}{8\gamma _{n}}-\frac{\gamma _{n}-\gamma _{s}}{8}=\frac{c(c-\gamma _{n})-\gamma _{n}(c-\gamma _{s})}{8\gamma _{n}}\). Since \(\gamma _{n}>\gamma _{s}>c\), \(\pi _M^{RN}>\pi _M^{RA}\).
-
(5)
\(\pi _M^{RN}-\pi _M^{RP}=\frac{(c-\gamma _{n})^2}{8\gamma _{n}}-\frac{(c-c_h\gamma _{n})^2}{8\gamma _{n}(1-\gamma _{n})}=\frac{(c-\gamma _{n})^2(1-\gamma _{n})-(c-c_h\gamma _{n})^2}{8\gamma _{n}(1-\gamma _{n})}\). Since \((c-\gamma _{n})^2(1-\gamma _{n})-(c-c_h\gamma _{n})^2=\gamma _{n}^2-\gamma _{n}^3+2c\gamma ^2+2cc_h\gamma _{n}-2c\gamma _{n}-c^2\gamma _{n}>0\), we can prove that \(\pi _M^{RN}>\pi _M^{RP}\).
-
(6)
\(\pi _M^{RA}-\pi _M^{RP}=\frac{\gamma _{n}-\gamma _{s}}{8}-\frac{(c-c_h\gamma _{n})^2}{8\gamma _{n}(1-\gamma _{n})}=\frac{(\gamma _{n}-\gamma _{s})\gamma _{n}(1-\gamma _{n})-(c-c_h\gamma _{n})^2}{8\gamma _n(1-\gamma _{n})}\). When \((\gamma _{n}-\gamma _{s})\gamma _{n}(1-\gamma _{n})-(c-c_h\gamma _{n})^2<0\), that is \(0<c\le c_{h}\gamma _{n}-\sqrt{\gamma _{n}(1-\gamma _{n})(\gamma _{n}-\gamma _{s})}\), \(\pi _M^{RA}<\pi _M^{RP}\). When \(c\ge c_{h}\gamma _{n}-\sqrt{\gamma _{n}(1-\gamma _{n})(\gamma _{n}-\gamma _{s})}\), \(\pi _M^{RA}\ge \pi _M^{RP}\). Set \(c_{RM}^*=c_{h}\gamma _{n}-\sqrt{\gamma _{n}(1-\gamma _{n})(\gamma _{n}-\gamma _{s})}\).
1.2 B.2 Proof of Proposition 4
-
(1)
Set \(\Delta \pi =\pi _R^{AN*}-\pi _R^{AA*}=\frac{\alpha (c-\gamma _{n})^2}{4\gamma _{n}}-\frac{(\gamma _{n}-\gamma _{s})[(4\gamma _{n}-\alpha \gamma _{s})(\alpha \gamma _{n}\gamma _{s}-c\alpha \gamma _{s}-c\gamma _{s}+c^2)]}{\gamma _{s}(4\gamma _{n}-\gamma _{s}-\alpha \gamma _{s})^2}+\frac{(\gamma _{n}-\gamma _{s})(\gamma _{n}\gamma _{s}^2)}{\gamma _{s}(4\gamma _{n}-\gamma _{s}-\alpha \gamma _{s})^2}\). c has two solutions \(c_{AN1}\) and \(c_{AN2}\) when \(\Delta \pi =0\). \(c_{AN2}=\frac{\gamma _{n}\gamma _{s}\sigma _3}{\sigma _4}\), where \(\sigma _3=8\gamma _{n}\gamma _{s}+8\alpha \gamma _{n}^2-\alpha \gamma _{s}^2-8\gamma _{n}^2+8\gamma _{n}\sqrt{\alpha \gamma _{s}(\gamma _{n}-\gamma _{s})}-2\gamma _{s}\sqrt{\alpha \gamma _{s}(\gamma _{n}-\gamma _{s})}+\alpha ^3\gamma _{s}^2-2\alpha \gamma _{s}\sqrt{\alpha \gamma _{s}(\gamma _{n}-\gamma _{s})}+2\alpha \gamma _{n}\gamma _{s}-6\alpha ^2\gamma _{n}\gamma _{s}\) and \(\sigma _4=\alpha ^3\gamma _{s}^3-8\alpha ^2\gamma _{n}\gamma _{s}^2+2\alpha ^2\gamma _{s}^3+20\alpha \gamma _{n}^2\gamma _{s}-12\alpha \gamma _{n}\gamma _{s}^2+\alpha \gamma _{s}^3-16\gamma _{n}^3+16\gamma _{n}^2\gamma _{s}\). We can obtain that \(c_{AN2}<0\) and \(c_{AN1}>\bar{c}\). \(\Delta \pi \vert _{c=0}\), so \(\Delta \pi >0\) under the constrain \(0<c<\bar{c}\). We can prove that \(\pi _R^{AN*}>\pi _R^{AA*}\).
-
(2)
\(\pi _M^{AN*}-\pi _M^{AA*}=\frac{(1-\alpha )(\gamma _{n}-c)^2}{4\gamma _{n}}-\frac{(2\gamma _{n}-c)^2(\gamma _{n}-\gamma _{s})(1-\alpha )}{(4\gamma _{n}-\gamma _{s}-\alpha \gamma _{s})^2}\). We solve \(\pi _M^{AN*}-\pi _M^{AA*}=0\) and obtain two solutions, \(c_{MAN1}\) and \(c_{MAN2}\). \(\bar{c}<c_{MAN1}<c_{MAN2}\). We can obtain that \(\pi _M^{AN*}>\pi _M^{AA*}\).
Rights and permissions
About this article
Cite this article
Zhang, H., Zhao, H. & Zhao, S. Strategic interplay between store brand strategy and selling mode choice. J Ambient Intell Human Comput 14, 16269–16281 (2023). https://doi.org/10.1007/s12652-022-03847-4
Received:
Accepted:
Published:
Issue Date:
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s12652-022-03847-4