The right to use one’s own language and the matter of simplicity

Abstract

The paper advances the thesis that at present both international language law and national language law of most states in relation to the right to use one’s own language are confusing, incoherent and more complicated than ought to be. First the author points out that international language law, which is embedded into international human rights law, recognises the right to use one’s own language not as a universal right, a right for all but as a minority right, a right for some and that this way of recognition of this right is in sharp contradiction with underlying principles of human rights law such as the universal nature of human rights, the principle of equal rights and the principle of non-discrimination. Then the author analyses national language law and concludes that almost all states recognise the right to use one’s own language as a minority right and recognise it, though in most cases only implicitly, as a majority right, too. In other words, under national law practically all human beings do enjoy this right in one way or another. After all, international legislators also ought to recognise this right not only as the right of persons belonging to linguistic minorities, but as a simple universal human right, as everyone’s right to use his own language.