Skip to main content
Log in

Political culture and corporate cash holdings

  • Published:
Journal of Economics and Finance Aims and scope Submit manuscript

Abstract

Do political beliefs matter for corporate cash-holding behavior? In this paper, we analyze whether the political preferences of managers affect their cash holdings. Using a composite political index to measure corporate political culture, we find that firms with Republican-leaning managers hold significantly less cash than firms managed by Democrats. We attribute the lower-level cash holdings of Republican firms to more conservative corporate policies, indicated by lower risk exposure, lower R&D expenditure, lower capital investment, and higher profitability. Our results survive various robustness tests, such as state-fixed effects and IV tests.

This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution to check access.

Access this article

Price excludes VAT (USA)
Tax calculation will be finalised during checkout.

Instant access to the full article PDF.

Similar content being viewed by others

Data availability statement

The data that support the findings of this study are available from COMPUSTAT and Thompson Reuters, but restrictions apply to the availability of these data, which were used under license for the current study, and so are not publicly available. The PCI data is publicly available as a supplemental material to Hutton et al. (2015).

Notes

  1. According to the 2021 Gallup poll, 74% of Republicans self-identify as conservative, 22% as moderate, and just 4% as liberal. In contrast, 12% of Democrats self-identify as conservative, 37% as moderate, and 50% as liberal.

  2. https://news.gallup.com/poll/21496/gun-ownership-higher-among-republicans-than-democrats.aspx

References 

  • Abernethy MA, Li W, Zhang Y, Shi H (2022) Firm culture and internal control system. Account Finance 00:1–27

  • Abramowitz AI, Saunders KL (2006) Exploring the bases of partisanship in the American electorate: Social identity vs. ideology. Polit Res Q 59(2):175–187

  • Acharya VV, Almeida H, Campello M (2007) Is cash negative debt? A hedging perspective on corporate financial policies. J Financ Int 16(4):515–554

    Google Scholar 

  • Acharya V, Davydenko SA, Strebulaev IA (2012) Cash holdings and credit risk. Rev Finan Stud 25(12):3572–3609

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Adhikari BK, Agrawal A (2016) Does local religiosity matter for bank risk-taking? J Corp Finan 38(2016):272–293

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Bates TW, Kahle KM, Stulz RM (2009) Why do U.S. firms hold so much more cash than they used to? J Finan 64:1985–2021

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Bayat Ali, Goergen Marc, CEO Political Ideology, Shareholder Primacy and Payout Policy (2020) European Corporate Governance Institute – Finance Working Paper No. 650/2020, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3522270. https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3522270

  • Berry-Stölzle TR, Irlbeck S (2021) Religiosity and risk-taking: Is there a demand-side effect? J Corp Finan 71:102–117

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Bhandari A, Golden J (2021) CEO political preference and credit ratings. J Corp Finan 68:101909

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Bhandari A, Golden J, Thevenot M (2020) CEO political ideologies and auditor-client contracting. J Account Public Policy 39(5):106755

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Bhojraj S, Sengupta P (2003) Effect of corporate governance on bond ratings and yields: The role of institutional investors and outside directors. J Bus 76(3):455–475

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Boubakri N, Chkir I, Saadi S, Zhu H (2021) Does national culture affect corporate innovation? International evidence. J Corp Finan 66:101847

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Chen X, Harford J, Li K (2007) Monitoring: Which institutions matter? J Financ Econ 86(2):279–305

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Chen Y, Dou PY, Rhee SG, Truong C, Veeraraghavan M (2015) National culture and corporate cash holdings around the world. J Bank Finance 50:1–18

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Christensen DM, Dhaliwal DS, Boivie S, Graffin SD (2015) Top management conservatism and corporate risk strategies: Evidence from managers’ personal political orientation and corporate tax avoidance. Strateg Manag J 36(12):1918–1938

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Cooper MJ, Gulen H, Ovtchinnikov AV (2010) Corporate political contributions and stock returns. J Financ 65(2):687–724

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Cronqvist H, AK Makhija, SE Yonker (2012) Behavioral consistency in corporate finance: CEO personal and corporate leverage. J Finan Econ 103(1):20–40

  • DeAngelo H, DeAngelo L, Stulz RM (2006) Dividend policy and the earned/contributed capital mix: A test of the lifecycle theory. J Financ Econ 81:227–254

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Denis DJ, Sibilkov V (2009) Financial constraints, investment, and the value of cash holdings. Rev Finan Stud 23(1):247–269

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Denis DJ, Osobov I (2008) Why do firms pay dividends? International evidence on the determinants of dividend policy. J Financ Econ 89(1):62–82

  • Di Giuli A, Kostovetsky L (2014) Are red or blue companies more likely to go green? Politics and corporate social responsibility. J Financ Econ 111(1):158–180

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Dittmar A, Mahrt-Smith J (2007) Corporate governance and the value of cash holdings. J Financ Econ 83(3):599–634

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Dixit J (2007). The ideological animal. Psych. Today (January 1), https://www.psychologytoday.com/articles/200612/the-ideological -animal.

