Abstract
Life has semiotic nature; and as life forms differ in their complexity, functionality, and adaptability, we assume that forms of semiosis also vary accordingly. Here we propose a criterion to distinguish between the primitive kind of semiosis, which we call “protosemiosis” (following Prodi) from the advanced kind of semiosis, or “eusemiosis”. In protosemiosis, agents associate signs directly with actions without considering objects, whereas in eusemiosis, agents associate signs with objects and only then possibly with actions. Protosemiosis started from the origin of life, and eusemiosis started when evolving agents acquired the ability to track and classify objects. Eusemiosis is qualitatively different from protosemiosis because it can not be reduced to a small number of specific signaling pathways. Proto-signs can be classified into proto-icons that signal via single specific interaction, proto-indexes that combine several functions, and proto-symbols that are processed by a universal subagent equipped with a set of heritable adapters. Prefix “proto” is used here to characterize signs at the protosemiotic level. Although objects are not recognized by protosemiotic agents, they can be reliably reconstructed by human observers. In summary, protosemiosis is a primitive kind of semiosis that supports “know-how” without “know-what”. Without studying protosemiosis, the biosemiotics theory would be incomplete.
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Notes
For citations of Peirce we use abbreviations: CP = Collected papers, EP = Essential Peirce, and W = Writings.
Note that Peirce’s notion of object is not related to agents who interact with them. He used only the meta-agent perspective assuming that objects are the same for every agent.
Detailed analysis of the term “agent” can be found in (Sharov 2010).
Known epigenetic mechanisms can support adaptive learning within individual cells as follows from a hypothetical model (Sharov 2013).
The notion of fitness in neo-Darwinism (i.e., the relative rate of self-reproduction) provides a quantitative measure of natural self-interest but it does not capture its functional aspects. For example, mules cannot reproduce and their fitness is zero, but yet they are alive and capable of goal-directed actions at both molecular and behavioral levels. In fact, mules have inherited their goals and capacity for interpreting signs from their self-reproducing parents. But self-reproduction is necessary for the continuation of life lineages and for adaptive evolution.
By categorization we mean recognition and differentiation of objects by agents based on a large set of perceived properties, which cannot be reduced to a small number of logical gates (e.g., “AND”, “OR”) and contributes to the functional goal-directed activity of the agent (Sharov 2013).
It should not to be confused with the linguistic notion of proto-language (which is better called “ancestral language”).
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Acknowledgments
This research was supported by the Intramural Research Program of the NIH, National Institute on Aging, and by the School of Social Sciences and Humanities, University of Tampere. The content of this paper is not endorsed or suggested by the funding agencies.
We thank anonymous reviewers for valuable input about this paper.
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Sharov, A.A., Vehkavaara, T. Protosemiosis: Agency with Reduced Representation Capacity. Biosemiotics 8, 103–123 (2015). https://doi.org/10.1007/s12304-014-9219-7
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s12304-014-9219-7