Abstract
The elliptic curve cryptography plays a central role in various cryptographic schemes and protocols. For efficiency reasons, Edwards curves and twisted Edwards curves have been introduced. In this paper, we study the properties of twisted Edwards curves on the ring \({\mathbb {Z}}/n{\mathbb {Z}}\) where \(n=p^rq^s\) is a prime power RSA modulus and propose a new scheme and study its efficiency and security.
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Appendices
A: Proof of Theorem 1
Let \(p>2\) be a prime number. Suppose that d is a non-square in \({\mathbb {Z}}/p{\mathbb {Z}}\) and a a square with \(a\equiv b^2\pmod p\). Let \((x_{1},y_{1})\), \((x_{2},y_{2})\) be two points on the curve \(E_{a,d,p}\). Suppose that \(dx_{1}y_{1}x_{2}y_{2}\equiv \delta \equiv \pm 1\pmod p\). Then \(x_{1}y_{1}x_{2}y_{2}\ne 0\pmod p\) and
Hence, since \(\delta ^2\equiv 1\pmod p\) and \(ax_{1}^{2}+y_{1}^{2}\equiv dx_{1}^{2}y_{1}^{2}\left( ax_{2}^{2}+y_{2}^{2}\right) \pmod p\), we get
If \(bx_{2}+y_{2}\not \equiv 0\pmod p\), then, since \(x_{1}y_{1}\ne 0\pmod p\), we have \(\gcd (x_{1}y_{1}(bx_{2}+y_{2}),p)=1\), and
is a square which is a contradiction. Similarly, we have
If \(bx_{2}-y_{2}\not \equiv 0\pmod p\), then \(\gcd (x_{1}y_{1}(bx_{2}-y_{2}),p)=1\), and
is a square which is a contradiction. It follows that \(bx_{2}+y_{2}\equiv 0\pmod p\) and \(bx_{2}-y_{2}\equiv 0\pmod p\), from which we deduce \(x_{2}\equiv 0\pmod p\) and \(y_{2}\equiv 0\pmod p\). This is also a contradiction. As a consequence, we have always \(\delta \not \equiv \pm 1\pmod p\) and the denominators in the addition law never vanish. This terminates the proof.
B: Proof of Lemma 2
Let (x, y) be a point on the curve \(ax^{2}+y^{2}\equiv 1+dx^{2}y^{2}\pmod p\) with \(ad(a-d)\ne 0\). If \(x\ne 0\), then \(y\ne \pm 1\) and
Since \(d\ne a\) and \(y\ne \pm 1\), then multiplying both sides by \(\frac{4(1+y)}{(1-y)^{3}(a-d)}\), we get
Setting \(Y\equiv \frac{2(1+y)}{(1-y)x}\pmod p\) and transforming the right side, we get
Setting \(X\equiv \frac{1+y}{1-y}\pmod p\) and plugging it in the right side of the former equality, we get
Multiplying by \((a-d)^{3}\), we get
Setting \(U\equiv (a-d)X\pmod p\) and \(V\equiv (a-d)Y\pmod p\), this transforms to \(V^{2}=U^{3}+2(a+d)U^{2}+(a-d)^{2}U\pmod p\) which can be rewritten as
that is
Let \(u\equiv U+\frac{2(a+d)}{3}\pmod p\) and \(v\equiv V\pmod p\). Then using u and v, we get
Summarizing the transformations, we get for \(x\ne 0\),
Now, if \(x=0\), then \(y^{2}=1\) and \(y=\pm 1\). If \(y=1\), then the transformations (3) are not valid and the point (0, 1) is transformed to the point at infinity \({\mathcal {O}}\). If \(y=-1\), then \(u\equiv \frac{2}{3}(a+d)\pmod p\). Plugging this in the Eq. (2), we get \(v=0\). Hence, the point \((0,-1)\) on \(E_{a,d,p}\) is transformed to the point \(\left( \frac{2}{3}(a+d),0\right) \) on the Eq. (2). This terminates the proof.
C: Proof of Lemma 3
Since \({\mathcal {O}}\) and (0, 1) are the neutral elements in \(W_{a,d,p}\) and \(E_{a,d,p}\) respectively, then they correspond to each other. For \(u\ne \frac{5d-a}{3}\) and \(v\ne 0\), we can invert (3) to get
Observe that (4) is not defined for \(v=0\) and for \(3u+a-5d\equiv 0\pmod p\).
First, for \(v=0\), suppose that \((u,0)\in W_{a,d,p}\). Then u satisfies the equation
The first root of (5) is \(u=\frac{2}{3}(a+d)\). Plugging this in the second coordinate of (4), we get \(y=-1\). Plugging \(y=-1\) in the equation \(ax^{2}+y^{2}=1+dx^{2}y^{2}\) of \(E_{a,d,p}\), we get \(ax^{2}=dx^{2}\). Since \(a\ne d\), then \(x=0\). Therefore the point \((\frac{2}{3}(a+d),0)\in W_{a,d,p}\) is mapped to \((0,-1)\in E_{a,d,p}\).
In the case ad is a square in \({\mathbb {Z}}/p{\mathbb {Z}}\), then the second and third roots of (5) are \(u=-\frac{1}{3}\left( a+d\pm 6\sqrt{ad}\right) \). Then the second coordinate of (4) is
Plugging \(y=\mp \sqrt{\frac{a}{d}}\) in the equation of \(E_{a,d,p}\), we get \(ax^{2}+\frac{a}{d}=1+ax^{2}\) and \(\frac{a}{d}=1\). Since \(a\ne d\), then this is impossible. Therefore the points \((u,v)=\left( -\frac{1}{3}\left( a+d\pm 6\sqrt{ad}\right) ,0\right) \in W_{a,d,p}\) are not mapped in \(E_{a,d,p}\).
Second, for \(3u+a-5d\equiv 0\pmod 0\) we have \(u\equiv -\frac{1}{3}(a-5d)\pmod p\). Suppose that there exists v such that \((u,v)=\left( -\frac{1}{3}(a-5d),v\right) \in W_{a,d,p}\). Then v satisfies
Hence, if d is a square in \({\mathbb {Z}}/p{\mathbb {Z}}\), then \(v\equiv \pm 2\sqrt{d}(a-d)\pmod p\). Plugging \((u,v)=\left( -\frac{1}{3}(a-5d),\pm 2\sqrt{d}(a-d)\right) \) in the first coordinate of (4), we get \(x=\mp \frac{\sqrt{d}}{d}\). Plugging this in the equation of \(W_{a,d,p}\), we get \(\frac{a}{d}+y^{2}=1+y^{2}\) and \(\frac{a}{d}=1\), which is impossible since \(a\ne d\). Consequently, the points \((u,v)=\left( -\frac{1}{3}(a-5d),\pm 2\sqrt{d}(a-d)\right) \in W_{a,d,p}\) are not mapped on the twisted Edwards curve \(E_{a,d,p}\).
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Boudabra, M., Nitaj, A. A new public key cryptosystem based on Edwards curves. J. Appl. Math. Comput. 61, 431–450 (2019). https://doi.org/10.1007/s12190-019-01257-y
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s12190-019-01257-y