Skip to main content
SpringerLink
Log in

Good (and Bad) Words for the Ontological (and Anthropomorphic) Description of Behavior

  • Original Research
  • Published:
Biosemiotics Aims and scope Submit manuscript

Abstract

This work is an effort to philosophize about the scientific words we must use to describe behaviors. It was written as an essay thus it is left here for further development; the issue before us is an ethological one, it addresses the question: which words are the most convenient to use in rigorous behavioral studies in order to produce scientific knowledge? We discuss the historical and philosophical roots of this behavioral-scientific problem. We admit anthropomorphic inference of organisms’ behaviors, as a mean to create scientific-novel knowledge. We present two examples –based on the ethological study of triatomines (vectors of Chagas disease)–, where our anthropomorphic approach resulted in the discovery of novel meanings.

This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution to check access.

Access this article

Log in via an institution

Price excludes VAT (USA)
Tax calculation will be finalised during checkout.

Instant access to the full article PDF.

Institutional subscriptions

Fig. 1

Similar content being viewed by others

Notes

  1. In an interview. YouTube. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=7s8SSilNSXw. Accessed 27 January 2021.

  2. Proposition 5.6, p. 68.

  3. When the renaissance was barely over, beginning modernity, Baruch Spinoza formally demarcated his metaphysics of a God in human mold. For this influential philosopher God is “the sum of the natural and physical laws of the universe and certainly not an individual entity or creator”.

  4. Non-human animals use signals to communicate. Or can we call them words? Are non-human animal’s words, real words? Possibly, they are pre-words, as they are in a primitive state. In such savage state in which they are, they are not useful for structuring concepts, theories and other semiotic artifacts.

  5. The Venezuelan philosopher contends, “strictly speaking, in concept and in word, there has never been a natural man –outside, perhaps, of those hours, not countable as and for hours, destined to sleep, or out of those moments spent in drunkenness, orgies and bacchanalia.” [En rigor de concepto y de palabra, hombre natural no lo ha habido jamás —fuera, tal vez, de esas horas, no computables como y por horas, destinadas al sueño, o de los ratos consumidos en borracheras, orgías y bacanales.].

  6. Kinji Imanishi and his team reported for first time how Japanese apes Macaca fuscata on Koshima Islet learned from humans to wash hot sweet potatoes, eventually transmitting such “culture” from one generation to the other. To primatologists, this was the most famous study revealing bioculture (Kawai M 1965, Matsuzawa 2015). Although, the behavior originated by replicating humans’ habit of washing sweet potatoes, down the generations the macaques started washing other things in water such as apples and other fruits.

  7. By this axiological statement, we do not mean that non-human animals are inferior, but rather to highlight the contrast in the evolutionary degrees of complexity of their respective languages –and cultures.

  8. Heterotopia describes a socio-cultural space–time defined by actual institutions and discourses. According to Foucault heterotopias are somehow ‘other’: disturbing, intense, incompatible, contradictory or transforming. Heterotopias are worlds within worlds, mirroring and yet upsetting what is outside. The Gallic philosopher provided examples: institutions, companies, universities, laboratories, schools, museums, ships, bars, brothels, prisons, and so on. While heterotopia follows the template established by the notions of (good) utopia and (bad) dystopia, the possibilities of heterotopia are not good or bad but rather success or failure.

  9. pp. 24–25.

  10. p. 26.

  11. Hopeful monsters are “mutants, i.e. linving things with a profound mutant phenotype that have the potency to establish an original evolutionary lineage. Whilst, the Synthetic Theory of evolutionary biology has rejected the relevance of such monsters, this theory cannot not fully explain the mechanism and mode of macroevolution.

  12. Are artificial words exclusively scientific words? No; artificial words did not start with science –we must acknowledge. However, scientific words are in a trend, plan, project and program to become more and more artificial because of science. Our scientific knowledge lays the foundations for a philosophical, humane –very human project– whose purpose is to make more and more advanced technological creations. Such –scientific– project includes and pursues the design and invention of originalities, artifacts, new words, and novel languages –for the progress of the technological revolution that we are experiencing. The way in which an object or a word passes from its natural state to an artificial process (sensu Whitehead 1929) occurs less and less accidentally, it rather occurs more and more under the design of our scientific plan.

