Abstract
In recent years, there has been a massive increase in Chinese authorities hunting down their own citizens abroad. Although the Chinese government’s anti-corruption campaign has led to numerous suspects returning to China and reporting to the police, it has repeatedly been criticised for providing the basis to eliminate any political and economic opposition. Various institutions, including Chinese intelligence agencies, operating worldwide, carry out these hunts. Their advancements illustrate the global orientation of such organisations, which has developed in line with Beijing’s growing confidence and changing foreign policy.
Zusammenfassung
Die Fahndung chinesischer Behörden nach eigenen Staatsbürgern im Ausland hat in den letzten Jahren massiv zugenommen. Das liegt an der Antikorruptionskampagne der Regierung in Peking, die einerseits zur Selbstanzeige und Rückkehr zahlreicher Verdächtigter nach China geführt hat. Andererseits wird im Rahmen der Kampagne politische und wirtschaftliche Opposition beseitigt. Die Fahndung wird u. a. von den chinesischen Geheimdiensten durchgeführt was ihren globalen Handlungsanspruch unterstreicht.
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Notes
Netizen is a neologism composed of the terms “net” and “citizen”.
Research on this topic has proven difficult. Repeated efforts to contact authors about some of their statements on Chinese anti-corruption campaigns were unsuccessful, which may be due to problematic sources. Furthermore, Chinese authorities refused to answer a relatively short list of questions. The following German authorities gave brief statements that they were either not able or willing to provide information on the topic: Bundeskriminalamt (25. Oct. 2017), Bundesamt für Verfassungsschutz (26. Oct. 2017) and Bundesnachrichtendienst (07. Nov. 2017). The latter referred to Auswärtiges Amt, which is yet to reply. A notable exception was the Bundesministerium des Innern, which gave an in-depth response and added valuable documents on 21st Dec. 2017.
As yet, Sam Pa’s various functions seem to play an important role, such as in the Government’s Sentencing Memorandum in the trial USA vs. Mahmoud Thiam from 04. Aug. 2017. One of Sam Pa’s occupations was a leading position in the China International Fund (CIF), which maintained business relations with former Guinean Minister of Mines Mahmoud Thiam. In August 2017, Thiam was sentenced to a long prison term for money laundering (Van Voris 2017). To this date, there is hardly any coverage on Sam Pa. Chinese officials and journalists are either uncooperative or pretend to know nothing about the case. As far as the author can tell, the last article on Sam Pa was published in April 2017 (Epoch Times 2017). For further details on Sam Pa’s office in Hong Kong, see Blancke (2016).
In English: As party leader, [Xi Jinping] has [...] occupied important positions even on the province level with his own followers and has politically neutralized tens of thousands of unpleasant officials through a major anti-corruption campaign (The author’s translation).
Various Chinese and Western media reported on incredibly large amounts of cash and valuables that were found upon arresting suspects. Apparently, officers needed thirteen lorries to remove General Xu Caihou’s vast amounts of precious jewellery and cash. Other reports state that sixteen machines were used to count the cash found with another official, Wei Pengyuan. In such politically charged environments, it is difficult to tell how much truth there is to either of the reports.
When searching the Chinese Interpol wanted list for terms such as corruption, funding, fraud or deception on 14th April 2018, no results showed up. Several attempts to contact the rapporteur Bernd Fabritius, Group of the European People’s Party, remained unanswered.
“[At] the end of the day, there are more Chinese going in hiding than foreigners coming taking up refugee of whatever nature in China. The wide disparity there probably does not give any Western government much of an incentive to cooperate with China. References to rights and principles are pretty much gestures of convenience. The root causes for such a state of affairs, meanwhile, lies within China, too.” Prof. Zha Daojiong in an E‑mail addressed to the author, 19th January 2018.
In English: Both in revolution and construction, we need to learn from other countries and use their experiences as an example. However, mechanically adopting and applying other countries’ experiences and models would not lead to success [...]. Going our own way and building a socialism on Chinese principles - that is the basic conclusion we have drawn from a long history of experience. (The author’s translation).
Information on Liu Yuejin’s role varies: He is introduced as the “director of the narcotics control department of the MPS” (Zhang 2012). In the Intelligence Online newsletter from 25th January 2017, however, Yuejin is portrayed as the “deputy director of the Gonganbu who is in charge of the fight against drugs” (Intelligence Online 2017, p. 2). According to China Wiki, last modified 5th January 2016, he is a “former assistant minister of public security and a key figure in China’s crackdown on illegal narcotics. He was appointed as the first commissioner of counterterrorism in December 2015” (China Wiki 2016). On his role during the Mekong crisis, it is said that “Liu was [an] appointed head of a special investigation team that worked with police in Laos, Myanmar and Thailand.” Following China Vitae, however, he has been an “Anti-terrorism Commissioner” in the MPS since 2015 (China Vitae 2018).
Wikipedia (2018a) lists a detailed account with cross-references. One of the individuals residing in China, Gui Minhai, possesses a Swedish citizenship. Chinese authorities detained him while he was in the company of Swedish diplomats in January 2018 (Reuters 2018). Other countries may have been inspired by such operations: In July 2017, a Vietnamese businessman was kidnapped and sentenced to a life-long prison term back in Vietnam (Deutsche Welle 2018).
Among the Chinese community in Europe, there have been sporadic threats and intimidations from members of the embassies or nationalist Chinese individuals acting on behalf of the embassies. Public events, e. g. by the Free Tibet movement or Falun Gong, are often observed and filmed in an ostentatious manner (Source B as an intelligence official and conversations between the author and members of various NGOs).
