Abstract
The research suggests that there is a penalty for invoking one’s sixth amendment right in a trial. This study uses Tobit models to empirically document the existence of a trial penalty, and we provide estimates of the magnitude of its effect. In a comparative analysis of three alternative trial settings, we find that courts treat defendants differently under alternative sets of rules. Thus, we provide some evidence that defendants might face discrimination in court. We find that the lengths of the sentences of those found guilty in jury trials are 11 years longer than those found guilty in bench trials or those taking plea bargains. Further, we find that women are more likely to be found guilty in bench trials than in jury trials and that prior convictions are directly related to jury convictions and unrelated to bench trials. In addition, gang affiliation is less likely to matter for bench trials.
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Notes
The due process clause of the 14th amendment prohibits the state from penalizing an individual for the exercise of a constitutional right, where “penalty”‘ has been interpreted to include the withholding of a reward.
See the appendix for a chart
Some individuals plead guilty by insanity, but there are too few cases to analyze.
The choice of the fixed and random effects design depends on whether one believes the idiosyncratic errors are correlated with the regressors. Statistically, this correlation is calculated with the Hausman test. In our study, this test means that fixed effects models will only compare outcomes within each large city to one another. The random effects model allows a researcher to compare outcomes both within each city and between each city.
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Acknowledgments
We want to thank the editor (Dr. James Payne), Bruce Benson, and two anonymous reviewers for their helpful feedback. Any remaining errors are our own.
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Boudreaux, C.J. An economic analysis of the trial penalty: a comparative analysis of three alternative trial settings. J Econ Finan 41, 553–568 (2017). https://doi.org/10.1007/s12197-016-9368-4
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s12197-016-9368-4