  13. According to Pattee (2015) theories and laws in physics place the subject as mere metaphysical observer, this author points out that: “The problem is that physics does not have a theory of the observer-subject. The concept of the subject remains physically ambiguous.” Biology does not have a theory of the observer-subject neither. Nevertheless, biology studies the observer-subject; it is truly working and making experiments with it. Thus, it is actually dealing with this "in-between philosophy and science" matter. Probably, a theory of the observer-subject is currently in a trend within biosemiotics.

  14. The first ethologists began to interpret animal behavior as a language of fixed symbols. Classical ethologists emphasized the existence of innate behaviors such as fixed action patterns in all species, but that emphasis almost disappeared from modern ethology many decades ago. Greater emphasis has been placed on understanding the (molecular, genetic and physiological) mechanisms behind such behavioral adaptations.

  15. According to Edmund Husserl (2012) essence is ideal, which means that essence is an intentional object of consciousness; for this author essence is interpreted as sense –in other words, our senses create ideal objects of essential things (e.g. genotypes, epi-genotypes, phenotypes and behaviors) to be read in our mind.

  16. The structure of our brain and mind do not allow us to see more than three spatial dimensions.

  17. According to Fisher (1991) the rhetorical effect of the charge of anthropomorphism is to accuse certain researchers of committing a scientific crime, caused perhaps by (human) emotions. The charge not only commits such scientists of a mistake of reasoning, but it also suggests humans are irrational. Painfully, we tend to think anthropomorphism –as Christianism, capitalism, socialism, communisms, etc.– assumes a doctrinarian way of thinking. Anthropomorphism refers to a blatant logical mistake, “the category mistake of ascribing human attributes to something not human”. But, what if instead of regarding the anthropomorphic view as a mistake, we see it as a measuring tool? Which by the way, although sound to some as scandalous, it is not a terribly original idea.

  18. An idea is a canon, an agreement, an accepted principle or rule, a criterion or standard of judgment that can change over time. While concepts are strictly defined and closed, ideas are open and might evolve –i.e. improve– throughout human history.

References

  • Aldana, E., & Otálora-Luna, F. (2019). Artistic notion of mimicry, a case study: Does Triatoma maculata (Hemiptera: Reduviidae: Triatominae) plagiarize bees, tigers or traffic signals? Biosemiotics, 12(1), 157–174.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Bateson and Peter H Klopfer (Ed.), Perspectives in ethology. Vol 9. (pp. 49–85). New York: Plenum Publishing Corporation.

  • Bateson, P., & Laland, K. N. (2013). Tinbergen's four questions: an appreciation and an update. Trends in Ecology & Evolution, 28(12), 712–718.

  • Boakes, R. (1984). From Darwin to behaviorism: Psychology and the minds of animals. Cambridge University Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Burkhardt, R. W., Jr. (1981). On the emergence of ethology as a scientific discipline. Conspectus of History, 1(7), 62–81.

    Google Scholar 

  • Calvés, J. A. (2018). The philosophy of biology in the fundamental concepts of metaphysics of Martin Heidegger. Influences of Hans Driesch and Jakob von Uexküll. Filosofia e História Da Biologia, 13(1), 61–70.

    Google Scholar 

  • Corning, P. A. (2014). Evolution ‘on purpose’: How behaviour has shaped the evolutionary process. Biological Journal of the Linnean Society, 112(2), 242–260.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Crist, E. (1998). The ethological constitution of animals as natural objects: The technical writings of Konrad Lorenz and Nikolaas Tinbergen. Biology and Philosophy, 13(1), 61–102.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Derrida, J. (2006). L’Animal que donc je suis. Galilée.

    Google Scholar 

  • Drummond, H. (1981). The nature and description of behavior patterns. In Perspectives in ethology (pp. 1–33). Springer, Boston, MA.

  • Eibl-Eibesfeldt, I. (1975). Ethology, the biology of behavior. Holt, Rinehart and Winston.

    Google Scholar 

  • Eibl-Eibesfeldt, I. (1979). Etología: Introducción al estudio comparado del comportamiento (2nd ed.). Barcelona: Omega.

  • Fisher, J. A. (1991). Disambiguating anthropomorphism: an interdisciplinary review. In PPG

  • Foucault, M. (1979). Las palabras y las cosas: una arqueología de las ciencias humanas. Argentina: Siglo XXI.

