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Replies to critics

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Abstract

In this article, I respond to critics in the book symposium on Delusions and Beliefs: A Philosophical Inquiry (Routledge 2019).

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I do not analyze or generate any datasets, because my work proceeds within a theoretical and philosophical approach.

Notes

  1. Ohlhorst refers to McKay & Dennett’s (2009) idea of positive illusions as adaptive misbeliefs. See Miyazono and Bortolotti (2021; Chapter 2) for a discussion of this idea.

  2. However, Atkinson says that he is currently working on a theory of this kind for different explanatory purposes, which might give some independent motivations for adopting the minimal-role dry-functionalism.

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Acknowledgements

I acknowledge the support of JSPS KAKENHI (grant number 21H00464).

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Authors and Affiliations

  1. Faculty of Humanities and Human Sciences, Hokkaido University Nishi 7 Chome, Kita 10 Jo, Kita-ku, Sapporo, Hokkaido, 060-0810, Japan

    Kengo Miyazono

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  1. Kengo Miyazono
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Correspondence to Kengo Miyazono.

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Miyazono, K. Replies to critics. AJPH 1, 43 (2022). https://doi.org/10.1007/s44204-022-00048-w

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