  • Elnahas AM, Kim D (2017) CEO political ideology and mergers and acquisitions decisions. J Corp Finan 45:162–175

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Francis BB, Hasan I, Sun X, Wu Q (2016) CEO political preference and corporate tax sheltering. J Corp Finan 38:37–53

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Gompers PA, Ishii JL, Metrick A (2003) Corporate governance and equity prices. Quart J Econ 118(1):107–155

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Graham J, Haidt J, Nosek BA (2009) Liberals and conservatives rely on different sets of moral foundations. J Pers Soc Psychol 96(5):1029

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Guiso L, Sapienza P, Zingales L (2015) The value of corporate culture. J Financ Econ 117(1):60–76

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Han S, Qiu J (2007) Corporate precautionary cash holdings. J Corp Finan 13(1):43–57

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Hardford J (1999) Corporate cash reserves and acquisitions. J Financ 54(6):1969–1997

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Hardford J, Mansi S, Maxwell W (2008) Corporate governance and firm cash holdings. J Financ Econ 87:535–555

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Hartzell JC, Starks LT (2003) Institutional investors and executive compensation. J Financ 58(6):2351–2374

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Haushalter D, Klasa S, Maxwell WF (2007) The influence of product market dynamics on a firm’s cash holdings and hedging behavior. J Financ Econ 84(3):797–825

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Hu H, Lian Y, Zhou W (2019) Do local protestant values affect corporate cash holdings? J Bus Ethics 154:147–166

  • Hutton I, Jiang D, Kumar A (2014) Corporate policies of Republican managers. J Finan Quant Anal 49(5–6):1279–1310

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Hutton I, Jiang D, Kumar A (2015) Political Values, Culture, and Corporate Litigation. Manage Sci 61(12):2905–2925

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Jensen MC (1986) Agency costs of free cash flow, corporate finance, and takeovers. Am Econ Rev 76(2):323–329

    Google Scholar 

  • Jost JT (2006) The end of the end of ideology. Am Psychol 61:651–670

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Jost JT, Glaser J, Kruglanski AW, Sulloway FJ (2003) Political conservatism as motivated social cognition. Psychol Bull 129(3):339

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Jost JT, Napier JL, Thorisdottir H, Gosling SD, Palfai TP, Ostafin B (2007) Are needs to manage uncertainty and threat associated with political conservatism or ideological extremity? Pers Soc Psychol Bull 33:989–1007

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Kam C, Simas EN (2010) Risk orientation and policy frames. J Polit 72(2):381–396

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Keynes JM (1936) The general theory of employment, interest, and money. Harcourt Brace, London

    Google Scholar 

  • Li K, Griffin D, Yue H, Zhao L (2013) How does culture influence corporate risk-taking? J Corp Finan 23:1–22

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Liu Y, Mauer DC (2011) Corporate cash holdings and CEO compensation incentives. J Financ Econ 102(1):183–198

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • McConnell JJ, Servaes H (1990) Additional evidence on equity ownership and corporate value. J Financ Econ 27(2):595–612

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • O’Reilly CA, Chatman JA (1996) Culture as social control: Corporations, cults, and commitment. In: BM Staw, Cummings LL (eds) Research in organizational behavior: An annual series of analytical essays and critical reviews, vol 18. Elsevier Science/JAI Press, pp 157–200

  • Opler T, Pinkowitz L, Stulz RM, Williamson R (1999) The determinants and implications of corporate cash holdings. J Financ Econ 52:3–46

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Ovtchinnikov AV, Pantaleoni E (2012) Individual political contributions and firm performance. J Financ Econ 105(2):367–392

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Palazzo B (2012) Cash holdings, risk, and expected returns. J Financ Econ 104(1):162–185

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Shleifer A, Vishny RW (1986) Large shareholders and corporate control. J Polit Econ 94(3 Part 1):461–488

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Unsal O, Hassan MK, Zirek D (2016) Corporate lobbying, CEO political ideology and firm performance. J Corp Finan 38:126–149

    Article  Google Scholar 

Download references

Author information

Authors and Affiliations

Authors

Corresponding author

Correspondence to Katarzyna Platt.

Ethics declarations

Ethics statement

The authors declare that have no financial or non-financial interests that are directly or indirectly related to the work submitted for publication.

Additional information

Publisher's note

Springer Nature remains neutral with regard to jurisdictional claims in published maps and institutional affiliations.

Electronic supplementary material

Below is the link to the electronic supplementary material.

Supplementary file1 (DOCX 29 KB)

Appendix

Appendix

Table 10

Table 10 Variable definitions

Rights and permissions

Springer Nature or its licensor (e.g. a society or other partner) holds exclusive rights to this article under a publishing agreement with the author(s) or other rightsholder(s); author self-archiving of the accepted manuscript version of this article is solely governed by the terms of such publishing agreement and applicable law.

Reprints and permissions

About this article

Check for updates. Verify currency and authenticity via CrossMark

Cite this article

Banks, CH., Hu, H. & Platt, K. Political culture and corporate cash holdings. J Econ Finan 47, 541–563 (2023). https://doi.org/10.1007/s12197-023-09636-9

Download citation

  • Accepted:

  • Published:

  • Issue Date:

  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s12197-023-09636-9

Keywords

JEL Classification

Navigation