  • Foucault, M. (2005). The order of things: an archaeology of human sciences. London and New York: Routledge - Taylor and Francis e-Library.

  • Gadamer, H. G. (2004). Truth and method. Crossroad.

    Google Scholar 

  • García Bacca, J. D. (1969). Curso sistemático de filosofía actual. Caracas: Alfadil.

  • García Bacca, J. D. (1977). Teoría y metateoría de la ciencia. Vol. I & II. Caracas: Universidad Central de Venezuela.

  • García Bacca, J. D. (1978). Juan David García Bacca, profeta. Soler Serrano entrevista al filósofo, ensayista y traductor español nacionalizado venezolano. Resource document. Guglielmo Bin. https://youtu.be/oPaTu8ym8Ww. Accessed 29 January 2021.

  • García Bacca, J. D. (1963a). Historia filosófica de la ciencia. Universidad Nacional Autónoma de México.

    Google Scholar 

  • García Bacca, J. D. (1963b). 7 Modelos de filosofar. Universidad Central de Venezuela.

    Google Scholar 

  • García Bacca, J. D. (1967). Elementos de filosofía de las ciencias. Universidad Central de Venezuela.

    Google Scholar 

  • García Bacca, J. D. (1987). Elogio de la técnica. Anthropos.

    Google Scholar 

  • García Bacca, J. D. (1991). Sobre el Quijote y Don Quijote de la Mancha: Ejercicios literario-filosóficos. Anthropos.

    Google Scholar 

  • García Bacca, J. D. (2001). Sobre realismo: Tres ejercicios literario-filsóficos (natural, crítico, integral). Anthropos.

    Google Scholar 

  • Gómez Marañón, A. (2020). El concepto de Umwelt de Jakob Von Uexküll: Hacia una ontología del mundo animal. Revista Internacional De Filosofía Hodós, 9(11), 58–73.

    Google Scholar 

  • Gould, S. J. (1991). Exaptation: A crucial tool for an evolutionary psychology. Journal of Social Issues, 47(3), 43–65.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Husserl, E. (2012). Ideas pertaining to a pure phenomenology and to a phenomenological philosophy: First book: General introduction to a pure phenomenology (Vol. 2). Springer Science & Business Media.

  • Kawai, M. (1965). Newly acquired pre-cultural behavior of the natural troop of Japanese monkeys on Koshima Islet. Primates, 6, 1–30.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Lehner, P. N. (1996). Handbook of ethological methods. Cambridge: Cambridge University press.

  • Lorenz, K. (1950). The comparative method in studying innate behavior patterns. In Society for Experimental Biology, Physiological mechanisms in animal behavior. Symposia of the Society of Experimental Biology IV. (pp. 221–268) USA: Academic Press.

  • Lorenz, K. (2002). On aggression. Psychology Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Lorenz, K. (2009). Kant’s doctrine of the a priori in the light of contemporary biology. In M. Ruse (Ed.), Philosophy after Darwin: Classic and contemporary readings (pp. 231–247). Princeton University Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Matsuzawa, T. (2015). Sweet-potato washing revisited: 50th anniversary of the Primates article.

  • Menninghaus, W. (2011). Wozu Kunst?: Ästhetik nach Darwin (pp. 76–126). Suhrkamp Verlag.

    Google Scholar 

  • Nesse, R. M. (2013). Tinbergen’s four questions, organized: a response to Bateson and Laland. Trends in Ecology & Evolution, 28(12), 681–682. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.tree.2013.10.008.

  • Otálora-Luna, F., Páez-Rondón, O., Aldana, E., & Ramírez, C. M. S. (2021) Orientation of Belminus triatomines to cockroaches and cockroaches’ fecal volatiles: an ethological approach. acta ethologica, 1–14.

  • Otálora-Luna, F. (2017). Intuición Trans-Demoníaca. Cuadernos De Filosofía Latinoamericana, 38(117), 135–143.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Otálora-Luna, F., & Aldana, E. (2017). The beauty of sensory ecology. History and Philosophy of the Life Sciences, 39(3), 1–7.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Otálora-Luna, F., Aldana, E., & Viloria, Á. (2017). Crítica a la teoría de la evolución pura: Hacia la belleza estructural. Ludus Vitalis, 25(47), 167–185.

