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The pitfalls of parliamentarisation: why the procedure of appointing the European Commission should be changed

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European View

Abstract

After the European elections of 2014, the European Parliament managed to seize the power to select the Commission president from the EU heads of state and government. This democratic advance, however, is yet to find its counterpart in the subsequent process of selecting the other commissioners. For one thing, the entitlement to equal representation of all 28 member states hinders any reduction of the Commission to a more workable size. For another, because the right to nominate commissioners rests solely with the national governments, the composition of the Commission primarily reflects the partisan majorities of the Council rather than those of the Parliament, leading to a limited reflection of the president’s mandate in the composition of the Commission. The following article examines how these problems could be resolved. It proposes a moderate amendment to the parity principle to reduce the Commission’s size, a larger pool of candidates from which to select commissioners and the election of candidates by European citizens. The last proposal could even be implemented without any change to the treaties.

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Notes

  1. Certainly the powers to confirm the Commission as a whole and condone hearings with nominees enable the European Parliament to put pressure on the Commission and the member states in the course of the nomination process and, in the past, the Parliament has even managed to elicit the retraction of a couple of nominees. However, these instances are rare and the Parliament’s role in the nomination process remains by and large confirmatory.

  2. Cf. Parkinson (1957). For empirical evidence, see Klimek et al. (2008).

  3. Andrus Ansip (Estonia), Miguel Arias Cañete (Spain), Corina Creţu (Romania), Valdis Dombrovskis (Latvia), Christos Stylianides (Cyprus) and Marianne Thyssen (Belgium).

References

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Correspondence to Frank Decker.

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Decker, F. The pitfalls of parliamentarisation: why the procedure of appointing the European Commission should be changed. European View 13, 319–326 (2014). https://doi.org/10.1007/s12290-014-0321-7

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