Abstract
The last electoral process to appoint academic authorities for the 2010-2014 period at the University of Cartagena, Colombia, is analyzed because of its nature as both a public and nonprofit organization. Data from the official voting records reported by the institution is used to address the research objectives. The paper establishes a Marketing Map approach to show how much the votes of each one (obtained, from a candidate’s perspective; given, from an electorate’s perspective) counts when a standardized comparative base is adopted given a particular institutional arrangement. Therefore, the approach appeals the interest of the actual winners (and likely future candidates to another chair, or the same as reelected), future new candidates, university’s stakeholders, and scholars interested in democratic processes. The paper contributes with designing an institutional electoral benchmarking tool, technically simple to elaborate, and easy to read and to understand in practice. Also, the created tool provides useful insights to organizations or institutions with similar features. As underlying contribution, the paper honors the public nature of information in public organizations when available for rigorous analyses taking an outside point of view and contributes in its own way to increasing the available literature about democratic processes. Conclusions, future research avenues and practical implications both in political and marketing terms are elicited from prior parts of the paper.
Notes
The effective vote concept refers to the statistical equivalent that one vote has in order to its professor or student nature, according the s&p ratio in each Faculty or Academic Program. On this concept rests another: eligibility. The latter refers to the percentage of effective voting necessary to be considered as feasible Dean or Academic Program Director. Technically speaking, the eligibility percentage is an individual threshold. It corresponds to a 30% of the total effective voting (Universidad de Cartagena 1996, 2011).
It happens because the institution calculates the effective vote from a student perspective allocating the s&p ratio as denominator in a quotient where each student is the numerator. But, at the end, the total calculations remain correspondence with those adopted by the author.
One-program Faculties refer to Faculties whose Academic Program is the same as Faculty name. Thus, the academic authority is in practical terms, an Academic Program Director with the hierarchy of a Dean. However, the Faculty of Pharmaceutical Sciences is the exception; due that it has two hierarchies, both appointed by way of electoral processes: a Dean and an Academic Program Director.
Multi-unit Faculties are those Faculties with more than one Academic Program, that is, whose academic authorities are a Dean and at least two Academic Program Directors.
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Acknowledgements
The author greatfully acknowledges to Camille Villafañe-Rodríguez and María Rivera-Laborde, from the University of Puerto Rico-Rio Piedras Campus, for the support received in terms of style evaluation. Also to Emilio Pantojas-García for encouraging this initiative from Cambridge as a Wilbur Marvin Visiting Scholar at the David Rockefeller Center for Latin American Studies at Harvard University during the September-December 2010 period. Finally, I’m thankful with the two blinded reviewers for their valuable comments and suggestions aimed to improve the quality of the paper.
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Consuegra De la Ossa, H.J. How much my vote counts? Exploring a marketing map approach in a case of public university elections. Int Rev Public Nonprofit Mark 8, 73–88 (2011). https://doi.org/10.1007/s12208-011-0065-x
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s12208-011-0065-x