    Google Scholar 

  • Páez-Rondón, O., Aldana, E., Dickens, J., & Otálora-Luna, F. (2018). Ethological description of a fixed action pattern in a kissing bug (Triatominae): Vision, gustation, proboscis extension and drinking of water and guava. Journal of Ethology, 36(2), 107–116.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Pattee, H. H. (2015). Cell phenomenology: The first phenomenon. Progress in Biophysics and Molecular Biology, 119(3), 461–468.

    Article  CAS  Google Scholar 

  • Portmann, A. (1956). Biologie und Geist. Basel: Herder.

  • Rosen, R. (1991). Life itself: A comprehensive inquiry into the nature, origin, and fabrication of life. Columbia University Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Rosenblat, A. (2017). Buenas y malas palabras: una selección. Caracas: Editorial El Perro y La Rana.

  • Schrödinger, E. (2018). What is life? Cambridge University Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Schutz, A. (1976). Don Quixote and the problem of reality. In Brodersen A. (Ed.), Collected papers II. Phaenomenologica (Collection fondée par H. L. Van Breda et publiée sous le patronage des Centres D’Archives-Husserl), vol 15. (pp. 135–158). Dordrecht: Springer

  • ten Cate, C., & Okanoya, K. (2012). Revisiting the syntactic abilities of non-human animals: Natural vocalizations and artificial grammar learning. Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society b: Biological Sciences, 367(1598), 1984–1994.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Whitehead, A.N. (1929). Process and Reality. An essay in cosmology. Gifford Lectures Delivered in the University of Edinburgh During the Session 1927–1928, Macmillan, New York, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge UK.

  • Whitehead, A. N. (1920). The concept of nature. Cambridge University Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Whitehead, A. N. (1925). Science and the modern world. Macmillan Company.

    Google Scholar 

  • Whitehead, A. N. (1947). Essays in science and philosophy. Philosophical Library.

    Google Scholar 

  • Wittgenstein, L. (2001) Tractatus logico-philosophicus. London & New York: Routledge - Taylor & Francis Group

  • Wittgenstein, L. (1958). Philosophical investigations. Blackwell.

    Google Scholar 

Download references

Acknowledgements

We acknowledge students’ rich discussions during the Sensory Ecology course lectured at University of Richmond, Virginia, US, on 2020. The photo is public domain as it is more than fifty years old and was originally published without complying with copyright formalities.

Author information

Authors and Affiliations

  1. Departament of Biology, School of Art & Sciences, University of Richmond, Richmond, VA, USA

    Fernando Otálora-Luna, Tiara Fulmore & Jory Brinkerhoff

  2. Laboratorio de Entomología “Herman Lent”, Departamento de Biología, Facultad de Ciencias, Universidad de Los Andes, Merida, Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela

    Fernando Otálora-Luna, Oscar Páez-Rondón & Elis Aldana

  3. Laboratorio de Ecología Sensorial, Centro Multidisciplinario de Ciencias, Instituto Venezolano de Investigaciones Científicas, Merida, Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela

    Oscar Páez-Rondón

Authors
  1. Fernando Otálora-Luna
    View author publications

    You can also search for this author in PubMed Google Scholar

  2. Tiara Fulmore
    View author publications

    You can also search for this author in PubMed Google Scholar

  3. Oscar Páez-Rondón
    View author publications

    You can also search for this author in PubMed Google Scholar

  4. Elis Aldana
    View author publications

    You can also search for this author in PubMed Google Scholar

  5. Jory Brinkerhoff
    View author publications

    You can also search for this author in PubMed Google Scholar

Corresponding author

Correspondence to Fernando Otálora-Luna.

Additional information

Publisher's Note

Springer Nature remains neutral with regard to jurisdictional claims in published maps and institutional affiliations.

Rights and permissions

Reprints and permissions

About this article

Check for updates. Verify currency and authenticity via CrossMark

Cite this article

Otálora-Luna, F., Fulmore, T., Páez-Rondón, O. et al. Good (and Bad) Words for the Ontological (and Anthropomorphic) Description of Behavior. Biosemiotics 14, 807–828 (2021). https://doi.org/10.1007/s12304-021-09449-5

Download citation

  • Received:

  • Accepted:

  • Published:

  • Issue Date:

  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s12304-021-09449-5

Keywords

Search

Navigation