Contrary to common depictions, Chinese teams are active in various European states, e. g. Germany or Great Britain. Members of such teams are usually disguised as representatives of Chinese trade delegations, employees in Chinese think tanks or as temporary employees/visitors in specific Chinese institutions such as the Chinese foreign media. Certain institutions may be used as relaxation room, while representatives of the intelligence agencies in the Chinese embassies oversee their communications and management. (In that case source A is an intelligence official).
The term Operation Sky Net has been quite a popular one: Aside from the British military first using it in the 1960s, it was also used for a Chinese national surveillance system initiated in 2005, for a campaign against patent fraud in 2008, for the Chinese police’s fight against the illegal trade of endangered species in 2013 and in some reports by the World Customs Organisation. The terms Fox Hunt and Sky Net sometimes get mixed up in Western and Chinese media.
According to Chinese sources, the aforementioned office is supported by the G20 Research Centre on Anti-Corruption, Fugitive Repatriation and Asset Recovery, which was founded at Beijing University on 23rd September 2016 (Lei 2016b). The exact role and output of this supposed research institute remain unclear. However, the political agenda is explicitly mentioned in the title.
Traditionally, Chinese security authorities refrain from giving out information. Instead, they seem to have limited their output in light of counterintelligence campaigns. Hence, all reports must be seen as insufficient. The special type of bureaucracy within such organisations often leads to changes that are difficult to detect from the outside. The information provided on websites or in publications may be contradictory and therefore needs to be compared thoroughly. The informative value of reports on the institutions involved is frequently impeded by the random introduction of new terms and institutions, differences in translation and various other obstacles. The same is true for reports on operations inside and outside of the country. If entities referred to in this text have been annulled or replaced by the time this article is printed, this may be an effect of China’s domestic political struggle. This text refrains from depicting the long development and history of individual organisations.
Information can be forwarded to Chinese authorities via https://www.12388.gov.cn/ztzz/html/index_formAnonymous.html. Accessed 14 Apr. 2018.
According to other sources, Liu Jianchao has been the Deputy Director of the National Bureau of Corruption since 2015. In his biography on the website of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People’s Republic of China, he has been listed as the “Assistant Minister of Foreign Affairs” since 2015 (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People’s Republic of China, n.d.).
The functions associated with the MPS and MSS are often being confused or depicted incorrectly, as texts on this topic show. Furthermore, their organisational connection is located incorrectly a lot of the time. The Chinese agents involved comprise a complex network, which consists of divisions and subdivisions, various offices, branch offices, etc. Due to this article’s limitations, the network cannot be displayed as a graphic or an organigram.
This is particularly true for some states involved in China’s One Belt One Road (OBOR) campaign, such as Pakistan or smaller states in Eastern Europe. This example further illustrates China’s growing dominance based on economic circumstances.
In various border regions, China has deployed Brigades for Special Operations, which operate transnationally. Each brigade is thought to consist of 1000 soldiers. Around 6000 soldiers are assumed to be stationed in Hong Kong, including a 50 member unit only consisting of women (Arthur et al. 2018, pp. 50-54).
In this case source C is an intelligence official.
It is no secret that Chinese intelligence agencies cooperate with journalists abroad. The mentioned newspaper previously attracted attention in this regard (Pansey and Chang-Woo 2015).
For an overview of the Confucius Institutes’ role in American higher education, see Peterson (2017).
For D, this breach of trust is a patriotic duty. Various interviews with Chinese nationals abroad illustrate their firm belief in the official reasoning. For example, such reasoning portrays human rights activists or Tibet activists as terrorists, wherefore the disclosure of any relevant information on such individuals is seen as a contribution to combating terrorism. D is rewarded with a financial bonus and her contact details are stored in the MSS’s database for future operations.
Zhao Leji, the CCDI’s new head, illustrates such developments: Born in 1957, he joined the CPC in 1975 and was one of the younger cadres. His biography reveals his unconditional loyalty to the party and that he is one of Xi Jinping’s closest advisors. It remains to be seen whether he is going to continue along the lines of his predecessor and implement further CCDI offices in the ministries and subordinate entities.
For further reading, see Faligot and Kauffer (1988).
A symbol of such processes may be seen in the reorganisation of the Committee for State Security (KGB) and reorganisation of the Federal Security Service (FSB), during which the former firth directorate was turned into a department for tax investigation. Further developments show that those who were completely loyal to Putin, were spared from tax investigations.
This control system has also been adapted by other heirs of the KGB, such as by North Korean intelligence agencies.
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[“Skynet 2017” action started. Improve the system and mechanism, comprehensively deepen the international anti-corruption pursuit and recovery work]. 
[Many figures were first disclosed. What are the anti-corruption messages revealed in the Supreme Court work report?]. 
[African former mineral minister got on a trial because of 85 millions bribes from China. Over 200 pages from FBI reveals China political resources trade in Africa]. 
[G20 Anti-Corruption Research Center: Providing intellectual support for international cooperation against corruption]. Author information
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Blancke, S. Tigers, Flies and Crocodiles: Hunting Season for Chinese Intelligence. Chinese Anti-Corruption Campaigns in an Aggressive Foreign Policy. Z Außen Sicherheitspolit 11, 343–364 (2018). https://doi.org/10.1007/s12399-018-0713-x
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s12399-018-0713-x
Keywords
- Operation Sky Net
- Operation Fox Hunt
- Anti-corruption campaign
- Chinese intelligence agencies
- Chinese state security