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The Folk Epistemology of Delusions

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Abstract

Lisa Bortolotti argues convincingly that opponents of the doxastic view of delusion are committed to unnecessarily stringent standards for belief attribution. Folk psychology recognises many non-rational ways in which beliefs can be caused, and our attributions of delusions may be guided by a sense that delusions are beliefs that we cannot explain in any folk psychological terms.

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References

  1. Currie, G. 2000. Imagination, delusion and hallucinations. In Pathologies of Belief, ed. M. Coltheart and M. Davies, 167–182. Oxford: Blackwell.

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  2. Nozick, R. 1993. The Nature of Rationality. Princeton: Princeton University Press.

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Authors and Affiliations

  1. History and Philosophy of Science, University of Sydney, Sydney, Australia

    Dominic Murphy

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  1. Dominic Murphy
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Correspondence to Dominic Murphy.

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Murphy, D. The Folk Epistemology of Delusions. Neuroethics 5, 19–22 (2012). https://doi.org/10.1007/s12152-011-9125-5

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s12152-011-9125-5

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