Neuroethics

, Volume 5, Issue 1, pp 19–22 | Cite as

The Folk Epistemology of Delusions

Original Paper

Abstract

Lisa Bortolotti argues convincingly that opponents of the doxastic view of delusion are committed to unnecessarily stringent standards for belief attribution. Folk psychology recognises many non-rational ways in which beliefs can be caused, and our attributions of delusions may be guided by a sense that delusions are beliefs that we cannot explain in any folk psychological terms.

Keywords

Delusion Folk psychology Belief 

References

  1. 1.
    Currie, G. 2000. Imagination, delusion and hallucinations. In Pathologies of Belief, ed. M. Coltheart and M. Davies, 167–182. Oxford: Blackwell.Google Scholar
  2. 2.
    Nozick, R. 1993. The Nature of Rationality. Princeton: Princeton University Press.Google Scholar

Copyright information

© Springer Science+Business Media B.V. 2011

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.History and Philosophy of ScienceUniversity of SydneySydneyAustralia

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